-# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.133 2023/06/29 06:12:04 tb Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.134 2023/07/05 12:18:21 tb Exp $
LIB= crypto
LIBREBUILD=y
SRCS+= ech_lib.c
# ecdsa/
-SRCS+= ecs_asn1.c
SRCS+= ecs_err.c
SRCS+= ecs_lib.c
-SRCS+= ecs_ossl.c
+SRCS+= ecdsa.c
# engine/
SRCS+= eng_all.c
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: ecdsa.c,v 1.1 2023/07/05 12:18:21 tb Exp $ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+
+#include "bn_local.h"
+#include "ec_local.h"
+#include "ecdsa_local.h"
+
+static const ASN1_TEMPLATE ECDSA_SIG_seq_tt[] = {
+ {
+ .flags = 0,
+ .tag = 0,
+ .offset = offsetof(ECDSA_SIG, r),
+ .field_name = "r",
+ .item = &BIGNUM_it,
+ },
+ {
+ .flags = 0,
+ .tag = 0,
+ .offset = offsetof(ECDSA_SIG, s),
+ .field_name = "s",
+ .item = &BIGNUM_it,
+ },
+};
+
+const ASN1_ITEM ECDSA_SIG_it = {
+ .itype = ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE,
+ .utype = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE,
+ .templates = ECDSA_SIG_seq_tt,
+ .tcount = sizeof(ECDSA_SIG_seq_tt) / sizeof(ASN1_TEMPLATE),
+ .funcs = NULL,
+ .size = sizeof(ECDSA_SIG),
+ .sname = "ECDSA_SIG",
+};
+
+ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_SIG_new(void);
+void ECDSA_SIG_free(ECDSA_SIG *a);
+ECDSA_SIG *d2i_ECDSA_SIG(ECDSA_SIG **a, const unsigned char **in, long len);
+int i2d_ECDSA_SIG(const ECDSA_SIG *a, unsigned char **out);
+
+ECDSA_SIG *
+d2i_ECDSA_SIG(ECDSA_SIG **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
+{
+ return (ECDSA_SIG *)ASN1_item_d2i((ASN1_VALUE **)a, in, len,
+ &ECDSA_SIG_it);
+}
+
+int
+i2d_ECDSA_SIG(const ECDSA_SIG *a, unsigned char **out)
+{
+ return ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)a, out, &ECDSA_SIG_it);
+}
+
+ECDSA_SIG *
+ECDSA_SIG_new(void)
+{
+ return (ECDSA_SIG *)ASN1_item_new(&ECDSA_SIG_it);
+}
+
+void
+ECDSA_SIG_free(ECDSA_SIG *a)
+{
+ ASN1_item_free((ASN1_VALUE *)a, &ECDSA_SIG_it);
+}
+
+void
+ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps)
+{
+ if (pr != NULL)
+ *pr = sig->r;
+ if (ps != NULL)
+ *ps = sig->s;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *
+ECDSA_SIG_get0_r(const ECDSA_SIG *sig)
+{
+ return sig->r;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *
+ECDSA_SIG_get0_s(const ECDSA_SIG *sig)
+{
+ return sig->s;
+}
+
+int
+ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s)
+{
+ if (r == NULL || s == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ BN_free(sig->r);
+ BN_free(sig->s);
+ sig->r = r;
+ sig->s = s;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * FIPS 186-5, section 6.4.1, step 2: convert hashed message into an integer.
+ * Use the order_bits leftmost bits if it exceeds the group order.
+ */
+static int
+ecdsa_prepare_digest(const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
+ const EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *e)
+{
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+ int digest_bits, order_bits;
+
+ if (!BN_bin2bn(digest, digest_len, e)) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(key)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ order_bits = EC_GROUP_order_bits(group);
+
+ digest_bits = 8 * digest_len;
+ if (digest_bits <= order_bits)
+ return 1;
+
+ return BN_rshift(e, e, digest_bits - order_bits);
+}
+
+int
+ecdsa_sign(int type, const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
+ unsigned char *signature, unsigned int *signature_len, const BIGNUM *kinv,
+ const BIGNUM *r, EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ ECDSA_SIG *sig;
+ int out_len = 0;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if ((sig = ECDSA_do_sign_ex(digest, digest_len, kinv, r, key)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((out_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig, &signature)) < 0) {
+ out_len = 0;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ *signature_len = out_len;
+ ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * FIPS 186-5, section 6.4.1, steps 3-8 and 11: Generate k, calculate r and
+ * kinv, and clear it. If r == 0, try again with a new random k.
