-/* $OpenBSD: x509_policy.c,v 1.10 2023/04/26 21:07:32 tb Exp $ */
-/* Copyright (c) 2022, Google Inc.
+/* $OpenBSD: x509_policy.c,v 1.11 2023/04/26 21:35:22 tb Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2022, Google Inc.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
- * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
#include <openssl/x509.h>
/* XXX move to proper place */
#define X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION 201
-// This file computes the X.509 policy tree, as described in RFC 5280, section
-// 6.1. It differs in that:
-//
-// (1) It does not track "qualifier_set". This is not needed as it is not
-// output by this implementation.
-//
-// (2) It builds a directed acyclic graph, rather than a tree. When a given
-// policy matches multiple parents, RFC 5280 makes a separate node for
-// each parent. This representation condenses them into one node with
-// multiple parents. Thus we refer to this structure as a "policy graph",
-// rather than a "policy tree".
-//
-// (3) "expected_policy_set" is not tracked explicitly and built temporarily
-// as part of building the graph.
-//
-// (4) anyPolicy nodes are not tracked explicitly.
-//
-// (5) Some pruning steps are deferred to when policies are evaluated, as a
-// reachability pass.
-
-// An X509_POLICY_NODE is a node in the policy graph. It corresponds to a node
-// from RFC 5280, section 6.1.2, step (a), but we store some fields differently.
+/*
+ * This file computes the X.509 policy tree, as described in RFC 5280, section
+ * 6.1. It differs in that:
+ *
+ * (1) It does not track "qualifier_set". This is not needed as it is not
+ * output by this implementation.
+ *
+ * (2) It builds a directed acyclic graph, rather than a tree. When a given
+ * policy matches multiple parents, RFC 5280 makes a separate node for
+ * each parent. This representation condenses them into one node with
+ * multiple parents. Thus we refer to this structure as a "policy graph",
+ * rather than a "policy tree".
+ *
+ * (3) "expected_policy_set" is not tracked explicitly and built temporarily
+ * as part of building the graph.
+ *
+ * (4) anyPolicy nodes are not tracked explicitly.
+ *
+ * (5) Some pruning steps are deferred to when policies are evaluated, as a
+ * reachability pass.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * An X509_POLICY_NODE is a node in the policy graph. It corresponds to a node
+ * from RFC 5280, section 6.1.2, step (a), but we store some fields differently.
+ */
typedef struct x509_policy_node_st {
- // policy is the "valid_policy" field from RFC 5280.
+ /* policy is the "valid_policy" field from RFC 5280. */
ASN1_OBJECT *policy;
- // parent_policies, if non-empty, is the list of "valid_policy" values for all
- // nodes which are a parent of this node. In this case, no entry in this list
- // will be anyPolicy. This list is in no particular order and may contain
- // duplicates if the corresponding certificate had duplicate mappings.
- //
- // If empty, this node has a single parent, anyPolicy. The node is then a root
- // policies, and is in authorities-constrained-policy-set if it has a path to
- // a leaf node.
- //
- // Note it is not possible for a policy to have both anyPolicy and a
- // concrete policy as a parent. Section 6.1.3, step (d.1.ii) only runs if
- // there was no match in step (d.1.i). We do not need to represent a parent
- // list of, say, {anyPolicy, OID1, OID2}.
+ /*
+ * parent_policies, if non-empty, is the list of "valid_policy" values
+ * for all nodes which are a parent of this node. In this case, no entry
+ * in this list will be anyPolicy. This list is in no particular order
+ * and may contain duplicates if the corresponding certificate had
+ * duplicate mappings.
+ *
+ * If empty, this node has a single parent, anyPolicy. The node is then
+ * a root policies, and is in authorities-constrained-policy-set if it
+ * has a path to a leaf node.
+ *
+ * Note it is not possible for a policy to have both anyPolicy and a
+ * concrete policy as a parent. Section 6.1.3, step (d.1.ii) only runs
+ * if there was no match in step (d.1.i). We do not need to represent a
+ * parent list of, say, {anyPolicy, OID1, OID2}.
