Avoid passing last and depth to x509_verify_cert_error() on ENOMEM.

In x509_verify_ctx_set_xsc_chain(), an ENOMEM case is currently passing
the last certificate and depth (which is no longer actually depth) to
x509_verify_cert_error(). Given we've hit an ENOMEM situation, neither
of these are useful so remove both.

ok tb@

diff --git a/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_verify.c b/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_verify.c
index 598e268..62cbb7c 100644 (file)
--- a/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_verify.c
+++ b/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_verify.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: x509_verify.c,v 1.31 2021/02/24 17:59:05 tb Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: x509_verify.c,v 1.32 2021/02/25 16:57:10 jsing Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2020-2021 Bob Beck <beck@openbsd.org>
  *
@@ -197,7 +197,6 @@ static int
 x509_verify_ctx_set_xsc_chain(struct x509_verify_ctx *ctx,
     struct x509_verify_chain *chain, int set_error, int is_trusted)
 {
-       X509 *last = x509_verify_chain_last(chain);
        size_t depth;
        int i;
 
@@ -218,7 +217,7 @@ x509_verify_ctx_set_xsc_chain(struct x509_verify_ctx *ctx,
        sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->xsc->chain, X509_free);
        ctx->xsc->chain = X509_chain_up_ref(chain->certs);
        if (ctx->xsc->chain == NULL)
-               return x509_verify_cert_error(ctx, last, depth,
+               return x509_verify_cert_error(ctx, NULL, 0,
                    X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, 0);
 
        if (set_error) {