-# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.17 2021/02/02 18:33:11 claudio Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.18 2021/02/04 08:10:24 claudio Exp $
PROG= rpki-client
SRCS= as.c cert.c cms.c crl.c gbr.c io.c ip.c log.c main.c mft.c mkdir.c \
output.c output-bgpd.c output-bird.c output-csv.c output-json.c \
- roa.c rsync.c tal.c validate.c x509.c
+ parser.c roa.c rsync.c tal.c validate.c x509.c
MAN= rpki-client.8
LDADD+= -lcrypto -lutil
-/* $OpenBSD: extern.h,v 1.39 2021/02/02 18:33:11 claudio Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: extern.h,v 1.40 2021/02/04 08:10:24 claudio Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2019 Kristaps Dzonsons <kristaps@bsd.lv>
*
#ifndef EXTERN_H
#define EXTERN_H
+#include <sys/queue.h>
#include <sys/tree.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
RTYPE_GBR,
};
+/*
+ * An entity (MFT, ROA, certificate, etc.) that needs to be downloaded
+ * and parsed.
+ */
+struct entity {
+ enum rtype type; /* type of entity (not RTYPE_EOF) */
+ char *uri; /* file or rsync:// URI */
+ ssize_t repo; /* repo index or <0 if w/o repo */
+ int has_pkey; /* whether pkey/sz is specified */
+ unsigned char *pkey; /* public key (optional) */
+ size_t pkeysz; /* public key length (optional) */
+ char *descr; /* tal description */
+ TAILQ_ENTRY(entity) entries;
+};
+TAILQ_HEAD(entityq, entity);
+
/*
* Statistics collected during run-time.
*/
int as_check_covered(uint32_t, uint32_t,
const struct cert_as *, size_t);
+/* Parser-specific */
+void entity_free(struct entity *);
+void entity_read_req(int fd, struct entity *);
+void proc_parser(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
+
/* Rsync-specific. */
int rsync_uri_parse(const char **, size_t *,
-/* $OpenBSD: main.c,v 1.92 2021/02/02 18:35:38 claudio Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: main.c,v 1.93 2021/02/04 08:10:24 claudio Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2019 Kristaps Dzonsons <kristaps@bsd.lv>
*
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <fnmatch.h>
#include <fts.h>
-#include <inttypes.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
size_t reposz; /* number of repos */
} rt;
-/*
- * An entity (MFT, ROA, certificate, etc.) that needs to be downloaded
- * and parsed.
- */
-struct entity {
- enum rtype type; /* type of entity (not RTYPE_EOF) */
- char *uri; /* file or rsync:// URI */
- ssize_t repo; /* repo index or <0 if w/o repo */
- int has_pkey; /* whether pkey/sz is specified */
- unsigned char *pkey; /* public key (optional) */
- size_t pkeysz; /* public key length (optional) */
- char *descr; /* tal description */
- TAILQ_ENTRY(entity) entries;
-};
-
-TAILQ_HEAD(entityq, entity);
-
/*
* Database of all file path accessed during a run.
*/
RB_PROTOTYPE(filepath_tree, filepath, entry, filepathcmp);
struct filepath_tree fpt = RB_INITIALIZER(&fpt);
-/*
- * Mark that our subprocesses will never return.
- */
static void entityq_flush(struct msgbuf *, struct entityq *,
const struct repo *);
-static void proc_parser(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
-static void build_chain(const struct auth *, STACK_OF(X509) **);
-static void build_crls(const struct auth *, struct crl_tree *,
- STACK_OF(X509_CRL) **);
const char *bird_tablename = "ROAS";
RB_GENERATE(filepath_tree, filepath, entry, filepathcmp);
-static void
+void
entity_free(struct entity *ent)
{
* Matched by entity_buffer_req().
* The pointer must be passed entity_free().
*/
-static void
+void
entity_read_req(int fd, struct entity *ent)
{
entityq_add(procq, q, nfile, RTYPE_MFT, repo, NULL, 0, NULL);
}
-/*
- * Parse and validate a ROA.
- * This is standard stuff.
- * Returns the roa on success, NULL on failure.
