From e73b9b968e5ddf36783610e334a332759ebed584 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: deraadt <deraadt@openbsd.org>
Date: Thu, 21 Jul 2016 07:22:38 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] 2004 privsep caused "tcpdump -r" to became a priviledged
 operation because we felt chroot-containment was also necessary for off-line
 analysis.  Today use of pledge "stdio" for the packet parser acts as an even
 better sandbox. We can therefore silently ignore chroot setup failure, and
 regain tcpdump -r support.

Result of a discussion with tedu -- which probably happened because we
became aware of the laughable retarded -Z option in upstream tcpdump.
ok tedu sthen guenther stsp
---
 usr.sbin/tcpdump/privsep.c | 52 +++++++++++++++-----------------------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)

diff --git a/usr.sbin/tcpdump/privsep.c b/usr.sbin/tcpdump/privsep.c
index bd23597f338..8bc37b65795 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/tcpdump/privsep.c
+++ b/usr.sbin/tcpdump/privsep.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: privsep.c,v 1.40 2015/12/05 19:27:17 mmcc Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: privsep.c,v 1.41 2016/07/21 07:22:38 deraadt Exp $	*/
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2003 Can Erkin Acar
@@ -136,16 +136,11 @@ priv_init(int argc, char **argv)
 	int bpfd = -1;
 	int i, socks[2], cmd, nflag = 0;
 	struct passwd *pw;
-	uid_t uid;
-	gid_t gid;
 	char *cmdbuf, *infile = NULL;
 	char *RFileName = NULL;
 	char *WFileName = NULL;
 	sigset_t allsigs, oset;
 
-	if (geteuid() != 0)
-		errx(1, "need root privileges");
-
 	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
 	for (i = 1; i < _NSIG; i++)
 		signal(i, SIG_DFL);
@@ -162,31 +157,33 @@ priv_init(int argc, char **argv)
 		err(1, "fork() failed");
 
 	if (child_pid) {
-		/* Parent, drop privileges to _tcpdump */
+		close(socks[0]);
+		priv_fd = socks[1];
+
+		set_slave_signals();
+		sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL);
+
+		/*
+		 * Parent, attempt to drop privs and chroot.  If any of this
+		 * fails that is OK, safety is still provided by pledge(2).
+		 */
 		pw = getpwnam("_tcpdump");
 		if (pw == NULL)
-			errx(1, "unknown user _tcpdump");
+			return (0);
 
-		/* chroot, drop privs and return */
-		if (chroot(pw->pw_dir) != 0)
-			err(1, "unable to chroot");
-		if (chdir("/") != 0)
-			err(1, "unable to chdir");
+		/* Attempt to chroot */
+		if (chroot(pw->pw_dir) == -1)
+			return (0);
+		if (chdir("/") == -1)
+			return (0);
 
 		/* drop to _tcpdump */
 		if (setgroups(1, &pw->pw_gid) == -1)
-			err(1, "setgroups() failed");
+			return (0);
 		if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) == -1)
-			err(1, "setresgid() failed");
+			return (0);
 		if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) == -1)
-			err(1, "setresuid() failed");
-		endpwent();
-
-		close(socks[0]);
-		priv_fd = socks[1];
-
-		set_slave_signals();
-		sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL);
+			return (0);
 
 		return (0);
 	}
@@ -194,15 +191,6 @@ priv_init(int argc, char **argv)
 	sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL);
 	signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
 
-	/* Child - drop suid privileges */
-	gid = getgid();
-	uid = getuid();
-
-	if (setresgid(gid, gid, gid) == -1)
-		err(1, "setresgid() failed");
-	if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) == -1)
-		err(1, "setresuid() failed");
-
 	/* parse the arguments for required options */
 	opterr = 0;
 	while ((i = getopt(argc, argv,
-- 
2.20.1