-/* $OpenBSD: ssl_sess.c,v 1.36 2014/07/11 09:24:44 beck Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssl_sess.c,v 1.37 2014/07/12 23:59:11 jsing Exp $ */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* OTHERWISE.
*/
-#include <stdio.h>
#include <openssl/lhash.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#endif
+
#include "ssl_locl.h"
static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl)
{
SSL_SESSION *sess;
- /* Need to lock this all up rather than just use CRYPTO_add so that
+
+ /*
+ * Need to lock this all up rather than just use CRYPTO_add so that
* somebody doesn't free ssl->session between when we check it's
- * non-null and when we up the reference count. */
+ * non-null and when we up the reference count.
+ */
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
sess = ssl->session;
if (sess)
sess->references++;
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+
return (sess);
}
SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
{
- return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, argl, argp,
- new_func, dup_func, free_func);
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION,
+ argl, argp, new_func, dup_func, free_func);
}
int
ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
+
CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
+
return (ss);
}
return 0;
}
-/* Even with SSLv2, we have 16 bytes (128 bits) of session ID space. SSLv3/TLSv1
- * has 32 bytes (256 bits). As such, filling the ID with random gunk repeatedly
- * until we have no conflict is going to complete in one iteration pretty much
- * "most" of the time (btw: understatement). So, if it takes us 10 iterations
- * and we still can't avoid a conflict - well that's a reasonable point to call
- * it quits. Either the RAND code is broken or someone is trying to open roughly
- * very close to 2^128 (or 2^256) SSL sessions to our server. How you might
- * store that many sessions is perhaps a more interesting question ... */
+/*
+ * Even with SSLv2, we have 16 bytes (128 bits) of session ID space.
+ * SSLv3/TLSv1 has 32 bytes (256 bits). As such, filling the ID with random
+ * gunk repeatedly until we have no conflict is going to complete in one
+ * iteration pretty much "most" of the time (btw: understatement). So, if it
+ * takes us 10 iterations and we still can't avoid a conflict - well that's a
+ * reasonable point to call it quits. Either the RAND code is broken or someone
+ * is trying to open roughly very close to 2^128 (or 2^256) SSL sessions to our
+ * server. How you might store that many sessions is perhaps a more interesting
+ * question...
+ */
#define MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS 10
+
static int
-def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
- unsigned int *id_len)
+def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id, unsigned int *id_len)
{
unsigned int retry = 0;
- do
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0)
- return 0;
- while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) &&
- (++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS));
+
+ do {
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ } while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) &&
+ (++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS));
+
if (retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)
return 1;
+
/* else - woops a session_id match */
/* XXX We should also check the external cache --
* but the probability of a collision is negligible, and
int
ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session)
{
- /* This gets used by clients and servers. */
-
unsigned int tmp;
SSL_SESSION *ss = NULL;
GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id;
- if ((ss = SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL) return (0);
+ /* This gets used by clients and servers. */
+
+ if ((ss = SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL)
+ return (0);
/* If the context has a default timeout, use it */
if (s->session_ctx->session_timeout == 0)
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
return (0);
}
- /* If RFC4507 ticket use empty session ID */
+
+ /* If RFC4507 ticket use empty session ID. */
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
ss->session_id_length = 0;
goto sess_id_done;
}
- /* Choose which callback will set the session ID */
+
+ /* Choose which callback will set the session ID. */
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
if (s->generate_session_id)
cb = s->generate_session_id;
else if (s->session_ctx->generate_session_id)
cb = s->session_ctx->generate_session_id;
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- /* Choose a session ID */
+
+ /* Choose a session ID. */
tmp = ss->session_id_length;
if (!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp)) {
/* The callback failed */
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
return (0);
}
- /* Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero.
- * nor set it higher than it was. */
+
+ /*
+ * Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero.
+ * nor set it higher than it was.
+ */
if (!tmp || (tmp > ss->session_id_length)) {
/* The callback set an illegal length */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
return (0);
}
ss->session_id_length = tmp;
- /* Finally, check for a conflict */
+
+ /* Finally, check for a conflict. */
if (SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id,
ss->session_id_length)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
return (0);
}
- sess_id_done:
+
+sess_id_done:
if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
ss->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
if (ss->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
return 0;
}
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
return 0;
}
+
memcpy(ss->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
ss->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length;
s->session = ss;
return (1);
}
-/* ssl_get_prev attempts to find an SSL_SESSION to be used to resume this
+/*
+ * ssl_get_prev attempts to find an SSL_SESSION to be used to resume this
* connection. It is only called by servers.
*
* session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
* 0: a session may have been found.
*
* Side effects:
- * - If a session is found then s->session is pointed at it (after freeing an
- * existing session if need be) and s->verify_result is set from the session.
- * - Both for new and resumed sessions, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 1
- * if the server should issue a new session ticket (to 0 otherwise).
+ * - If a session is found then s->session is pointed at it (after freeing
+ * an existing session if need be) and s->verify_result is set from the
+ * session.
+ * - Both for new and resumed sessions, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set
+ * to 1 if the server should issue a new session ticket (to 0 otherwise).