- */
-static struct roa *
-proc_parser_roa(struct entity *entp,
- X509_STORE *store, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
- struct auth_tree *auths, struct crl_tree *crlt)
-{
- struct roa *roa;
- X509 *x509;
- int c;
- struct auth *a;
- STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
- STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls;
-
- if ((roa = roa_parse(&x509, entp->uri)) == NULL)
- return NULL;
-
- a = valid_ski_aki(entp->uri, auths, roa->ski, roa->aki);
-
- build_chain(a, &chain);
- build_crls(a, crlt, &crls);
-
- assert(x509 != NULL);
- if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, x509, chain))
- cryptoerrx("X509_STORE_CTX_init");
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx,
- X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL | X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
- X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(ctx, crls);
-
- if (X509_verify_cert(ctx) <= 0) {
- c = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
- if (verbose > 0 || c != X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL)
- warnx("%s: %s", entp->uri,
- X509_verify_cert_error_string(c));
- X509_free(x509);
- roa_free(roa);
- sk_X509_free(chain);
- sk_X509_CRL_free(crls);
- return NULL;
- }
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
- sk_X509_free(chain);
- sk_X509_CRL_free(crls);
- X509_free(x509);
-
- /*
- * If the ROA isn't valid, we accept it anyway and depend upon
- * the code around roa_read() to check the "valid" field itself.
- */
-
- if (valid_roa(entp->uri, auths, roa))
- roa->valid = 1;
-
- return roa;
-}
-
-/*
- * Parse and validate a manifest file.
- * Here we *don't* validate against the list of CRLs, because the
- * certificate used to sign the manifest may specify a CRL that the root
- * certificate didn't, and we haven't scanned for it yet.
- * This chicken-and-egg isn't important, however, because we'll catch
- * the revocation list by the time we scan for any contained resources
- * (ROA, CER) and will see it then.
- * Return the mft on success or NULL on failure.
- */
-static struct mft *
-proc_parser_mft(struct entity *entp, X509_STORE *store, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
- struct auth_tree *auths, struct crl_tree *crlt)
-{
- struct mft *mft;
- X509 *x509;
- int c;
- struct auth *a;
- STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
-
- if ((mft = mft_parse(&x509, entp->uri)) == NULL)
- return NULL;
-
- a = valid_ski_aki(entp->uri, auths, mft->ski, mft->aki);
- build_chain(a, &chain);
-
- if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, x509, chain))
- cryptoerrx("X509_STORE_CTX_init");
-
- /* CRL checked disabled here because CRL is referenced from mft */
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL);
-
- if (X509_verify_cert(ctx) <= 0) {
- c = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
- warnx("%s: %s", entp->uri, X509_verify_cert_error_string(c));
- mft_free(mft);
- X509_free(x509);
- sk_X509_free(chain);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
- sk_X509_free(chain);
- X509_free(x509);
-
- if (!mft_check(entp->uri, mft)) {
- mft_free(mft);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- return mft;
-}
-
-/*
- * Certificates are from manifests (has a digest and is signed with
- * another certificate) Parse the certificate, make sure its
- * signatures are valid (with CRLs), then validate the RPKI content.
- * This returns a certificate (which must not be freed) or NULL on
- * parse failure.
- */
-static struct cert *
-proc_parser_cert(const struct entity *entp,
- X509_STORE *store, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
- struct auth_tree *auths, struct crl_tree *crlt)
-{
- struct cert *cert;
- X509 *x509;
- int c;
- struct auth *a = NULL, *na;
- char *tal;
- STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
- STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls;
-
- assert(!entp->has_pkey);
-
- /* Extract certificate data and X509. */
-
- cert = cert_parse(&x509, entp->uri);
- if (cert == NULL)
- return NULL;
-
- a = valid_ski_aki(entp->uri, auths, cert->ski, cert->aki);
- build_chain(a, &chain);
- build_crls(a, crlt, &crls);
-
- /*
- * Validate certificate chain w/CRLs.
- * Only check the CRLs if specifically asked.
- */
-
- assert(x509 != NULL);
- if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, x509, chain))
- cryptoerrx("X509_STORE_CTX_init");
-
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx,
- X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL | X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
- X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(ctx, crls);
-
- if (X509_verify_cert(ctx) <= 0) {
- c = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
- warnx("%s: %s", entp->uri,
- X509_verify_cert_error_string(c));
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
- cert_free(cert);
- sk_X509_free(chain);
- sk_X509_CRL_free(crls);
- X509_free(x509);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
- sk_X509_free(chain);
- sk_X509_CRL_free(crls);
-
- /* Validate the cert to get the parent */
- if (!valid_cert(entp->uri, auths, cert)) {
- X509_free(x509); // needed? XXX
- return cert;
- }
-
- /*
- * Add validated certs to the RPKI auth tree.
- */
-
- cert->valid = 1;
-
- na = malloc(sizeof(*na));
- if (na == NULL)
- err(1, NULL);
-
- tal = a->tal;
-
- na->parent = a;
- na->cert = cert;
- na->tal = tal;
- na->fn = strdup(entp->uri);
- if (na->fn == NULL)
- err(1, NULL);
-
- if (RB_INSERT(auth_tree, auths, na) != NULL)
- err(1, "auth tree corrupted");
-
- return cert;
-}
-
-
-/*
- * Root certificates come from TALs (has a pkey and is self-signed).
