From 0a3ea9a34cee028313ca98d63edd32b02167f62d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: jsg Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2023 00:06:25 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] spelling; ok markus@ --- usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL | 6 +++--- usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL.agent | 4 ++-- usr.bin/ssh/ssh-keyscan.c | 6 +++--- usr.bin/ssh/sshkey.c | 4 ++-- usr.bin/ssh/xmss_hash.c | 4 ++-- 5 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL b/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL index a4f37c7c505..faac0ca77dc 100644 --- a/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL +++ b/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL @@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ approaches. OpenSSH supports a number of transport-layer hardening measures under a "strict KEX" feature. This feature is signalled similarly to the RFC8308 ext-info feature: by including a additional algorithm in the -initiial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT kex_algorithms field. The client may append +initial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT kex_algorithms field. The client may append "kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com" to its kex_algorithms and the server may append "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com". These pseudo-algorithms are only valid in the initial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT and MUST be ignored @@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ if they are present in subsequent SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT packets. When an endpoint that supports this extension observes this algorithm name in a peer's KEXINIT packet, it MUST make the following changes to -the the protocol: +the protocol: a) During initial KEX, terminate the connection if any unexpected or out-of-sequence packet is received. This includes terminating the @@ -790,4 +790,4 @@ master instance and later clients. OpenSSH extends the usual agent protocol. These changes are documented in the PROTOCOL.agent file. -$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.52 2023/12/19 06:41:14 djm Exp $ +$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.53 2023/12/20 00:06:25 jsg Exp $ diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL.agent b/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL.agent index e4a6b74c50b..7637882f12b 100644 --- a/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL.agent +++ b/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL.agent @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ with private keys as they are loaded from a PKCS#11 token. bool certs_only string certsblob -Where "certsblob" constists of one or more certificates encoded as public +Where "certsblob" consists of one or more certificates encoded as public key blobs: string[] certificates @@ -112,4 +112,4 @@ A SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED will return SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if any key (plain private or certificate) was successfully loaded, or SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if no key was loaded. -$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.agent,v 1.21 2023/12/18 14:46:56 djm Exp $ +$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.agent,v 1.22 2023/12/20 00:06:25 jsg Exp $ diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/ssh-keyscan.c b/usr.bin/ssh/ssh-keyscan.c index 6a43d75fe34..b9586e8e4d2 100644 --- a/usr.bin/ssh/ssh-keyscan.c +++ b/usr.bin/ssh/ssh-keyscan.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.153 2023/06/21 05:06:04 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.154 2023/12/20 00:06:25 jsg Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres . * @@ -478,11 +478,11 @@ congreet(int s) /* * Read the server banner as per RFC4253 section 4.2. The "SSH-" - * protocol identification string may be preceeded by an arbitrarily + * protocol identification string may be preceded by an arbitrarily * large banner which we must read and ignore. Loop while reading * newline-terminated lines until we have one starting with "SSH-". * The ID string cannot be longer than 255 characters although the - * preceeding banner lines may (in which case they'll be discarded + * preceding banner lines may (in which case they'll be discarded * in multiple iterations of the outer loop). */ for (;;) { diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/sshkey.c b/usr.bin/ssh/sshkey.c index 24be04e1102..22e6ad1e032 100644 --- a/usr.bin/ssh/sshkey.c +++ b/usr.bin/ssh/sshkey.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.140 2023/10/16 08:40:00 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.141 2023/12/20 00:06:25 jsg Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2008 Alexander von Gernler. All rights reserved. @@ -1894,7 +1894,7 @@ sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp, goto out; } if (sshkey_type_is_cert(type)) { - /* Skip nonce that preceeds all certificates */ + /* Skip nonce that precedes all certificates */ if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/xmss_hash.c b/usr.bin/ssh/xmss_hash.c index 6712cfbe52e..9eb112c5f97 100644 --- a/usr.bin/ssh/xmss_hash.c +++ b/usr.bin/ssh/xmss_hash.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: xmss_hash.c,v 1.3 2022/04/20 16:00:25 millert Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: xmss_hash.c,v 1.4 2023/12/20 00:06:25 jsg Exp $ */ /* hash.c version 20160722 Andreas Hülsing @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ int prf(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, const unsigned char *key, u } /* - * Implemts H_msg + * Implements H_msg */ int h_msg(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned int keylen, const unsigned int n) { -- 2.20.1