+ */
STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *parent_policies;
- // mapped is one if this node matches a policy mapping in the certificate and
- // zero otherwise.
+ /*
+ * mapped is one if this node matches a policy mapping in the
+ * certificate and zero otherwise.
+ */
int mapped;
- // reachable is one if this node is reachable from some valid policy in the
- // end-entity certificate. It is computed during |has_explicit_policy|.
+ /*
+ * reachable is one if this node is reachable from some valid policy in
+ * the end-entity certificate. It is computed during |has_explicit_policy|.
+ */
int reachable;
} X509_POLICY_NODE;
#define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_sort(st) SKM_sk_sort(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st))
#define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_is_sorted(st) SKM_sk_is_sorted(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st))
-// An X509_POLICY_LEVEL is the collection of nodes at the same depth in the
-// policy graph. This structure can also be used to represent a level's
-// "expected_policy_set" values. See |process_policy_mappings|.
+/*
+ * An X509_POLICY_LEVEL is the collection of nodes at the same depth in the
+ * policy graph. This structure can also be used to represent a level's
+ * "expected_policy_set" values. See |process_policy_mappings|.
+ */
typedef struct x509_policy_level_st {
- // nodes is the list of nodes at this depth, except for the anyPolicy node, if
- // any. This list is sorted by policy OID for efficient lookup.
+ /*
+ * nodes is the list of nodes at this depth, except for the anyPolicy
+ * node, if any. This list is sorted by policy OID for efficient lookup.
+ */
STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes;
- // has_any_policy is one if there is an anyPolicy node at this depth, and zero
- // otherwise.
+ /*
+ * has_any_policy is one if there is an anyPolicy node at this depth,
+ * and zero otherwise.
+ */
int has_any_policy;
} X509_POLICY_LEVEL;
sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_zero(level->nodes);
}
-// x509_policy_level_find returns the node in |level| corresponding to |policy|,
-// or NULL if none exists.
+/*
+ * x509_policy_level_find returns the node in |level| corresponding to |policy|,
+ * or NULL if none exists.
+ */
static X509_POLICY_NODE *
x509_policy_level_find(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
const ASN1_OBJECT *policy)
return sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, idx);
}
-// x509_policy_level_add_nodes adds the nodes in |nodes| to |level|. It returns
-// one on success and zero on error. No policy in |nodes| may already be present
-// in |level|. This function modifies |nodes| to avoid making a copy, but the
-// caller is still responsible for releasing |nodes| itself.
-//
-// This function is used to add nodes to |level| in bulk, and avoid resorting
-// |level| after each addition.
+/*
+ * x509_policy_level_add_nodes adds the nodes in |nodes| to |level|. It returns
+ * one on success and zero on error. No policy in |nodes| may already be present
+ * in |level|. This function modifies |nodes| to avoid making a copy, but the
+ * caller is still responsible for releasing |nodes| itself.
+ *
+ * This function is used to add nodes to |level| in bulk, and avoid resorting
+ * |level| after each addition.
+ */
static int
x509_policy_level_add_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes)
sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_sort(level->nodes);
#if !defined(NDEBUG)
- // There should be no duplicate nodes.
+ /* There should be no duplicate nodes. */
for (size_t i = 1; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes); i++) {
assert(
OBJ_cmp(
return 1;
}
-// process_certificate_policies updates |level| to incorporate |x509|'s
-// certificate policies extension. This implements steps (d) and (e) of RFC
-// 5280, section 6.1.3. |level| must contain the previous level's
-// "expected_policy_set" information. For all but the top-most level, this is
-// the output of |process_policy_mappings|. |any_policy_allowed| specifies
-// whether anyPolicy is allowed or inhibited, taking into account the exception
-// for self-issued certificates.
+/*
+ * process_certificate_policies updates |level| to incorporate |x509|'s
+ * certificate policies extension. This implements steps (d) and (e) of RFC
+ * 5280, section 6.1.3. |level| must contain the previous level's
+ * "expected_policy_set" information. For all but the top-most level, this is
+ * the output of |process_policy_mappings|. |any_policy_allowed| specifies
+ * whether anyPolicy is allowed or inhibited, taking into account the exception
+ * for self-issued certificates.
