From: djm Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2014 22:42:48 +0000 (+0000) Subject: KNF and add a little more debug() X-Git-Url: http://artulab.com/gitweb/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=fe1a5fa8eace778d250e0b72b5a590d10b54743d;p=openbsd KNF and add a little more debug() --- diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/auth-rhosts.c b/usr.bin/ssh/auth-rhosts.c index 3843aaa4936..04084622bd4 100644 --- a/usr.bin/ssh/auth-rhosts.c +++ b/usr.bin/ssh/auth-rhosts.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.45 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.46 2014/12/23 22:42:48 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -53,7 +53,8 @@ check_rhosts_file(const char *filename, const char *hostname, const char *server_user) { FILE *f; - char buf[1024]; /* Must not be larger than host, user, dummy below. */ +#define RBUFLN 1024 + char buf[RBUFLN];/* Must not be larger than host, user, dummy below. */ int fd; struct stat st; @@ -76,8 +77,9 @@ check_rhosts_file(const char *filename, const char *hostname, return 0; } while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) { - /* All three must be at least as big as buf to avoid overflows. */ - char hostbuf[1024], userbuf[1024], dummy[1024], *host, *user, *cp; + /* All three must have length >= buf to avoid overflows. */ + char hostbuf[RBUFLN], userbuf[RBUFLN], dummy[RBUFLN]; + char *host, *user, *cp; int negated; for (cp = buf; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) @@ -136,8 +138,8 @@ check_rhosts_file(const char *filename, const char *hostname, /* Check for empty host/user names (particularly '+'). */ if (!host[0] || !user[0]) { /* We come here if either was '+' or '-'. */ - auth_debug_add("Ignoring wild host/user names in %.100s.", - filename); + auth_debug_add("Ignoring wild host/user names " + "in %.100s.", filename); continue; } /* Verify that host name matches. */ @@ -145,7 +147,8 @@ check_rhosts_file(const char *filename, const char *hostname, if (!innetgr(host + 1, hostname, NULL, NULL) && !innetgr(host + 1, ipaddr, NULL, NULL)) continue; - } else if (strcasecmp(host, hostname) && strcmp(host, ipaddr) != 0) + } else if (strcasecmp(host, hostname) && + strcmp(host, ipaddr) != 0) continue; /* Different hostname. */ /* Verify that user name matches. */ @@ -204,7 +207,8 @@ auth_rhosts2_raw(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostnam /* Switch to the user's uid. */ temporarily_use_uid(pw); /* - * Quick check: if the user has no .shosts or .rhosts files, return + * Quick check: if the user has no .shosts or .rhosts files and + * no system hosts.equiv/shosts.equiv files exist then return * failure immediately without doing costly lookups from name * servers. */ @@ -219,27 +223,38 @@ auth_rhosts2_raw(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostnam /* Switch back to privileged uid. */ restore_uid(); - /* Deny if The user has no .shosts or .rhosts file and there are no system-wide files. */ + /* + * Deny if The user has no .shosts or .rhosts file and there + * are no system-wide files. + */ if (!rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index] && stat(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, &st) < 0 && - stat(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, &st) < 0) + stat(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, &st) < 0) { + debug3("%s: no hosts access files exist", __func__); return 0; + } - /* If not logging in as superuser, try /etc/hosts.equiv and shosts.equiv. */ - if (pw->pw_uid != 0) { + /* + * If not logging in as superuser, try /etc/hosts.equiv and + * shosts.equiv. + */ + if (pw->pw_uid == 0) + debug3("%s: root user, ignoring system hosts files", __func__); + else { if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr, client_user, pw->pw_name)) { - auth_debug_add("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by /etc/hosts.equiv.", - hostname, ipaddr); + auth_debug_add("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by " + "/etc/hosts.equiv.", hostname, ipaddr); return 1; } if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr, client_user, pw->pw_name)) { - auth_debug_add("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by %.100s.", - hostname, ipaddr, _PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV); + auth_debug_add("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by " + "%.100s.", hostname, ipaddr, _PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV); return 1; } } + /* * Check that the home directory is owned by root or the user, and is * not group or world writable. @@ -286,20 +301,25 @@ auth_rhosts2_raw(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostnam auth_debug_add("Bad file modes for %.200s", buf); continue; } - /* Check if we have been configured to ignore .rhosts and .shosts files. */ + /* + * Check if we have been configured to ignore .rhosts + * and .shosts files. + */ if (options.ignore_rhosts) { - auth_debug_add("Server has been configured to ignore %.100s.", - rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]); + auth_debug_add("Server has been configured to " + "ignore %.100s.", rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]); continue; } /* Check if authentication is permitted by the file. */ - if (check_rhosts_file(buf, hostname, ipaddr, client_user, pw->pw_name)) { + if (check_rhosts_file(buf, hostname, ipaddr, + client_user, pw->pw_name)) { auth_debug_add("Accepted by %.100s.", rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]); /* Restore the privileged uid. */ restore_uid(); - auth_debug_add("Accepted host %s ip %s client_user %s server_user %s", - hostname, ipaddr, client_user, pw->pw_name); + auth_debug_add("Accepted host %s ip %s client_user " + "%s server_user %s", hostname, ipaddr, + client_user, pw->pw_name); return 1; } } diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/auth2-hostbased.c b/usr.bin/ssh/auth2-hostbased.c index 2bd8fcb38a2..e378562186a 100644 --- a/usr.bin/ssh/auth2-hostbased.c +++ b/usr.bin/ssh/auth2-hostbased.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.19 2014/12/21 22:27:56 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.20 2014/12/23 22:42:48 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost, resolvedname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns); ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr(); - debug2("userauth_hostbased: chost %s resolvedname %s ipaddr %s", + debug2("%s: chost %s resolvedname %s ipaddr %s", __func__, chost, resolvedname, ipaddr); if (((len = strlen(chost)) > 0) && chost[len - 1] == '.') { @@ -171,19 +171,27 @@ hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost, } if (options.hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only) { - if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, chost, chost) == 0) + if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, chost, chost) == 0) { + debug2("%s: auth_rhosts2 refused " + "user \"%.100s\" host \"%.100s\" (from packet)", + __func__, cuser, chost); return 0; + } lookup = chost; } else { if (strcasecmp(resolvedname, chost) != 0) logit("userauth_hostbased mismatch: " "client sends %s, but we resolve %s to %s", chost, ipaddr, resolvedname); - if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr) == 0) + if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr) == 0) { + debug2("%s: auth_rhosts2 refused " + "user \"%.100s\" host \"%.100s\" addr \"%.100s\"", + __func__, cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr); return 0; + } lookup = resolvedname; } - debug2("userauth_hostbased: access allowed by auth_rhosts2"); + debug2("%s: access allowed by auth_rhosts2", __func__); if (key_is_cert(key) && key_cert_check_authority(key, 1, 0, lookup, &reason)) {