From dbcbc0bb1d9d9d361e11d96640c49ce2b90b17bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: dtucker Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2022 03:30:32 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Don't log NULL hostname in restricted agent code, printf("%s", NULL) is not safe on all platforms. with & ok djm --- usr.bin/ssh/ssh-agent.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/ssh-agent.c b/usr.bin/ssh/ssh-agent.c index f402d914095..c459dbec79e 100644 --- a/usr.bin/ssh/ssh-agent.c +++ b/usr.bin/ssh/ssh-agent.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.285 2022/01/01 04:18:06 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.286 2022/01/12 03:30:32 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -250,6 +250,7 @@ match_key_hop(const char *tag, const struct sshkey *key, const struct dest_constraint_hop *dch) { const char *reason = NULL; + const char *hostname = dch->hostname ? dch->hostname : "(ORIGIN)"; u_int i; char *fp; @@ -260,7 +261,7 @@ match_key_hop(const char *tag, const struct sshkey *key, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal_f("fingerprint failed"); debug3_f("%s: entering hostname %s, requested key %s %s, %u keys avail", - tag, dch->hostname, sshkey_type(key), fp, dch->nkeys); + tag, hostname, sshkey_type(key), fp, dch->nkeys); free(fp); for (i = 0; i < dch->nkeys; i++) { if (dch->keys[i] == NULL) @@ -287,10 +288,10 @@ match_key_hop(const char *tag, const struct sshkey *key, return -1; /* shouldn't happen */ if (!sshkey_equal(key->cert->signature_key, dch->keys[i])) continue; - if (sshkey_cert_check_host(key, dch->hostname, 1, + if (sshkey_cert_check_host(key, hostname, 1, SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, &reason) != 0) { debug_f("cert %s / hostname %s rejected: %s", - key->cert->key_id, dch->hostname, reason); + key->cert->key_id, hostname, reason); continue; } return 0; -- 2.20.1