+ */
+
+int
+ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *in_ctx, BIGNUM **out_kinv, BIGNUM **out_r)
+{
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+ EC_POINT *point = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *k = NULL, *r = NULL;
+ const BIGNUM *order;
+ BIGNUM *x;
+ int order_bits;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ BN_free(*out_kinv);
+ *out_kinv = NULL;
+
+ BN_free(*out_r);
+ *out_r = NULL;
+
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(key)) == NULL) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((k = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((ctx = in_ctx) == NULL)
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+ if ((x = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group)) == NULL) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_cmp(order, BN_value_one()) <= 0) {
+ ECDSAerror(EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Reject curves with an order that is smaller than 80 bits. */
+ if ((order_bits = BN_num_bits(order)) < 80) {
+ ECDSAerror(EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Preallocate space. */
+ if (!BN_set_bit(k, order_bits) ||
+ !BN_set_bit(r, order_bits) ||
+ !BN_set_bit(x, order_bits))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Step 11: repeat until r != 0. */
+ do {
+ /* Step 3: generate random k. */
+ if (!bn_rand_interval(k, BN_value_one(), order)) {
+ ECDSAerror(ECDSA_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k,
+ * so we compute G * k using an equivalent scalar of fixed
+ * bit-length.
+ *
+ * We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent
+ * a small timing information leakage. We then choose the sum
+ * that is one bit longer than the order. This guarantees the
+ * code path used in the constant time implementations
+ * elsewhere.
+ *
+ * TODO: revisit the bn_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic
+ * conditional copy.
+ */
+ if (!BN_add(r, k, order) ||
+ !BN_add(x, r, order) ||
+ !bn_copy(k, BN_num_bits(r) > order_bits ? r : x))
+ goto err;
+
+ BN_set_flags(k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+ /* Step 5: P = k * G. */
+ if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Steps 6 (and 7): from P = (x, y) retain the x-coordinate. */
+ if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, NULL,
+ ctx)) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Step 8: r = x (mod order). */
+ if (!BN_nnmod(r, x, order, ctx)) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } while (BN_is_zero(r));
+
+ /* Step 4: calculate kinv. */
+ if (BN_mod_inverse_ct(k, k, order, ctx) == NULL) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ *out_kinv = k;
+ k = NULL;
+
+ *out_r = r;
+ r = NULL;
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ if (ctx != in_ctx)
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ BN_free(k);
+ BN_free(r);
+ EC_POINT_free(point);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * FIPS 186-5, section 6.4.1, step 9: compute s = inv(k)(e + xr) mod order.
+ * In order to reduce the possibility of a side-channel attack, the following
+ * is calculated using a random blinding value b in [1, order):
+ * s = inv(b)(be + bxr)inv(k) mod order.
+ */
+
+static int
+ecdsa_compute_s(BIGNUM **out_s, const BIGNUM *e, const BIGNUM *kinv,
+ const BIGNUM *r, const EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+ const BIGNUM *order, *priv_key;
+ BIGNUM *b, *binv, *be, *bxr;
+ BIGNUM *s = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ *out_s = NULL;
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+ if ((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(key)) == NULL) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group)) == NULL) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)) == NULL) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((b = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if ((binv = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if ((be = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if ((bxr = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * In a valid ECDSA signature, r must be in [1, order). Since r can be
+ * caller provided - either directly or by replacing sign_setup() - we
+ * can't rely on this being the case.
