From: tb Date: Tue, 4 Jul 2023 14:59:32 +0000 (+0000) Subject: Clean up ECDSA verification X-Git-Url: http://artulab.com/gitweb/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=c3b977fdacb8dd76e3850b3cb66520d4eedbf615;p=openbsd Clean up ECDSA verification Use variable names that correspond more closely to the standard. Use an additional variable for s^-1 for readability. Annotate the code with the corresponding steps from FIPS 186-5. ok jsing --- diff --git a/lib/libcrypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c b/lib/libcrypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c index 685ba6e6c7a..de51d3aa4a8 100644 --- a/lib/libcrypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c +++ b/lib/libcrypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ecs_ossl.c,v 1.69 2023/07/04 14:57:05 tb Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ecs_ossl.c,v 1.70 2023/07/04 14:59:32 tb Exp $ */ /* * Written by Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project */ @@ -506,6 +506,11 @@ ossl_ecdsa_verify(int type, const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len, return ret; } +/* + * FIPS 186-5, section 6.4.2: ECDSA signature verification. + * The caller provides us with the hash of the message, so has performed step 2. + */ + int ossl_ecdsa_verify_sig(const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len, const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *key) @@ -515,7 +520,7 @@ ossl_ecdsa_verify_sig(const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len, EC_POINT *point = NULL; const BIGNUM *order; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; - BIGNUM *u1, *u2, *e, *x; + BIGNUM *e, *sinv, *u, *v, *x; int ret = -1; if (key == NULL || sig == NULL) { @@ -538,11 +543,13 @@ ossl_ecdsa_verify_sig(const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len, BN_CTX_start(ctx); - if ((u1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) + if ((e = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; - if ((u2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) + if ((sinv = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; - if ((e = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) + if ((u = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) + goto err; + if ((v = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if ((x = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; @@ -552,7 +559,7 @@ ossl_ecdsa_verify_sig(const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len, goto err; } - /* Verify that r and s are in the range [1, order). */ + /* Step 1: verify that r and s are in the range [1, order). */ if (BN_cmp(sig->r, BN_value_one()) < 0 || BN_cmp(sig->r, order) >= 0) { ECDSAerror(ECDSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); ret = 0; @@ -564,28 +571,35 @@ ossl_ecdsa_verify_sig(const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len, goto err; } + /* Step 3: convert the hash into an integer. */ if (!ecdsa_prepare_digest(digest, digest_len, key, e)) goto err; - if (BN_mod_inverse_ct(u2, sig->s, order, ctx) == NULL) { /* w = inv(s) */ + /* Step 4: compute the inverse of s modulo order. */ + if (BN_mod_inverse_ct(sinv, sig->s, order, ctx) == NULL) { ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } - if (!BN_mod_mul(u1, e, u2, order, ctx)) { /* u1 = ew */ + /* Step 5: compute u = s^-1 * e and v = s^-1 * r (modulo order). */ + if (!BN_mod_mul(u, e, sinv, order, ctx)) { ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } - if (!BN_mod_mul(u2, sig->r, u2, order, ctx)) { /* u2 = rw */ + if (!BN_mod_mul(v, sig->r, sinv, order, ctx)) { ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } - /* Compute the x-coordinate of G * u1 + pub_key * u2. */ + /* + * Steps 6 and 7: compute R = G * u + pub_key * v = (x, y). Reject if + * it's the point at infinity - getting affine coordinates fails. Keep + * the x coordinate. + */ if ((point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ECDSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } - if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, point, u1, pub_key, u2, ctx)) { + if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, point, u, pub_key, v, ctx)) { ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } @@ -593,13 +607,14 @@ ossl_ecdsa_verify_sig(const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len, ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } - if (!BN_nnmod(u1, x, order, ctx)) { + /* Step 8: convert x to a number in [0, order). */ + if (!BN_nnmod(x, x, order, ctx)) { ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } - /* If the signature is correct, the x-coordinate is equal to sig->r. */ - ret = (BN_cmp(u1, sig->r) == 0); + /* Step 9: the signature is valid iff the x-coordinate is equal to r. */ + ret = (BN_cmp(x, sig->r) == 0); err: BN_CTX_end(ctx);