+ */
static int
process_certificate_policies(const X509 *x509,
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
X509_get_ext_d2i(x509, NID_certificate_policies, &critical, NULL);
if (policies == NULL) {
if (critical != -1) {
- return 0; // Syntax error in the extension.
+ return 0; /* Syntax error in the extension. */
}
- // RFC 5280, section 6.1.3, step (e).
+ /* RFC 5280, section 6.1.3, step (e). */
x509_policy_level_clear(level);
return 1;
}
- // certificatePolicies may not be empty. See RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.4.
- // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/443): Move this check into the parser.
+ /*
+ * certificatePolicies may not be empty. See RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.4.
+ * TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/443): Move this check into the parser.
+ */
if (sk_POLICYINFO_num(policies) == 0) {
X509error(X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
goto err;
if (i > 0 &&
OBJ_cmp(sk_POLICYINFO_value(policies, i - 1)->policyid,
policy->policyid) == 0) {
- // Per RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.4, |policies| may not have duplicates.
+ /*
+ * Per RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.4, |policies| may not
+ * have duplicates.
+ */
X509error(X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
goto err;
}
}
- // This does the same thing as RFC 5280, section 6.1.3, step (d), though in
- // a slighty different order. |level| currently contains "expected_policy_set"
- // values of the previous level. See |process_policy_mappings| for details.
+ /*
+ * This does the same thing as RFC 5280, section 6.1.3, step (d),
+ * though in a slighty different order. |level| currently contains
+ * "expected_policy_set" values of the previous level.
+ * See |process_policy_mappings| for details.
+ */
const int previous_level_has_any_policy = level->has_any_policy;
- // First, we handle steps (d.1.i) and (d.2). The net effect of these two steps
- // is to intersect |level| with |policies|, ignoring anyPolicy if it is
- // inhibited.
+ /*
+ * First, we handle steps (d.1.i) and (d.2). The net effect of these
+ * two steps is to intersect |level| with |policies|, ignoring
+ * anyPolicy if it is inhibited.
+ */
if (!cert_has_any_policy || !any_policy_allowed) {
sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete_if(level->nodes,
delete_if_not_in_policies, policies);
level->has_any_policy = 0;
}
- // Step (d.1.ii) may attach new nodes to the previous level's anyPolicy node.
+ /*
+ * Step (d.1.ii) may attach new nodes to the previous level's anyPolicy
+ * node.
+ */
if (previous_level_has_any_policy) {
new_nodes = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null();
if (new_nodes == NULL) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_POLICYINFO_num(policies); i++) {
const POLICYINFO *policy = sk_POLICYINFO_value(policies,
i);
- // Though we've reordered the steps slightly, |policy| is in |level| if
- // and only if it would have been a match in step (d.1.ii).
+ /*
+ * Though we've reordered the steps slightly, |policy|
+ * is in |level| if and only if it would have been a
+ * match in step (d.1.ii).
+ */
if (!is_any_policy(policy->policyid) &&
x509_policy_level_find(level, policy->policyid) ==
NULL) {
X509_POLICY_NODE *node = x509_policy_node_new(
policy->policyid);
- if (node == NULL || //
+ if (node == NULL ||
!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(new_nodes,
node)) {
x509_policy_node_free(node);
delete_if_mapped(X509_POLICY_NODE *node, void *data)
{
const POLICY_MAPPINGS *mappings = data;
- // |mappings| must have been sorted by |compare_issuer_policy|.
+ /* |mappings| must have been sorted by |compare_issuer_policy|. */
assert(sk_POLICY_MAPPING_is_sorted(mappings));
POLICY_MAPPING mapping;
mapping.issuerDomainPolicy = node->policy;
return 1;
}
-// process_policy_mappings processes the policy mappings extension of |cert|,
-// whose corresponding graph level is |level|. |mapping_allowed| specifies
-// whether policy mapping is inhibited at this point. On success, it returns an
-// |X509_POLICY_LEVEL| containing the "expected_policy_set" for |level|. On
-// error, it returns NULL. This implements steps (a) and (b) of RFC 5280,
-// section 6.1.4.