+ */
+ if (BN_cmp(r, BN_value_one()) < 0 || BN_cmp(r, order) >= 0) {
+ ECDSAerror(ECDSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!bn_rand_interval(b, BN_value_one(), order)) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_mod_inverse_ct(binv, b, order, ctx) == NULL) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(bxr, b, priv_key, order, ctx)) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(bxr, bxr, r, order, ctx)) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(be, b, e, order, ctx)) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!BN_mod_add(s, be, bxr, order, ctx)) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* s = b(e + xr)k^-1 */
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, kinv, order, ctx)) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* s = (e + xr)k^-1 */
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, binv, order, ctx)) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Step 11: if s == 0 start over. */
+ if (!BN_is_zero(s)) {
+ *out_s = s;
+ s = NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_free(s);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * It is too expensive to check curve parameters on every sign operation.
+ * Instead, cap the number of retries. A single retry is very unlikely, so
+ * allowing 32 retries is amply enough.
+ */
+#define ECDSA_MAX_SIGN_ITERATIONS 32
+
+/*
+ * FIPS 186-5: Section 6.4.1: ECDSA signature generation, steps 2-12.
+ * The caller provides the hash of the message, thus performs step 1.
+ * Step 10, zeroing k and kinv, is done by BN_free().
+ */
+
+ECDSA_SIG *
+ecdsa_sign_sig(const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
+ const BIGNUM *in_kinv, const BIGNUM *in_r, EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *e;
+ int caller_supplied_values = 0;
+ int attempts = 0;
+ ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
+
+ if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+ if ((e = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Step 2: convert hash into an integer. */
+ if (!ecdsa_prepare_digest(digest, digest_len, key, e))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (in_kinv != NULL && in_r != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Use the caller's kinv and r. Don't call ECDSA_sign_setup().
+ * If we're unable to compute a valid signature, the caller
+ * must provide new values.
+ */
+ caller_supplied_values = 1;
+
+ if ((kinv = BN_dup(in_kinv)) == NULL) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((r = BN_dup(in_r)) == NULL) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ do {
+ /* Steps 3-8: calculate kinv and r. */
+ if (!caller_supplied_values) {
+ if (!ECDSA_sign_setup(key, ctx, &kinv, &r)) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Steps 9 and 11: if s is non-NULL, we have a valid signature.
+ */
+ if (!ecdsa_compute_s(&s, e, kinv, r, key, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (s != NULL)
+ break;
+
+ if (caller_supplied_values) {
+ ECDSAerror(ECDSA_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (++attempts > ECDSA_MAX_SIGN_ITERATIONS) {
+ ECDSAerror(EC_R_WRONG_CURVE_PARAMETERS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } while (1);
+
+ /* Step 12: output (r, s). */
+ if ((sig = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!ECDSA_SIG_set0(sig, r, s)) {
+ ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ r = NULL;
+ s = NULL;
+
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ BN_free(kinv);
+ BN_free(r);
+ BN_free(s);
+
+ return sig;
+}
+
+int
+ecdsa_verify(int type, const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
+ const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ ECDSA_SIG *s;
+ unsigned char *der = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ int der_len = 0;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ if ((s = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ p = sigbuf;
+ if (d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&s, &p, sig_len) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Ensure signature uses DER and doesn't have trailing garbage */
+ if ((der_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(s, &der)) != sig_len)
+ goto err;
+ if (timingsafe_memcmp(sigbuf, der, der_len))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = ECDSA_do_verify(digest, digest_len, s, key);
+
+ err:
+ freezero(der, der_len);
+ ECDSA_SIG_free(s);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * FIPS 186-5, section 6.4.2: ECDSA signature verification.
+ * The caller provides us with the hash of the message, so has performed step 2.
