From f05e15f4b1d52afd380e2162433b788ec0235b02 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: djm <djm@openbsd.org>
Date: Wed, 23 Feb 2022 11:18:13 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] avoid integer overflow of auth attempts (harmless, caught by
 monitor)

---
 usr.bin/ssh/auth2.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/auth2.c b/usr.bin/ssh/auth2.c
index ba7b3573d75..706934a6a9c 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/auth2.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/auth2.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.163 2021/12/26 23:34:41 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.164 2022/02/23 11:18:13 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -269,6 +269,8 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
 	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
 		*style++ = 0;
 
+	if (authctxt->attempt >= 1024)
+		auth_maxtries_exceeded(ssh);
 	if (authctxt->attempt++ == 0) {
 		/* setup auth context */
 		authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(ssh, user));
@@ -276,6 +278,7 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
 			authctxt->valid = 1;
 			debug2_f("setting up authctxt for %s", user);
 		} else {
+			authctxt->valid = 0;
 			/* Invalid user, fake password information */
 			authctxt->pw = fakepw();
 		}
-- 
2.20.1