-//
-// We represent the "expected_policy_set" as an |X509_POLICY_LEVEL|.
-// |has_any_policy| indicates whether there is an anyPolicy node with
-// "expected_policy_set" of {anyPolicy}. If a node with policy oid P1 contains
-// P2 in its "expected_policy_set", the level will contain a node of policy P2
-// with P1 in |parent_policies|.
-//
-// This is equivalent to the |X509_POLICY_LEVEL| that would result if the next
-// certificats contained anyPolicy. |process_certificate_policies| will filter
-// this result down to compute the actual level.
+/*
+ * process_policy_mappings processes the policy mappings extension of |cert|,
+ * whose corresponding graph level is |level|. |mapping_allowed| specifies
+ * whether policy mapping is inhibited at this point. On success, it returns an
+ * |X509_POLICY_LEVEL| containing the "expected_policy_set" for |level|. On
+ * error, it returns NULL. This implements steps (a) and (b) of RFC 5280,
+ * section 6.1.4.
+ *
+ * We represent the "expected_policy_set" as an |X509_POLICY_LEVEL|.
+ * |has_any_policy| indicates whether there is an anyPolicy node with
+ * "expected_policy_set" of {anyPolicy}. If a node with policy oid P1 contains
+ * P2 in its "expected_policy_set", the level will contain a node of policy P2
+ * with P1 in |parent_policies|.
+ *
+ * This is equivalent to the |X509_POLICY_LEVEL| that would result if the next
+ * certificats contained anyPolicy. |process_certificate_policies| will filter
+ * this result down to compute the actual level.
+ */
static X509_POLICY_LEVEL *
process_policy_mappings(const X509 *cert,
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
POLICY_MAPPINGS *mappings =
X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_policy_mappings, &critical, NULL);
if (mappings == NULL && critical != -1) {
- // Syntax error in the policy mappings extension.
+ /* Syntax error in the policy mappings extension. */
goto err;
}
if (mappings != NULL) {
- // PolicyMappings may not be empty. See RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.5.
- // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/443): Move this check into the parser.
+ /*
+ * PolicyMappings may not be empty. See RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.5.
+ * TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/443): Move this check into
+ * the parser.
+ */
if (sk_POLICY_MAPPING_num(mappings) == 0) {
X509error(X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
goto err;
}
- // RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, step (a).
+ /* RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, step (a). */
for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_POLICY_MAPPING_num(mappings); i++) {
- POLICY_MAPPING *mapping = sk_POLICY_MAPPING_value(mappings,
- i);
+ POLICY_MAPPING *mapping = sk_POLICY_MAPPING_value(mappings, i);
if (is_any_policy(mapping->issuerDomainPolicy) ||
is_any_policy(mapping->subjectDomainPolicy)) {
goto err;
}
}
- // Sort to group by issuerDomainPolicy.
+ /* Sort to group by issuerDomainPolicy. */
sk_POLICY_MAPPING_set_cmp_func(mappings, compare_issuer_policy);
sk_POLICY_MAPPING_sort(mappings);
if (mapping_allowed) {
- // Mark nodes as mapped, and add any nodes to |level| which may be needed
- // as part of RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, step (b.1).
+ /*
+ * Mark nodes as mapped, and add any nodes to |level|
+ * which may be needed as part of RFC 5280,
+ * section 6.1.4, step (b.1).
+ */
new_nodes = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null();
if (new_nodes == NULL) {
goto err;
i++) {
const POLICY_MAPPING *mapping = sk_POLICY_MAPPING_value(mappings,
i);
- // There may be multiple mappings with the same |issuerDomainPolicy|.
+ /*
+ * There may be multiple mappings with the same
+ * |issuerDomainPolicy|.