+ */
+
+int
+ecdsa_verify_sig(const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
+ const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+ const EC_POINT *pub_key;
+ EC_POINT *point = NULL;
+ const BIGNUM *order;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *e, *sinv, *u, *v, *x;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ if (key == NULL || sig == NULL) {
+ ECDSAerror(ECDSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(key)) == NULL) {
+ ECDSAerror(ECDSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((pub_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key)) == NULL) {
+ ECDSAerror(ECDSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+ if ((e = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if ((sinv = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if ((u = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if ((v = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if ((x = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group)) == NULL) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Step 1: verify that r and s are in the range [1, order). */
+ if (BN_cmp(sig->r, BN_value_one()) < 0 || BN_cmp(sig->r, order) >= 0) {
+ ECDSAerror(ECDSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ ret = 0;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (BN_cmp(sig->s, BN_value_one()) < 0 || BN_cmp(sig->s, order) >= 0) {
+ ECDSAerror(ECDSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ ret = 0;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Step 3: convert the hash into an integer. */
+ if (!ecdsa_prepare_digest(digest, digest_len, key, e))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Step 4: compute the inverse of s modulo order. */
+ if (BN_mod_inverse_ct(sinv, sig->s, order, ctx) == NULL) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Step 5: compute u = s^-1 * e and v = s^-1 * r (modulo order). */
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(u, e, sinv, order, ctx)) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(v, sig->r, sinv, order, ctx)) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Steps 6 and 7: compute R = G * u + pub_key * v = (x, y). Reject if
+ * it's the point at infinity - getting affine coordinates fails. Keep
+ * the x coordinate.
+ */
+ if ((point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, point, u, pub_key, v, ctx)) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, NULL, ctx)) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Step 8: convert x to a number in [0, order). */
+ if (!BN_nnmod(x, x, order, ctx)) {
+ ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Step 9: the signature is valid iff the x-coordinate is equal to r. */
+ ret = (BN_cmp(x, sig->r) == 0);
+
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EC_POINT_free(point);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+ECDSA_SIG *
+ECDSA_do_sign(const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len, EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ return ECDSA_do_sign_ex(digest, digest_len, NULL, NULL, key);
+}
+
+ECDSA_SIG *
+ECDSA_do_sign_ex(const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
+ const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *out_r, EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ if (key->meth->sign_sig == NULL) {
+ ECDSAerror(EVP_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return key->meth->sign_sig(digest, digest_len, kinv, out_r, key);
+}
+
+int
+ECDSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
+ unsigned char *signature, unsigned int *signature_len, EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ return ECDSA_sign_ex(type, digest, digest_len, signature, signature_len,
+ NULL, NULL, key);
+}
+
+int
+ECDSA_sign_ex(int type, const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
+ unsigned char *signature, unsigned int *signature_len, const BIGNUM *kinv,
+ const BIGNUM *r, EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ if (key->meth->sign == NULL) {
+ ECDSAerror(EVP_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return key->meth->sign(type, digest, digest_len, signature,
+ signature_len, kinv, r, key);
+}
+
+int
+ECDSA_sign_setup(EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *in_ctx, BIGNUM **out_kinv,
+ BIGNUM **out_r)
+{
+ if (key->meth->sign_setup == NULL) {
+ ECDSAerror(EVP_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return key->meth->sign_setup(key, in_ctx, out_kinv, out_r);
+}
+
+int
+ECDSA_do_verify(const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
+ const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ if (key->meth->verify_sig == NULL) {
