From: tb Date: Sat, 11 Mar 2023 15:29:03 +0000 (+0000) Subject: Fix an off-by-one in dsa_check_key() X-Git-Url: http://artulab.com/gitweb/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=54339fe5b2356b1d99f7c91e10d2c804de525011;p=openbsd Fix an off-by-one in dsa_check_key() The private key is a random number in [1, q-1], so 1 must be allowed. Since q is at least an 160-bit prime and 2^159 + 1 is not prime (159 is not a power of 2), the probability that this is hit is < 2^-159, but a tiny little bit wrong is still wrong. Found while investigating a report by bluhm ok jsing --- diff --git a/lib/libcrypto/dsa/dsa_lib.c b/lib/libcrypto/dsa/dsa_lib.c index 1a6ca54da12..6986f9ad6ba 100644 --- a/lib/libcrypto/dsa/dsa_lib.c +++ b/lib/libcrypto/dsa/dsa_lib.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: dsa_lib.c,v 1.41 2023/03/07 09:27:10 jsing Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: dsa_lib.c,v 1.42 2023/03/11 15:29:03 tb Exp $ */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * @@ -487,7 +487,7 @@ dsa_check_key(const DSA *dsa) /* The private key must be nonzero and in GF(q). */ if (dsa->priv_key != NULL) { - if (BN_cmp(dsa->priv_key, BN_value_one()) <= 0 || + if (BN_cmp(dsa->priv_key, BN_value_one()) < 0 || BN_cmp(dsa->priv_key, dsa->q) >= 0) { DSAerror(DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS); return 0;