+ */
if (last_policy != NULL &&
OBJ_cmp(mapping->issuerDomainPolicy,
last_policy) == 0) {
}
node = x509_policy_node_new(
mapping->issuerDomainPolicy);
- if (node == NULL || //
+ if (node == NULL ||
!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(new_nodes,
node)) {
x509_policy_node_free(node);
goto err;
}
} else {
- // RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, step (b.2). If mapping is inhibited, delete
- // all mapped nodes.
+ /*
+ * RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, step (b.2). If mapping is
+ * inhibited, delete all mapped nodes.
+ */
sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete_if(level->nodes,
delete_if_mapped, mappings);
sk_POLICY_MAPPING_pop_free(mappings,
}
}
- // If a node was not mapped, it retains the original "explicit_policy_set"
- // value, itself. Add those to |mappings|.
+ /*
+ * If a node was not mapped, it retains the original "explicit_policy_set"
+ * value, itself. Add those to |mappings|.
+ */
if (mappings == NULL) {
mappings = sk_POLICY_MAPPING_new_null();
if (mappings == NULL) {
}
}
- // Sort to group by subjectDomainPolicy.
+ /* Sort to group by subjectDomainPolicy. */
sk_POLICY_MAPPING_set_cmp_func(mappings, compare_subject_policy);
sk_POLICY_MAPPING_sort(mappings);
- // Convert |mappings| to our "expected_policy_set" representation.
+ /* Convert |mappings| to our "expected_policy_set" representation. */
next = x509_policy_level_new();
if (next == NULL) {
goto err;
X509_POLICY_NODE *last_node = NULL;
for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_POLICY_MAPPING_num(mappings); i++) {
POLICY_MAPPING *mapping = sk_POLICY_MAPPING_value(mappings, i);
- // Skip mappings where |issuerDomainPolicy| does not appear in the graph.
+ /*
+ * Skip mappings where |issuerDomainPolicy| does not appear in
+ * the graph.
+ */
if (!level->has_any_policy &&
x509_policy_level_find(level,
mapping->issuerDomainPolicy) == NULL) {
return next;
}
-// apply_skip_certs, if |skip_certs| is non-NULL, sets |*value| to the minimum
-// of its current value and |skip_certs|. It returns one on success and zero if
-// |skip_certs| is negative.
+/*
+ * apply_skip_certs, if |skip_certs| is non-NULL, sets |*value| to the minimum
+ * of its current value and |skip_certs|. It returns one on success and zero if
+ * |skip_certs| is negative.
+ */
static int
apply_skip_certs(const ASN1_INTEGER *skip_certs, size_t *value)
{
return 1;
}
- // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/443): Move this check into the parser.
+ /* TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/443): Move this check into the parser. */
if (skip_certs->type & V_ASN1_NEG) {
X509error(X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
- // If |skip_certs| does not fit in |uint64_t|, it must exceed |*value|.
+ /* If |skip_certs| does not fit in |uint64_t|, it must exceed |*value|. */
uint64_t u64;
if (ASN1_INTEGER_get_uint64(&u64, skip_certs) && u64 < *value) {
*value = (size_t)u64;
return 1;
}
-// process_policy_constraints updates |*explicit_policy|, |*policy_mapping|, and
-// |*inhibit_any_policy| according to |x509|'s policy constraints and inhibit
-// anyPolicy extensions. It returns one on success and zero on error. This
-// implements steps (i) and (j) of RFC 5280, section 6.1.4.
+/*
+ * process_policy_constraints updates |*explicit_policy|, |*policy_mapping|, and
+ * |*inhibit_any_policy| according to |x509|'s policy constraints and inhibit
+ * anyPolicy extensions. It returns one on success and zero on error. This
+ * implements steps (i) and (j) of RFC 5280, section 6.1.4.
+ */
static int
process_policy_constraints(const X509 *x509, size_t *explicit_policy,
size_t *policy_mapping,
if (constraints != NULL) {
if (constraints->requireExplicitPolicy == NULL &&
constraints->inhibitPolicyMapping == NULL) {
- // Per RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.11, at least one of the fields must be
- // present.