+ ECDSAerror(EVP_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return key->meth->verify_sig(digest, digest_len, sig, key);
+}
+
+int
+ECDSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
+ const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ if (key->meth->verify == NULL) {
+ ECDSAerror(EVP_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return key->meth->verify(type, digest, digest_len, sigbuf, sig_len, key);
+}
+
+int
+ECDSA_size(const EC_KEY *r)
+{
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+ const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
+ ECDSA_SIG sig;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (r == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(r)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ sig.r = (BIGNUM *)order;
+ sig.s = (BIGNUM *)order;
+
+ if ((ret = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(&sig, NULL)) < 0)
+ ret = 0;
+
+ err:
+ return ret;
+}
+++ /dev/null
-/* $OpenBSD: ecs_asn1.c,v 1.15 2023/07/05 11:37:46 tb Exp $ */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2000-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-
-#include "ecdsa_local.h"
-
-static const ASN1_TEMPLATE ECDSA_SIG_seq_tt[] = {
- {
- .flags = 0,
- .tag = 0,
- .offset = offsetof(ECDSA_SIG, r),
- .field_name = "r",
- .item = &BIGNUM_it,
- },
- {
- .flags = 0,
- .tag = 0,
- .offset = offsetof(ECDSA_SIG, s),
- .field_name = "s",
- .item = &BIGNUM_it,
- },
-};
-
-const ASN1_ITEM ECDSA_SIG_it = {
- .itype = ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE,
- .utype = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE,
- .templates = ECDSA_SIG_seq_tt,
- .tcount = sizeof(ECDSA_SIG_seq_tt) / sizeof(ASN1_TEMPLATE),
- .funcs = NULL,
- .size = sizeof(ECDSA_SIG),
- .sname = "ECDSA_SIG",
-};
-
-ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_SIG_new(void);
-void ECDSA_SIG_free(ECDSA_SIG *a);
-ECDSA_SIG *d2i_ECDSA_SIG(ECDSA_SIG **a, const unsigned char **in, long len);
-int i2d_ECDSA_SIG(const ECDSA_SIG *a, unsigned char **out);
-
-ECDSA_SIG *
-d2i_ECDSA_SIG(ECDSA_SIG **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
-{
- return (ECDSA_SIG *)ASN1_item_d2i((ASN1_VALUE **)a, in, len,
- &ECDSA_SIG_it);
-}
-
-int
-i2d_ECDSA_SIG(const ECDSA_SIG *a, unsigned char **out)
-{
- return ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)a, out, &ECDSA_SIG_it);
-}
-
-ECDSA_SIG *
-ECDSA_SIG_new(void)
-{
- return (ECDSA_SIG *)ASN1_item_new(&ECDSA_SIG_it);
-}
-
-void
-ECDSA_SIG_free(ECDSA_SIG *a)
-{
- ASN1_item_free((ASN1_VALUE *)a, &ECDSA_SIG_it);
-}
-
-void
-ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps)
-{
- if (pr != NULL)
- *pr = sig->r;
- if (ps != NULL)
- *ps = sig->s;
-}
-
-const BIGNUM *
-ECDSA_SIG_get0_r(const ECDSA_SIG *sig)
-{
- return sig->r;
-}
-
-const BIGNUM *
-ECDSA_SIG_get0_s(const ECDSA_SIG *sig)
-{
- return sig->s;
-}
-
-int
-ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s)
-{
- if (r == NULL || s == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- BN_free(sig->r);
- BN_free(sig->s);
- sig->r = r;
- sig->s = s;
- return 1;
-}
+++ /dev/null
-/* $OpenBSD: ecs_ossl.c,v 1.73 2023/07/05 11:37:46 tb Exp $ */
-/*
- * Written by Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-
-#include "bn_local.h"
-#include "ec_local.h"
-#include "ecdsa_local.h"
-
-/*
- * FIPS 186-5, section 6.4.1, step 2: convert hashed message into an integer.
- * Use the order_bits leftmost bits if it exceeds the group order.
- */
-static int
-ecdsa_prepare_digest(const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
- const EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *e)
-{
- const EC_GROUP *group;
- int digest_bits, order_bits;
-
- if (!BN_bin2bn(digest, digest_len, e)) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if ((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(key)) == NULL)
- return 0;
- order_bits = EC_GROUP_order_bits(group);
-
- digest_bits = 8 * digest_len;
- if (digest_bits <= order_bits)
- return 1;
-
- return BN_rshift(e, e, digest_bits - order_bits);
-}
-
-int
-ecdsa_sign(int type, const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
- unsigned char *signature, unsigned int *signature_len, const BIGNUM *kinv,
- const BIGNUM *r, EC_KEY *key)
-{
- ECDSA_SIG *sig;
- int out_len = 0;
- int ret = 0;
-
- if ((sig = ECDSA_do_sign_ex(digest, digest_len, kinv, r, key)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if ((out_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig, &signature)) < 0) {
- out_len = 0;
- goto err;
- }
-
- ret = 1;
-
- err:
- *signature_len = out_len;
- ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * FIPS 186-5, section 6.4.1, steps 3-8 and 11: Generate k, calculate r and
- * kinv, and clear it. If r == 0, try again with a new random k.