- * Parse the certificate, ensure that it's public key matches the
- * known public key from the TAL, and then validate the RPKI
- * content. If valid, we add it as a trusted root (trust anchor) to
- * "store".
- *
- * This returns a certificate (which must not be freed) or NULL on
- * parse failure.
- */
-static struct cert *
-proc_parser_root_cert(const struct entity *entp,
- X509_STORE *store, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
- struct auth_tree *auths, struct crl_tree *crlt)
-{
- char subject[256];
- ASN1_TIME *notBefore, *notAfter;
- X509_NAME *name;
- struct cert *cert;
- X509 *x509;
- struct auth *na;
- char *tal;
-
- assert(entp->has_pkey);
-
- /* Extract certificate data and X509. */
-
- cert = ta_parse(&x509, entp->uri, entp->pkey, entp->pkeysz);
- if (cert == NULL)
- return NULL;
-
- if ((name = X509_get_subject_name(x509)) == NULL) {
- warnx("%s Unable to get certificate subject", entp->uri);
- goto badcert;
- }
- if (X509_NAME_oneline(name, subject, sizeof(subject)) == NULL) {
- warnx("%s: Unable to parse certificate subject name",
- entp->uri);
- goto badcert;
- }
- if ((notBefore = X509_get_notBefore(x509)) == NULL) {
- warnx("%s: certificate has invalid notBefore, subject='%s'",
- entp->uri, subject);
- goto badcert;
- }
- if ((notAfter = X509_get_notAfter(x509)) == NULL) {
- warnx("%s: certificate has invalid notAfter, subject='%s'",
- entp->uri, subject);
- goto badcert;
- }
- if (X509_cmp_current_time(notBefore) != -1) {
- warnx("%s: certificate not yet valid, subject='%s'", entp->uri,
- subject);
- goto badcert;
- }
- if (X509_cmp_current_time(notAfter) != 1) {
- warnx("%s: certificate has expired, subject='%s'", entp->uri,
- subject);
- goto badcert;
- }
- if (!valid_ta(entp->uri, auths, cert)) {
- warnx("%s: certificate not a valid ta, subject='%s'",
- entp->uri, subject);
- goto badcert;
- }
-
- /*
- * Add valid roots to the RPKI auth tree and as a trusted root
- * for chain validation to the X509_STORE.
- */
-
- cert->valid = 1;
-
- na = malloc(sizeof(*na));
- if (na == NULL)
- err(1, NULL);
-
- if ((tal = strdup(entp->descr)) == NULL)
- err(1, NULL);
-
- na->parent = NULL;
- na->cert = cert;
- na->tal = tal;
- na->fn = strdup(entp->uri);
- if (na->fn == NULL)
- err(1, NULL);
-
- if (RB_INSERT(auth_tree, auths, na) != NULL)
- err(1, "auth tree corrupted");
-
- X509_STORE_add_cert(store, x509);
-
- return cert;
- badcert:
- X509_free(x509); // needed? XXX
- return cert;
-}
-
-/*
- * Parse a certificate revocation list
- * This simply parses the CRL content itself, optionally validating it
- * within the digest if it comes from a manifest, then adds it to the
- * store of CRLs.
- */
-static void
-proc_parser_crl(struct entity *entp, X509_STORE *store,
- X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, struct crl_tree *crlt)
-{
- X509_CRL *x509_crl;
- struct crl *crl;
-
- if ((x509_crl = crl_parse(entp->uri)) != NULL) {
- if ((crl = malloc(sizeof(*crl))) == NULL)
- err(1, NULL);
- if ((crl->aki = x509_crl_get_aki(x509_crl)) == NULL)
- errx(1, "x509_crl_get_aki failed");
- crl->x509_crl = x509_crl;
-
- if (RB_INSERT(crl_tree, crlt, crl) != NULL) {
- warnx("%s: duplicate AKI %s", entp->uri, crl->aki);
- free_crl(crl);
- }
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Parse a ghostbuster record
- */
-static void
-proc_parser_gbr(struct entity *entp, X509_STORE *store,
- X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, struct auth_tree *auths, struct crl_tree *crlt)
-{
- struct gbr *gbr;
- X509 *x509;
- int c;
- struct auth *a;
- STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
- STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls;
-
- if ((gbr = gbr_parse(&x509, entp->uri)) == NULL)
- return;
-
- a = valid_ski_aki(entp->uri, auths, gbr->ski, gbr->aki);
-
- build_chain(a, &chain);
- build_crls(a, crlt, &crls);
-
- assert(x509 != NULL);
- if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, x509, chain))
- cryptoerrx("X509_STORE_CTX_init");
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx,
- X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL | X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
- X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(ctx, crls);
-
- if (X509_verify_cert(ctx) <= 0) {
- c = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