+ /*
+ * Per RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.11, at least one of the
+ * fields must be
+ */
X509error(X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
POLICY_CONSTRAINTS_free(constraints);
return 0;
return ok;
}
-// has_explicit_policy returns one if the set of authority-space policy OIDs
-// |levels| has some non-empty intersection with |user_policies|, and zero
-// otherwise. This mirrors the logic in RFC 5280, section 6.1.5, step (g). This
-// function modifies |levels| and should only be called at the end of policy
-// evaluation.
+/*
+ * has_explicit_policy returns one if the set of authority-space policy OIDs
+ * |levels| has some non-empty intersection with |user_policies|, and zero
+ * otherwise. This mirrors the logic in RFC 5280, section 6.1.5, step (g). This
+ * function modifies |levels| and should only be called at the end of policy
+ * evaluation.
+ */
static int
has_explicit_policy(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) *levels,
const STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *user_policies)
assert(user_policies == NULL ||
sk_ASN1_OBJECT_is_sorted(user_policies));
- // Step (g.i). If the policy graph is empty, the intersection is empty.
+ /* Step (g.i). If the policy graph is empty, the intersection is empty. */
size_t num_levels = sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_num(levels);
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level = sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_value(levels,
num_levels - 1);
return 0;
}
- // If |user_policies| is empty, we interpret it as having a single anyPolicy
- // value. The caller may also have supplied anyPolicy explicitly.
+ /*
+ * If |user_policies| is empty, we interpret it as having a single
+ * anyPolicy value. The caller may also have supplied anyPolicy
+ * explicitly.
+ */
int user_has_any_policy = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(user_policies) == 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(user_policies); i++) {
if (is_any_policy(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(user_policies, i))) {
}
}
- // Step (g.ii). If the policy graph is not empty and the user set contains
- // anyPolicy, the intersection is the entire (non-empty) graph.
+ /*
+ * Step (g.ii). If the policy graph is not empty and the user set
+ * contains anyPolicy, the intersection is the entire (non-empty) graph.
+ */
if (user_has_any_policy) {
return 1;
}
- // Step (g.iii) does not delete anyPolicy nodes, so if the graph has
- // anyPolicy, some explicit policy will survive. The actual intersection may
- // synthesize some nodes in step (g.iii.3), but we do not return the policy
- // list itself, so we skip actually computing this.
+ /*
+ * Step (g.iii) does not delete anyPolicy nodes, so if the graph has
+ * anyPolicy, some explicit policy will survive. The actual intersection
+ * may synthesize some nodes in step (g.iii.3), but we do not return the
+ * policy list itself, so we skip actually computing this.
+ */
if (level->has_any_policy) {
return 1;
}
- // We defer pruning the tree, so as we look for nodes with parent anyPolicy,
- // step (g.iii.1), we must limit to nodes reachable from the bottommost level.
- // Start by marking each of those nodes as reachable.
+ /*
+ * We defer pruning the tree, so as we look for nodes with parent
+ * anyPolicy, step (g.iii.1), we must limit to nodes reachable from the
+ * bottommost level. Start by marking each of those nodes as reachable.
+ */
for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes); i++) {
sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, i)->reachable = 1;
}
continue;
}
if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(node->parent_policies) == 0) {
- // |node|'s parent is anyPolicy and is part of "valid_policy_node_set".
- // If it exists in |user_policies|, the intersection is non-empty and we
- // can return immediately.
+ /*
+ * |node|'s parent is anyPolicy and is part of
+ * "valid_policy_node_set". If it exists in
+ * |user_policies|, the intersection is
+ * non-empty and we * can return immediately.
+ */
if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_find(user_policies,
node->policy) >= 0) {
return 1;
}
} else if (i > 0) {
- // |node|'s parents are concrete policies. Mark the parents reachable,
- // to be inspected by the next loop iteration.
+ /* |node|'s parents are concrete policies. Mark
+ * the parents reachable, to be inspected by the
+ * next loop iteration.