- */
-
-int
-ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *in_ctx, BIGNUM **out_kinv, BIGNUM **out_r)
-{
- const EC_GROUP *group;
- EC_POINT *point = NULL;
- BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- BIGNUM *k = NULL, *r = NULL;
- const BIGNUM *order;
- BIGNUM *x;
- int order_bits;
- int ret = 0;
-
- BN_free(*out_kinv);
- *out_kinv = NULL;
-
- BN_free(*out_r);
- *out_r = NULL;
-
- if (key == NULL) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- goto err;
- }
- if ((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(key)) == NULL) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((k = BN_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if ((ctx = in_ctx) == NULL)
- ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- if (ctx == NULL) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-
- if ((x = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if ((point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if ((order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group)) == NULL) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (BN_cmp(order, BN_value_one()) <= 0) {
- ECDSAerror(EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Reject curves with an order that is smaller than 80 bits. */
- if ((order_bits = BN_num_bits(order)) < 80) {
- ECDSAerror(EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Preallocate space. */
- if (!BN_set_bit(k, order_bits) ||
- !BN_set_bit(r, order_bits) ||
- !BN_set_bit(x, order_bits))
- goto err;
-
- /* Step 11: repeat until r != 0. */
- do {
- /* Step 3: generate random k. */
- if (!bn_rand_interval(k, BN_value_one(), order)) {
- ECDSAerror(ECDSA_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k,
- * so we compute G * k using an equivalent scalar of fixed
- * bit-length.
- *
- * We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent
- * a small timing information leakage. We then choose the sum
- * that is one bit longer than the order. This guarantees the
- * code path used in the constant time implementations
- * elsewhere.
- *
- * TODO: revisit the bn_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic
- * conditional copy.
- */
- if (!BN_add(r, k, order) ||
- !BN_add(x, r, order) ||
- !bn_copy(k, BN_num_bits(r) > order_bits ? r : x))
- goto err;
-
- BN_set_flags(k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-
- /* Step 5: P = k * G. */
- if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Steps 6 (and 7): from P = (x, y) retain the x-coordinate. */
- if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, NULL,
- ctx)) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Step 8: r = x (mod order). */
- if (!BN_nnmod(r, x, order, ctx)) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- } while (BN_is_zero(r));
-
- /* Step 4: calculate kinv. */
- if (BN_mod_inverse_ct(k, k, order, ctx) == NULL) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- *out_kinv = k;
- k = NULL;
-
- *out_r = r;
- r = NULL;
-
- ret = 1;
-
- err:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- if (ctx != in_ctx)
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- BN_free(k);
- BN_free(r);
- EC_POINT_free(point);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * FIPS 186-5, section 6.4.1, step 9: compute s = inv(k)(e + xr) mod order.
- * In order to reduce the possibility of a side-channel attack, the following
- * is calculated using a random blinding value b in [1, order):
- * s = inv(b)(be + bxr)inv(k) mod order.
- */
-
-static int
-ecdsa_compute_s(BIGNUM **out_s, const BIGNUM *e, const BIGNUM *kinv,
- const BIGNUM *r, const EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- const EC_GROUP *group;
- const BIGNUM *order, *priv_key;
- BIGNUM *b, *binv, *be, *bxr;
- BIGNUM *s = NULL;
- int ret = 0;
-
- *out_s = NULL;
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-
- if ((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(key)) == NULL) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- goto err;
- }
- if ((order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group)) == NULL) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if ((priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)) == NULL) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((b = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if ((binv = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if ((be = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if ((bxr = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- /*
- * In a valid ECDSA signature, r must be in [1, order). Since r can be
- * caller provided - either directly or by replacing sign_setup() - we
- * can't rely on this being the case.
- */
- if (BN_cmp(r, BN_value_one()) < 0 || BN_cmp(r, order) >= 0) {
- ECDSAerror(ECDSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!bn_rand_interval(b, BN_value_one(), order)) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (BN_mod_inverse_ct(binv, b, order, ctx) == NULL) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!BN_mod_mul(bxr, b, priv_key, order, ctx)) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!BN_mod_mul(bxr, bxr, r, order, ctx)) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!BN_mod_mul(be, b, e, order, ctx)) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!BN_mod_add(s, be, bxr, order, ctx)) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- /* s = b(e + xr)k^-1 */
- if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, kinv, order, ctx)) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- /* s = (e + xr)k^-1 */
- if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, binv, order, ctx)) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Step 11: if s == 0 start over. */
- if (!BN_is_zero(s)) {
- *out_s = s;
- s = NULL;
- }
-
- ret = 1;
-
- err:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- BN_free(s);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * It is too expensive to check curve parameters on every sign operation.