- if (verbose > 0 || c != X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL)
- warnx("%s: %s", entp->uri,
- X509_verify_cert_error_string(c));
- }
-
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
- sk_X509_free(chain);
- sk_X509_CRL_free(crls);
- X509_free(x509);
- gbr_free(gbr);
-}
-
-/* use the parent (id) to walk the tree to the root and
- build a certificate chain from cert->x509 */
-static void
-build_chain(const struct auth *a, STACK_OF(X509) **chain)
-{
- *chain = NULL;
-
- if (a == NULL)
- return;
-
- if ((*chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
- err(1, "sk_X509_new_null");
- for (; a != NULL; a = a->parent) {
- assert(a->cert->x509 != NULL);
- if (!sk_X509_push(*chain, a->cert->x509))
- errx(1, "sk_X509_push");
- }
-}
-
-/* use the parent (id) to walk the tree to the root and
- build a stack of CRLs */
-static void
-build_crls(const struct auth *a, struct crl_tree *crlt,
- STACK_OF(X509_CRL) **crls)
-{
- struct crl find, *found;
-
- if ((*crls = sk_X509_CRL_new_null()) == NULL)
- errx(1, "sk_X509_CRL_new_null");
-
- if (a == NULL)
- return;
-
- find.aki = a->cert->ski;
- found = RB_FIND(crl_tree, crlt, &find);
- if (found && !sk_X509_CRL_push(*crls, found->x509_crl))
- err(1, "sk_X509_CRL_push");
-}
-
-/*
- * Process responsible for parsing and validating content.
- * All this process does is wait to be told about a file to parse, then
- * it parses it and makes sure that the data being returned is fully
- * validated and verified.
- * The process will exit cleanly only when fd is closed.
- */
-static void
-proc_parser(int fd)
-{
- struct tal *tal;
- struct cert *cert;
- struct mft *mft;
- struct roa *roa;
- struct entity *entp;
- struct entityq q;
- int c, rc = 1;
- struct msgbuf msgq;
- struct pollfd pfd;
- struct ibuf *b;
- X509_STORE *store;
- X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
- struct auth_tree auths = RB_INITIALIZER(&auths);
- struct crl_tree crlt = RB_INITIALIZER(&crlt);
-
- ERR_load_crypto_strings();
- OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers();
- OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
-
- if ((store = X509_STORE_new()) == NULL)
- cryptoerrx("X509_STORE_new");
- if ((ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- cryptoerrx("X509_STORE_CTX_new");
-
- TAILQ_INIT(&q);
-
- msgbuf_init(&msgq);
- msgq.fd = fd;
-
- pfd.fd = fd;
-
- io_socket_nonblocking(pfd.fd);
-
- for (;;) {
- pfd.events = POLLIN;
- if (msgq.queued)
- pfd.events |= POLLOUT;
-
- if (poll(&pfd, 1, INFTIM) == -1)
- err(1, "poll");
- if ((pfd.revents & (POLLERR|POLLNVAL)))
- errx(1, "poll: bad descriptor");
-
- /* If the parent closes, return immediately. */
-
- if ((pfd.revents & POLLHUP))
- break;
-
- /*
- * Start with read events.
- * This means that the parent process is sending us
- * something we need to parse.
- * We don't actually parse it til we have space in our
- * outgoing buffer for responding, though.
- */
-
- if ((pfd.revents & POLLIN)) {
- io_socket_blocking(fd);
- entp = calloc(1, sizeof(struct entity));
- if (entp == NULL)
- err(1, NULL);
- entity_read_req(fd, entp);
- TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&q, entp, entries);
- io_socket_nonblocking(fd);
- }
-
- if (pfd.revents & POLLOUT) {
- switch (msgbuf_write(&msgq)) {
- case 0:
- errx(1, "write: connection closed");
- case -1:
- err(1, "write");
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * If there's nothing to parse, then stop waiting for
- * the write signal.
- */
-
- if (TAILQ_EMPTY(&q)) {
- pfd.events &= ~POLLOUT;
- continue;
- }
-
- entp = TAILQ_FIRST(&q);
- assert(entp != NULL);
-
- if ((b = ibuf_dynamic(256, UINT_MAX)) == NULL)
- err(1, NULL);
- io_simple_buffer(b, &entp->type, sizeof(entp->type));
-
- switch (entp->type) {
- case RTYPE_TAL:
- if ((tal = tal_parse(entp->uri, entp->descr)) == NULL)
- goto out;
- tal_buffer(b, tal);
- tal_free(tal);
- break;
- case RTYPE_CER:
- if (entp->has_pkey)
- cert = proc_parser_root_cert(entp, store, ctx,
- &auths, &crlt);
- else
- cert = proc_parser_cert(entp, store, ctx,
- &auths, &crlt);
- c = (cert != NULL);
- io_simple_buffer(b, &c, sizeof(int));
- if (cert != NULL)
- cert_buffer(b, cert);
- /*
- * The parsed certificate data "cert" is now
- * managed in the "auths" table, so don't free
- * it here (see the loop after "out").
