-/* $OpenBSD: dcphy.c,v 1.20 2008/07/11 15:00:17 brad Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: dcphy.c,v 1.21 2008/07/22 11:20:10 martynas Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999
* since real Intel 21143 chips don't show valid link
* status until autonegotiation is switched off, and
* that only happens in dcphy_status(). Without this,
- * successful autonegotation is never recognised on
+ * successful autonegotiation is never recognised on
* these chips.
*/
if (++sc->mii_ticks <= sc->mii_anegticks)
***************************************************************************/
/* $FreeBSD: if_em.h,v 1.26 2004/09/01 23:22:41 pdeuskar Exp $ */
-/* $OpenBSD: if_em.h,v 1.36 2007/10/21 03:49:54 brad Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: if_em.h,v 1.37 2008/07/22 11:20:10 martynas Exp $ */
#ifndef _EM_H_DEFINED_
#define _EM_H_DEFINED_
#define EM_TX_OP_THRESHOLD (sc->num_tx_desc / 32)
/*
- * This parameter controls whether or not autonegotation is enabled.
+ * This parameter controls whether or not autonegotiation is enabled.
* 0 - Disable autonegotiation
* 1 - Enable autonegotiation
*/
client is permitted to negotiate in the SSL handshake phase. Notice that this
directive can be used both in per-server and per-directory context. In
per-server context it applies to the standard SSL handshake when a connection
-is established. In per-directory context it forces a SSL renegotation with the
+is established. In per-directory context it forces a SSL renegotiation with the
reconfigured Cipher Suite after the HTTP request was read but before the HTTP
response is sent.
<p>
Authentication. Notice that this directive can be used both in per-server and
per-directory context. In per-server context it applies to the client
authentication process used in the standard SSL handshake when a connection is
-established. In per-directory context it forces a SSL renegotation with the
+established. In per-directory context it forces a SSL renegotiation with the
reconfigured client verification level after the HTTP request was read but
before the HTTP response is sent.
<p>
used both in per-server and per-directory context. In per-server context it
applies to the client authentication process used in the standard SSL
handshake when a connection is established. In per-directory context it forces
-a SSL renegotation with the reconfigured client verification depth after the
+a SSL renegotiation with the reconfigured client verification depth after the
HTTP request was read but before the HTTP response is sent.
<p>
The depth actually is the maximum number of intermediate certificate issuers,
getsockname() failures to log the client IP address and to
change the log level to debug. [Jeff Trawick]
- *) Correction to mod_negotation for Win32, OS2, Netware etc, where
+ *) Correction to mod_negotiation for Win32, OS2, Netware etc, where
case insensitive requests such as the HEADER or README search
from autoindex would fail to match HEADER.html (because the
system internally looked for the case-sensitive header.* pattern.)
Apache to the main server error log, until the child can
open it's own error logs. [William Rowe]
- *) Revert mod_negotation's handling of path_info and query_args
+ *) Revert mod_negotiation's handling of path_info and query_args
to the 1.3.20 behavior. PR: 8628, 8582, 8538 [William Rowe]
*) Modify buff.h and buff.c to enable modules to intercept the
SSLVerifyDepth and/or SSLCipherSuite directives in <Directory> or
<Location> containers or even .htaccess files. When Apache reaches those
directories, those directives reconfigure the SSL parameters and the SSL
- renegotation is automatically enforced by mod_ssl. The only drawback is
+ renegotiation is automatically enforced by mod_ssl. The only drawback is
that although an optimization is done to reduce unnecessary
renegotiations (when the parameters were not actually changed), you
usually increase the overhead for a request because a SSL renegotiation
/*
* Simulate an EINTR in case OpenSSL wants to read more.
* (This is usually the case when the client forces an SSL
- * renegotation which is handled implicitly by OpenSSL.)
+ * renegotiation which is handled implicitly by OpenSSL.)
*/
if (rc < 0 && SSL_get_error(ssl, rc) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
errno = EINTR;
* Additionally the following optimization is possible here: When the
* currently active verify type is "none" but a client certificate is
* already known/present, it's enough to manually force a client
- * verification but at least skip the I/O-intensive renegotation
+ * verification but at least skip the I/O-intensive renegotiation
* handshake.
*/
if (dc->nVerifyClient != SSL_CVERIFY_UNSET) {
*/
if (renegotiate) {
/*
- * Now we force the SSL renegotation by sending the Hello Request
+ * Now we force the SSL renegotiation by sending the Hello Request
* message to the client. Here we have to do a workaround: Actually
* OpenSSL returns immediately after sending the Hello Request (the
* intent AFAIK is because the SSL/TLS protocol says it's not a must
}
/*
- * Because SSL renegotations can happen at any time (not only after
+ * Because SSL renegotiations can happen at any time (not only after
* SSL_accept()), the best way to log the current connection details is
* right after a finished handshake.
*/