- * Instead, cap the number of retries. A single retry is very unlikely, so
- * allowing 32 retries is amply enough.
- */
-#define ECDSA_MAX_SIGN_ITERATIONS 32
-
-/*
- * FIPS 186-5: Section 6.4.1: ECDSA signature generation, steps 2-12.
- * The caller provides the hash of the message, thus performs step 1.
- * Step 10, zeroing k and kinv, is done by BN_free().
- */
-
-ECDSA_SIG *
-ecdsa_sign_sig(const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
- const BIGNUM *in_kinv, const BIGNUM *in_r, EC_KEY *key)
-{
- BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
- BIGNUM *e;
- int caller_supplied_values = 0;
- int attempts = 0;
- ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
-
- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-
- if ((e = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- /* Step 2: convert hash into an integer. */
- if (!ecdsa_prepare_digest(digest, digest_len, key, e))
- goto err;
-
- if (in_kinv != NULL && in_r != NULL) {
- /*
- * Use the caller's kinv and r. Don't call ECDSA_sign_setup().
- * If we're unable to compute a valid signature, the caller
- * must provide new values.
- */
- caller_supplied_values = 1;
-
- if ((kinv = BN_dup(in_kinv)) == NULL) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- if ((r = BN_dup(in_r)) == NULL) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- do {
- /* Steps 3-8: calculate kinv and r. */
- if (!caller_supplied_values) {
- if (!ECDSA_sign_setup(key, ctx, &kinv, &r)) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Steps 9 and 11: if s is non-NULL, we have a valid signature.
- */
- if (!ecdsa_compute_s(&s, e, kinv, r, key, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (s != NULL)
- break;
-
- if (caller_supplied_values) {
- ECDSAerror(ECDSA_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (++attempts > ECDSA_MAX_SIGN_ITERATIONS) {
- ECDSAerror(EC_R_WRONG_CURVE_PARAMETERS);
- goto err;
- }
- } while (1);
-
- /* Step 12: output (r, s). */
- if ((sig = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!ECDSA_SIG_set0(sig, r, s)) {
- ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
- goto err;
- }
- r = NULL;
- s = NULL;
-
- err:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- BN_free(kinv);
- BN_free(r);
- BN_free(s);
-
- return sig;
-}
-
-int
-ecdsa_verify(int type, const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
- const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *key)
-{
- ECDSA_SIG *s;
- unsigned char *der = NULL;
- const unsigned char *p;
- int der_len = 0;
- int ret = -1;
-
- if ((s = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- p = sigbuf;
- if (d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&s, &p, sig_len) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- /* Ensure signature uses DER and doesn't have trailing garbage */
- if ((der_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(s, &der)) != sig_len)
- goto err;
- if (timingsafe_memcmp(sigbuf, der, der_len))
- goto err;
-
- ret = ECDSA_do_verify(digest, digest_len, s, key);
-
- err:
- freezero(der, der_len);
- ECDSA_SIG_free(s);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * FIPS 186-5, section 6.4.2: ECDSA signature verification.
- * The caller provides us with the hash of the message, so has performed step 2.