- */
- break;
- case RTYPE_MFT:
- mft = proc_parser_mft(entp, store, ctx, &auths, &crlt);
- c = (mft != NULL);
- io_simple_buffer(b, &c, sizeof(int));
- if (mft != NULL)
- mft_buffer(b, mft);
- mft_free(mft);
- break;
- case RTYPE_CRL:
- proc_parser_crl(entp, store, ctx, &crlt);
- break;
- case RTYPE_ROA:
- roa = proc_parser_roa(entp, store, ctx, &auths, &crlt);
- c = (roa != NULL);
- io_simple_buffer(b, &c, sizeof(int));
- if (roa != NULL)
- roa_buffer(b, roa);
- roa_free(roa);
- break;
- case RTYPE_GBR:
- proc_parser_gbr(entp, store, ctx, &auths, &crlt);
- break;
- default:
- abort();
- }
-
- ibuf_close(&msgq, b);
- TAILQ_REMOVE(&q, entp, entries);
- entity_free(entp);
- }
-
- rc = 0;
-out:
- while ((entp = TAILQ_FIRST(&q)) != NULL) {
- TAILQ_REMOVE(&q, entp, entries);
- entity_free(entp);
- }
-
- /* XXX free auths and crl tree */
-
- X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
- X509_STORE_free(store);
-
- msgbuf_clear(&msgq);
-
- exit(rc);
-}
-
/*
* Process parsed content.
* For non-ROAs, we grok for more data.
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: parser.c,v 1.1 2021/02/04 08:10:25 claudio Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Claudio Jeker <claudio@openbsd.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Kristaps Dzonsons <kristaps@bsd.lv>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/queue.h>
+#include <sys/tree.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <err.h>
+#include <poll.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <imsg.h>
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+#include "extern.h"
+
+static void build_chain(const struct auth *, STACK_OF(X509) **);
+static void build_crls(const struct auth *, struct crl_tree *,
+ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) **);
+/*
+ * Parse and validate a ROA.
+ * This is standard stuff.
+ * Returns the roa on success, NULL on failure.
+ */
+static struct roa *
+proc_parser_roa(struct entity *entp,
+ X509_STORE *store, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+ struct auth_tree *auths, struct crl_tree *crlt)
+{
+ struct roa *roa;
+ X509 *x509;
+ int c;
+ struct auth *a;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
+ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls;
+
+ if ((roa = roa_parse(&x509, entp->uri)) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ a = valid_ski_aki(entp->uri, auths, roa->ski, roa->aki);
+
+ build_chain(a, &chain);
+ build_crls(a, crlt, &crls);
+
+ assert(x509 != NULL);
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, x509, chain))
+ cryptoerrx("X509_STORE_CTX_init");
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx,
+ X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL | X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(ctx, crls);
+
+ if (X509_verify_cert(ctx) <= 0) {
+ c = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+ if (verbose > 0 || c != X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL)
+ warnx("%s: %s", entp->uri,
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string(c));
+ X509_free(x509);
+ roa_free(roa);
+ sk_X509_free(chain);
+ sk_X509_CRL_free(crls);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+ sk_X509_free(chain);
+ sk_X509_CRL_free(crls);
+ X509_free(x509);
+
+ /*
+ * If the ROA isn't valid, we accept it anyway and depend upon
+ * the code around roa_read() to check the "valid" field itself.
+ */
+
+ if (valid_roa(entp->uri, auths, roa))
+ roa->valid = 1;
+
+ return roa;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse and validate a manifest file.
+ * Here we *don't* validate against the list of CRLs, because the
+ * certificate used to sign the manifest may specify a CRL that the root
+ * certificate didn't, and we haven't scanned for it yet.
+ * This chicken-and-egg isn't important, however, because we'll catch
+ * the revocation list by the time we scan for any contained resources
+ * (ROA, CER) and will see it then.
+ * Return the mft on success or NULL on failure.
