From 8b29f376a7fbaefc3ef66f5f3c5cc5f03031de52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: tb <tb@openbsd.org>
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 2021 02:12:31 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Turn asserts in ASIdentifierChoice_canonize() into error
 checks

The first assert ensure that a stack that was just sorted in a stronger
sense is sorted in a weak sense and the second assert ensures that
the result of the canonization procedure is canonical. All callers check
for error, so these asserts don't do anything useful.

ok jsing
---
 lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_asid.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_asid.c b/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_asid.c
index 808dad7552e..216fd610c2a 100644
--- a/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_asid.c
+++ b/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_asid.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: x509_asid.c,v 1.22 2021/12/24 02:07:37 tb Exp $ */
+/*	$OpenBSD: x509_asid.c,v 1.23 2021/12/24 02:12:31 tb Exp $ */
 /*
  * Contributed to the OpenSSL Project by the American Registry for
  * Internet Numbers ("ARIN").
@@ -649,7 +649,8 @@ ASIdentifierChoice_canonize(ASIdentifierChoice *choice)
 		/*
 		 * Make sure we're properly sorted (paranoia).
 		 */
-		OPENSSL_assert(ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, b_min) <= 0);
+		if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, b_min) > 0)
+			goto done;
 
 		/*
 		 * Punt inverted ranges.
@@ -736,7 +737,8 @@ ASIdentifierChoice_canonize(ASIdentifierChoice *choice)
 	}
 
 	/* Paranoia */
-	OPENSSL_assert(ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(choice));
+	if (!ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(choice))
+		goto done;
 
 	ret = 1;
 
@@ -977,16 +979,22 @@ X509v3_asid_subset(ASIdentifiers *a, ASIdentifiers *b)
  * Core code for RFC 3779 3.3 path validation.
  */
 static int
-asid_validate_path_internal(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509)*chain,
+asid_validate_path_internal(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
     ASIdentifiers *ext)
 {
 	ASIdOrRanges *child_as = NULL, *child_rdi = NULL;
 	int i, ret = 1, inherit_as = 0, inherit_rdi = 0;
 	X509 *x;
 
-	OPENSSL_assert(chain != NULL && sk_X509_num(chain) > 0);
-	OPENSSL_assert(ctx != NULL || ext != NULL);
-	OPENSSL_assert(ctx == NULL || ctx->verify_cb != NULL);
+	/* We need a non-empty chain to test against. */
+	if (sk_X509_num(chain) <= 0)
+		goto err;
+	/* We need either a store ctx or an extension to work with. */
+	if (ctx == NULL && ext == NULL)
+		goto err;
+	/* If there is a store ctx, it needs a verify_cb. */
+	if (ctx != NULL && ctx->verify_cb == NULL)
+		goto err;
 
 	/*
 	 * Figure out where to start.  If we don't have an extension to
@@ -1031,7 +1039,6 @@ asid_validate_path_internal(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509)*chain,
 	 */
 	for (i++; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
 		x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
-		OPENSSL_assert(x != NULL);
 
 		if (x->rfc3779_asid == NULL) {
 			if (child_as != NULL || child_rdi != NULL)
@@ -1078,7 +1085,9 @@ asid_validate_path_internal(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509)*chain,
 	/*
 	 * Trust anchor can't inherit.
 	 */
-	OPENSSL_assert(x != NULL);
+
+	if (x == NULL)
+		goto err;
 
 	if (x->rfc3779_asid != NULL) {
 		if (x->rfc3779_asid->asnum != NULL &&
@@ -1091,6 +1100,12 @@ asid_validate_path_internal(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509)*chain,
 
  done:
 	return ret;
+
+ err:
+	if (ctx != NULL)
+		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 #undef validation_err
@@ -1101,9 +1116,7 @@ asid_validate_path_internal(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509)*chain,
 int
 X509v3_asid_validate_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 {
-	if (ctx->chain == NULL ||
-	    sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 0 ||
-	    ctx->verify_cb == NULL) {
+	if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) <= 0 || ctx->verify_cb == NULL) {
 		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
 		return 0;
 	}
-- 
2.20.1