- */
-
-int
-ecdsa_verify_sig(const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
- const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *key)
-{
- const EC_GROUP *group;
- const EC_POINT *pub_key;
- EC_POINT *point = NULL;
- const BIGNUM *order;
- BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- BIGNUM *e, *sinv, *u, *v, *x;
- int ret = -1;
-
- if (key == NULL || sig == NULL) {
- ECDSAerror(ECDSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
- goto err;
- }
- if ((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(key)) == NULL) {
- ECDSAerror(ECDSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
- goto err;
- }
- if ((pub_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key)) == NULL) {
- ECDSAerror(ECDSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-
- if ((e = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if ((sinv = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if ((u = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if ((v = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if ((x = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if ((order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group)) == NULL) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Step 1: verify that r and s are in the range [1, order). */
- if (BN_cmp(sig->r, BN_value_one()) < 0 || BN_cmp(sig->r, order) >= 0) {
- ECDSAerror(ECDSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- ret = 0;
- goto err;
- }
- if (BN_cmp(sig->s, BN_value_one()) < 0 || BN_cmp(sig->s, order) >= 0) {
- ECDSAerror(ECDSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- ret = 0;
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Step 3: convert the hash into an integer. */
- if (!ecdsa_prepare_digest(digest, digest_len, key, e))
- goto err;
-
- /* Step 4: compute the inverse of s modulo order. */
- if (BN_mod_inverse_ct(sinv, sig->s, order, ctx) == NULL) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Step 5: compute u = s^-1 * e and v = s^-1 * r (modulo order). */
- if (!BN_mod_mul(u, e, sinv, order, ctx)) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!BN_mod_mul(v, sig->r, sinv, order, ctx)) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Steps 6 and 7: compute R = G * u + pub_key * v = (x, y). Reject if
- * it's the point at infinity - getting affine coordinates fails. Keep
- * the x coordinate.
- */
- if ((point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, point, u, pub_key, v, ctx)) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, NULL, ctx)) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Step 8: convert x to a number in [0, order). */
- if (!BN_nnmod(x, x, order, ctx)) {
- ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Step 9: the signature is valid iff the x-coordinate is equal to r. */
- ret = (BN_cmp(x, sig->r) == 0);
-
- err:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- EC_POINT_free(point);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-ECDSA_SIG *
-ECDSA_do_sign(const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len, EC_KEY *key)
-{
- return ECDSA_do_sign_ex(digest, digest_len, NULL, NULL, key);
-}
-
-ECDSA_SIG *
-ECDSA_do_sign_ex(const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
- const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *out_r, EC_KEY *key)
-{
- if (key->meth->sign_sig == NULL) {
- ECDSAerror(EVP_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED);
- return 0;
- }
- return key->meth->sign_sig(digest, digest_len, kinv, out_r, key);
-}
-
-int
-ECDSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
- unsigned char *signature, unsigned int *signature_len, EC_KEY *key)
-{
- return ECDSA_sign_ex(type, digest, digest_len, signature, signature_len,
- NULL, NULL, key);
-}
-
-int
-ECDSA_sign_ex(int type, const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
- unsigned char *signature, unsigned int *signature_len, const BIGNUM *kinv,
- const BIGNUM *r, EC_KEY *key)
-{
- if (key->meth->sign == NULL) {
- ECDSAerror(EVP_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED);
- return 0;
- }
- return key->meth->sign(type, digest, digest_len, signature,
- signature_len, kinv, r, key);
-}
-
-int
-ECDSA_sign_setup(EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *in_ctx, BIGNUM **out_kinv,
- BIGNUM **out_r)
-{
- if (key->meth->sign_setup == NULL) {
- ECDSAerror(EVP_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED);
- return 0;
- }
- return key->meth->sign_setup(key, in_ctx, out_kinv, out_r);
-}
-
-int
-ECDSA_do_verify(const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
- const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *key)
-{
- if (key->meth->verify_sig == NULL) {
- ECDSAerror(EVP_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED);
- return 0;
- }
- return key->meth->verify_sig(digest, digest_len, sig, key);
-}
-
-int
-ECDSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
- const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *key)
-{
- if (key->meth->verify == NULL) {
- ECDSAerror(EVP_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED);
- return 0;
- }
- return key->meth->verify(type, digest, digest_len, sigbuf, sig_len, key);
-}
-
-int
-ECDSA_size(const EC_KEY *r)
-{
- const EC_GROUP *group;
- const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
- ECDSA_SIG sig;
- int ret = 0;
-
- if (r == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if ((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(r)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if ((order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- sig.r = (BIGNUM *)order;
- sig.s = (BIGNUM *)order;
-
- if ((ret = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(&sig, NULL)) < 0)
- ret = 0;
-
- err:
- return ret;
-}
projects / openbsd / commitdiff