+ */
+static struct mft *
+proc_parser_mft(struct entity *entp, X509_STORE *store, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+ struct auth_tree *auths, struct crl_tree *crlt)
+{
+ struct mft *mft;
+ X509 *x509;
+ int c;
+ struct auth *a;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
+
+ if ((mft = mft_parse(&x509, entp->uri)) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ a = valid_ski_aki(entp->uri, auths, mft->ski, mft->aki);
+ build_chain(a, &chain);
+
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, x509, chain))
+ cryptoerrx("X509_STORE_CTX_init");
+
+ /* CRL checked disabled here because CRL is referenced from mft */
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL);
+
+ if (X509_verify_cert(ctx) <= 0) {
+ c = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+ warnx("%s: %s", entp->uri, X509_verify_cert_error_string(c));
+ mft_free(mft);
+ X509_free(x509);
+ sk_X509_free(chain);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+ sk_X509_free(chain);
+ X509_free(x509);
+
+ if (!mft_check(entp->uri, mft)) {
+ mft_free(mft);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return mft;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Certificates are from manifests (has a digest and is signed with
+ * another certificate) Parse the certificate, make sure its
+ * signatures are valid (with CRLs), then validate the RPKI content.
+ * This returns a certificate (which must not be freed) or NULL on
+ * parse failure.
+ */
+static struct cert *
+proc_parser_cert(const struct entity *entp,
+ X509_STORE *store, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+ struct auth_tree *auths, struct crl_tree *crlt)
+{
+ struct cert *cert;
+ X509 *x509;
+ int c;
+ struct auth *a = NULL, *na;
+ char *tal;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
+ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls;
+
+ assert(!entp->has_pkey);
+
+ /* Extract certificate data and X509. */
+
+ cert = cert_parse(&x509, entp->uri);
+ if (cert == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ a = valid_ski_aki(entp->uri, auths, cert->ski, cert->aki);
+ build_chain(a, &chain);
+ build_crls(a, crlt, &crls);
+
+ /*
+ * Validate certificate chain w/CRLs.
+ * Only check the CRLs if specifically asked.
+ */
+
+ assert(x509 != NULL);
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, x509, chain))
+ cryptoerrx("X509_STORE_CTX_init");
+
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx,
+ X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL | X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(ctx, crls);
+
+ if (X509_verify_cert(ctx) <= 0) {
+ c = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+ warnx("%s: %s", entp->uri,
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string(c));
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+ cert_free(cert);
+ sk_X509_free(chain);
+ sk_X509_CRL_free(crls);
+ X509_free(x509);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+ sk_X509_free(chain);
+ sk_X509_CRL_free(crls);
+
+ /* Validate the cert to get the parent */
+ if (!valid_cert(entp->uri, auths, cert)) {
+ X509_free(x509); // needed? XXX
+ return cert;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Add validated certs to the RPKI auth tree.
+ */
+
+ cert->valid = 1;
+
+ na = malloc(sizeof(*na));
+ if (na == NULL)
+ err(1, NULL);
+
+ tal = a->tal;
+
+ na->parent = a;
+ na->cert = cert;
+ na->tal = tal;
+ na->fn = strdup(entp->uri);
+ if (na->fn == NULL)
+ err(1, NULL);
+
+ if (RB_INSERT(auth_tree, auths, na) != NULL)
+ err(1, "auth tree corrupted");
+
+ return cert;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Root certificates come from TALs (has a pkey and is self-signed).
+ * Parse the certificate, ensure that it's public key matches the
+ * known public key from the TAL, and then validate the RPKI
+ * content. If valid, we add it as a trusted root (trust anchor) to
+ * "store".
+ *
+ * This returns a certificate (which must not be freed) or NULL on
+ * parse failure.
+ */
+static struct cert *
+proc_parser_root_cert(const struct entity *entp,
+ X509_STORE *store, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+ struct auth_tree *auths, struct crl_tree *crlt)
+{
+ char subject[256];
+ ASN1_TIME *notBefore, *notAfter;
+ X509_NAME *name;
+ struct cert *cert;
+ X509 *x509;
+ struct auth *na;
+ char *tal;
+
+ assert(entp->has_pkey);
+
+ /* Extract certificate data and X509. */
+
+ cert = ta_parse(&x509, entp->uri, entp->pkey, entp->pkeysz);
+ if (cert == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if ((name = X509_get_subject_name(x509)) == NULL) {
+ warnx("%s Unable to get certificate subject", entp->uri);
+ goto badcert;
+ }
+ if (X509_NAME_oneline(name, subject, sizeof(subject)) == NULL) {
+ warnx("%s: Unable to parse certificate subject name",
+ entp->uri);
+ goto badcert;
+ }
+ if ((notBefore = X509_get_notBefore(x509)) == NULL) {
+ warnx("%s: certificate has invalid notBefore, subject='%s'",
+ entp->uri, subject);
+ goto badcert;
+ }
+ if ((notAfter = X509_get_notAfter(x509)) == NULL) {
+ warnx("%s: certificate has invalid notAfter, subject='%s'",
+ entp->uri, subject);
+ goto badcert;
+ }
+ if (X509_cmp_current_time(notBefore) != -1) {
+ warnx("%s: certificate not yet valid, subject='%s'", entp->uri,
+ subject);
+ goto badcert;
+ }
+ if (X509_cmp_current_time(notAfter) != 1) {
+ warnx("%s: certificate has expired, subject='%s'", entp->uri,
+ subject);
+ goto badcert;
+ }
+ if (!valid_ta(entp->uri, auths, cert)) {
+ warnx("%s: certificate not a valid ta, subject='%s'",
+ entp->uri, subject);
+ goto badcert;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Add valid roots to the RPKI auth tree and as a trusted root
+ * for chain validation to the X509_STORE.