+ */
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *prev = sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_value(levels,
i - 1);
for (size_t k = 0; k <
X509_POLICY_NODE *parent = x509_policy_level_find(
prev,
- sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(node->parent_policies,
- k));
+ sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(node->parent_policies, k));
if (parent != NULL) {
parent->reachable = 1;
}
STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *user_policies_sorted = NULL;
size_t num_certs = sk_X509_num(certs);
- // Skip policy checking if the chain is just the trust anchor.
+ /* Skip policy checking if the chain is just the trust anchor. */
if (num_certs <= 1) {
return X509_V_OK;
}
- // See RFC 5280, section 6.1.2, steps (d) through (f).
+ /* See RFC 5280, section 6.1.2, steps (d) through (f). */
size_t explicit_policy =
(flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY) ? 0 : num_certs + 1;
size_t inhibit_any_policy =
level->has_any_policy = 1;
}
- // RFC 5280, section 6.1.3, steps (d) and (e). |any_policy_allowed| is
- // computed as in step (d.2).
+ /*
+ * RFC 5280, section 6.1.3, steps (d) and (e). |any_policy_allowed|
+ * is computed as in step (d.2).
+ */
const int any_policy_allowed =
inhibit_any_policy > 0 || (i > 0 && is_self_issued);
if (!process_certificate_policies(cert, level,
goto err;
}
- // RFC 5280, section 6.1.3, step (f).
+ /* RFC 5280, section 6.1.3, step (f). */
if (explicit_policy == 0 && x509_policy_level_is_empty(level)) {
ret = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
goto err;
}
- // Insert into the list.
+ /* Insert into the list. */
if (!sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_push(levels, level)) {
goto err;
}
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *current_level = level;
level = NULL;
- // If this is not the leaf certificate, we go to section 6.1.4. If it
- // is the leaf certificate, we go to section 6.1.5 instead.
+ /*
+ * If this is not the leaf certificate, we go to section 6.1.4.
+ * If it is the leaf certificate, we go to section 6.1.5 instead.
+ */
if (i != 0) {
- // RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, steps (a) and (b).
+ /* RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, steps (a) and (b). */
level = process_policy_mappings(cert, current_level,
policy_mapping > 0);
if (level == NULL) {
}
}
- // RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, step (h-j) for non-leaves, and section 6.1.5,
- // step (a-b) for leaves. In the leaf case, RFC 5280 says only to update
- // |explicit_policy|, but |policy_mapping| and |inhibit_any_policy| are no
- // longer read at this point, so we use the same process.
+ /*
+ * RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, step (h-j) for non-leaves, and
+ * section 6.1.5, step (a-b) for leaves. In the leaf case,
+ * RFC 5280 says only to update |explicit_policy|, but
+ * |policy_mapping| and |inhibit_any_policy| are no
+ * longer read at this point, so we use the same process.
+ */
if (i == 0 || !is_self_issued) {
if (explicit_policy > 0) {
explicit_policy--;
}
}
- // RFC 5280, section 6.1.5, step (g). We do not output the policy set, so it
- // is only necessary to check if the user-constrained-policy-set is not empty.
+ /*
+ * RFC 5280, section 6.1.5, step (g). We do not output the policy set,
+ * so it is only necessary to check if the user-constrained-policy-set
+ * is not empty.
+ */
if (explicit_policy == 0) {
- // Build a sorted copy of |user_policies| for more efficient lookup.
+ /*
+ * Build a sorted copy of |user_policies| for more efficient
+ * lookup.
+ */
if (user_policies != NULL) {
user_policies_sorted = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_dup(
user_policies);
err:
x509_policy_level_free(level);
- // |user_policies_sorted|'s contents are owned by |user_policies|, so we do
- // not use |sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free|.
+ /*
+ * |user_policies_sorted|'s contents are owned by |user_policies|, so
+ * we do not use |sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free|.
+ */
sk_ASN1_OBJECT_free(user_policies_sorted);
sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_pop_free(levels, x509_policy_level_free);
return ret;
projects / openbsd / commitdiff