+ */
+
+ cert->valid = 1;
+
+ na = malloc(sizeof(*na));
+ if (na == NULL)
+ err(1, NULL);
+
+ if ((tal = strdup(entp->descr)) == NULL)
+ err(1, NULL);
+
+ na->parent = NULL;
+ na->cert = cert;
+ na->tal = tal;
+ na->fn = strdup(entp->uri);
+ if (na->fn == NULL)
+ err(1, NULL);
+
+ if (RB_INSERT(auth_tree, auths, na) != NULL)
+ err(1, "auth tree corrupted");
+
+ X509_STORE_add_cert(store, x509);
+
+ return cert;
+ badcert:
+ X509_free(x509); // needed? XXX
+ return cert;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse a certificate revocation list
+ * This simply parses the CRL content itself, optionally validating it
+ * within the digest if it comes from a manifest, then adds it to the
+ * store of CRLs.
+ */
+static void
+proc_parser_crl(struct entity *entp, X509_STORE *store,
+ X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, struct crl_tree *crlt)
+{
+ X509_CRL *x509_crl;
+ struct crl *crl;
+
+ if ((x509_crl = crl_parse(entp->uri)) != NULL) {
+ if ((crl = malloc(sizeof(*crl))) == NULL)
+ err(1, NULL);
+ if ((crl->aki = x509_crl_get_aki(x509_crl)) == NULL)
+ errx(1, "x509_crl_get_aki failed");
+ crl->x509_crl = x509_crl;
+
+ if (RB_INSERT(crl_tree, crlt, crl) != NULL) {
+ warnx("%s: duplicate AKI %s", entp->uri, crl->aki);
+ free_crl(crl);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse a ghostbuster record
+ */
+static void
+proc_parser_gbr(struct entity *entp, X509_STORE *store,
+ X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, struct auth_tree *auths, struct crl_tree *crlt)
+{
+ struct gbr *gbr;
+ X509 *x509;
+ int c;
+ struct auth *a;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
+ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls;
+
+ if ((gbr = gbr_parse(&x509, entp->uri)) == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ a = valid_ski_aki(entp->uri, auths, gbr->ski, gbr->aki);
+
+ build_chain(a, &chain);
+ build_crls(a, crlt, &crls);
+
+ assert(x509 != NULL);
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, x509, chain))
+ cryptoerrx("X509_STORE_CTX_init");
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx,
+ X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL | X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(ctx, crls);
+
+ if (X509_verify_cert(ctx) <= 0) {
+ c = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+ if (verbose > 0 || c != X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL)
+ warnx("%s: %s", entp->uri,
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string(c));
+ }
+
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+ sk_X509_free(chain);
+ sk_X509_CRL_free(crls);
+ X509_free(x509);
+ gbr_free(gbr);
+}
+
+/* use the parent (id) to walk the tree to the root and
+ build a certificate chain from cert->x509 */
+static void
+build_chain(const struct auth *a, STACK_OF(X509) **chain)
+{
+ *chain = NULL;
+
+ if (a == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ if ((*chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
+ err(1, "sk_X509_new_null");
+ for (; a != NULL; a = a->parent) {
+ assert(a->cert->x509 != NULL);
+ if (!sk_X509_push(*chain, a->cert->x509))
+ errx(1, "sk_X509_push");
+ }
+}
+
+/* use the parent (id) to walk the tree to the root and
+ build a stack of CRLs */
+static void
+build_crls(const struct auth *a, struct crl_tree *crlt,
+ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) **crls)
+{
+ struct crl find, *found;
+
+ if ((*crls = sk_X509_CRL_new_null()) == NULL)
+ errx(1, "sk_X509_CRL_new_null");
+
+ if (a == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ find.aki = a->cert->ski;
+ found = RB_FIND(crl_tree, crlt, &find);
+ if (found && !sk_X509_CRL_push(*crls, found->x509_crl))
+ err(1, "sk_X509_CRL_push");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Process responsible for parsing and validating content.
+ * All this process does is wait to be told about a file to parse, then
+ * it parses it and makes sure that the data being returned is fully
+ * validated and verified.
+ * The process will exit cleanly only when fd is closed.
+ */
+void
+proc_parser(int fd)
+{
+ struct tal *tal;
+ struct cert *cert;
+ struct mft *mft;
+ struct roa *roa;
+ struct entity *entp;
+ struct entityq q;
+ int c, rc = 1;
+ struct msgbuf msgq;
+ struct pollfd pfd;
+ struct ibuf *b;
+ X509_STORE *store;
+ X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
+ struct auth_tree auths = RB_INITIALIZER(&auths);
+ struct crl_tree crlt = RB_INITIALIZER(&crlt);
+
+ ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+ OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers();
+ OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
+
+ if ((store = X509_STORE_new()) == NULL)
+ cryptoerrx("X509_STORE_new");
+ if ((ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ cryptoerrx("X509_STORE_CTX_new");
+
+ TAILQ_INIT(&q);
+
+ msgbuf_init(&msgq);
+ msgq.fd = fd;
+
+ pfd.fd = fd;
+
+ io_socket_nonblocking(pfd.fd);
+
+ for (;;) {
+ pfd.events = POLLIN;
+ if (msgq.queued)
+ pfd.events |= POLLOUT;
+
+ if (poll(&pfd, 1, INFTIM) == -1)
+ err(1, "poll");
+ if ((pfd.revents & (POLLERR|POLLNVAL)))
+ errx(1, "poll: bad descriptor");
+
+ /* If the parent closes, return immediately. */
+
+ if ((pfd.revents & POLLHUP))
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * Start with read events.
+ * This means that the parent process is sending us
+ * something we need to parse.
+ * We don't actually parse it til we have space in our
+ * outgoing buffer for responding, though.
+ */
+
+ if ((pfd.revents & POLLIN)) {
+ io_socket_blocking(fd);
+ entp = calloc(1, sizeof(struct entity));
+ if (entp == NULL)
+ err(1, NULL);
+ entity_read_req(fd, entp);
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&q, entp, entries);
+ io_socket_nonblocking(fd);
+ }
+
+ if (pfd.revents & POLLOUT) {
+ switch (msgbuf_write(&msgq)) {
+ case 0:
+ errx(1, "write: connection closed");
+ case -1:
+ err(1, "write");
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If there's nothing to parse, then stop waiting for
+ * the write signal.
+ */
+
+ if (TAILQ_EMPTY(&q)) {
+ pfd.events &= ~POLLOUT;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ entp = TAILQ_FIRST(&q);
+ assert(entp != NULL);
+
+ if ((b = ibuf_dynamic(256, UINT_MAX)) == NULL)
+ err(1, NULL);
+ io_simple_buffer(b, &entp->type, sizeof(entp->type));
+
+ switch (entp->type) {
+ case RTYPE_TAL:
+ if ((tal = tal_parse(entp->uri, entp->descr)) == NULL)
+ goto out;
+ tal_buffer(b, tal);
+ tal_free(tal);
+ break;
+ case RTYPE_CER:
+ if (entp->has_pkey)
+ cert = proc_parser_root_cert(entp, store, ctx,
+ &auths, &crlt);
+ else
+ cert = proc_parser_cert(entp, store, ctx,
+ &auths, &crlt);
+ c = (cert != NULL);
+ io_simple_buffer(b, &c, sizeof(int));
+ if (cert != NULL)
+ cert_buffer(b, cert);
+ /*
+ * The parsed certificate data "cert" is now
+ * managed in the "auths" table, so don't free
+ * it here (see the loop after "out").
+ */
+ break;
+ case RTYPE_MFT:
+ mft = proc_parser_mft(entp, store, ctx, &auths, &crlt);
+ c = (mft != NULL);
+ io_simple_buffer(b, &c, sizeof(int));
+ if (mft != NULL)
+ mft_buffer(b, mft);
+ mft_free(mft);
+ break;
+ case RTYPE_CRL:
+ proc_parser_crl(entp, store, ctx, &crlt);
+ break;
+ case RTYPE_ROA:
+ roa = proc_parser_roa(entp, store, ctx, &auths, &crlt);
+ c = (roa != NULL);
+ io_simple_buffer(b, &c, sizeof(int));
+ if (roa != NULL)
+ roa_buffer(b, roa);
+ roa_free(roa);
+ break;
+ case RTYPE_GBR:
+ proc_parser_gbr(entp, store, ctx, &auths, &crlt);
+ break;
+ default:
+ abort();
+ }
+
+ ibuf_close(&msgq, b);
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&q, entp, entries);
+ entity_free(entp);
+ }
+
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ while ((entp = TAILQ_FIRST(&q)) != NULL) {
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&q, entp, entries);
+ entity_free(entp);
+ }
+
+ /* XXX free auths and crl tree */
+
+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
+ X509_STORE_free(store);
+
+ msgbuf_clear(&msgq);
+
+ exit(rc);
+}
projects / openbsd / commitdiff