*/
int
ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
const unsigned char *limit)
{
- /* This is used only by servers. */
-
SSL_SESSION *ret = NULL;
int fatal = 0;
int try_session_cache = 1;
int r;
+ /* This is used only by servers. */
+
if (len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)
goto err;
if (len == 0)
try_session_cache = 0;
- r = tls1_process_ticket(s, session_id, len, limit, &ret); /* sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected */
+ /* Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected. */
+ r = tls1_process_ticket(s, session_id, len, limit, &ret);
switch (r) {
case -1: /* Error during processing */
fatal = 1;
abort();
}
- if (try_session_cache &&
- ret == NULL &&
- !(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) {
+ if (try_session_cache && ret == NULL &&
+ !(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode &
+ SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) {
SSL_SESSION data;
data.ssl_version = s->version;
data.session_id_length = len;
if (len == 0)
return 0;
memcpy(data.session_id, session_id, len);
+
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
ret = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(s->session_ctx->sessions, &data);
if (ret != NULL) {
- /* don't allow other threads to steal it: */
- CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+ /* Don't allow other threads to steal it. */
+ CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1,
+ CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
}
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+
if (ret == NULL)
s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
}
- if (try_session_cache &&
- ret == NULL &&
- s->session_ctx->get_session_cb != NULL) {
+ if (try_session_cache && ret == NULL &&
+ s->session_ctx->get_session_cb != NULL) {
int copy = 1;
- if ((ret = s->session_ctx->get_session_cb(s, session_id, len, ©))) {
+ if ((ret = s->session_ctx->get_session_cb(s, session_id,
+ len, ©))) {
s->session_ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit++;
- /* Increment reference count now if the session callback
- * asks us to do so (note that if the session structures
- * returned by the callback are shared between threads,
- * it must handle the reference count itself [i.e. copy == 0],
- * or things won't be thread-safe). */
+ /*
+ * Increment reference count now if the session
+ * callback asks us to do so (note that if the session
+ * structures returned by the callback are shared
+ * between threads, it must handle the reference count
+ * itself [i.e. copy == 0], or things won't be
+ * thread-safe).
+ */
if (copy)
- CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
-
- /* Add the externally cached session to the internal
- * cache as well if and only if we are supposed to. */
- if (!(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE))
- /* The following should not return 1, otherwise,
- * things are very strange */
- SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, ret);
+ CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1,
+ CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+
+ /*
+ * Add the externally cached session to the internal
+ * cache as well if and only if we are supposed to.
+ */
+ if (!(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode &
+ SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE))
+ /*
+ * The following should not return 1,
+ * otherwise, things are very strange.
+ */
+ SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, ret);
}
}
/* Now ret is non-NULL and we own one of its reference counts. */
- if (ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length
- || timingsafe_memcmp(ret->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, ret->sid_ctx_length) != 0) {
+ if (ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length ||
+ timingsafe_memcmp(ret->sid_ctx,
+ s->sid_ctx, ret->sid_ctx_length) != 0) {
/* We have the session requested by the client, but we don't
* want to use it in this context. */
goto err; /* treat like cache miss */
}
if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && s->sid_ctx_length == 0) {
- /* We can't be sure if this session is being used out of
+ /*
+ * We can't be sure if this session is being used out of
* context, which is especially important for SSL_VERIFY_PEER.
- * The application should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context.
+ * The application should have used
+ * SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context.
*
* For this error case, we generate an error instead of treating
* the event like a cache miss (otherwise it would be easy for
* applications to effectively disable the session cache by
* accident without anyone noticing).
*/
-
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION, SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,
+ SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED);
fatal = 1;
goto err;
}
p = buf;
l = ret->cipher_id;
l2n(l, p);
+
if ((ret->ssl_version >> 8) >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
ret->cipher = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &(buf[2]));
else
ret->cipher = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &(buf[1]));
+
if (ret->cipher == NULL)
goto err;
}
- if (ret->timeout < (time(NULL) - ret->time)) /* timeout */
- {
+ if (ret->timeout < (time(NULL) - ret->time)) {
+ /* timeout */
s->session_ctx->stats.sess_timeout++;
if (try_session_cache) {
/* session was from the cache, so remove it */
s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
return 1;
- err:
+err:
if (ret != NULL) {
SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
if (!try_session_cache) {
- /* The session was from a ticket, so we should
- * issue a ticket for the new session */
+ /*
+ * The session was from a ticket, so we should
+ * issue a ticket for the new session.
+ */
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
}
}
int ret = 0;
SSL_SESSION *s;
- /* add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache
+ /*
+ * Add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache
* even though it has two ways of access: each session is in a
- * doubly linked list and an lhash */
+ * doubly linked list and an lhash.
+ */
CRYPTO_add(&c->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
- /* if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later */
+ /*
+ * If session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment
+ * later.
+ */
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
s = lh_SSL_SESSION_insert(ctx->sessions, c);
- /* s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID.
+ /*
+ * s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID.
* In this case, s == c should hold (then we did not really modify
- * ctx->sessions), or we're in trouble. */
+ * ctx->sessions), or we're in trouble.
+ */
if (s != NULL && s != c) {
/* We *are* in trouble ... */
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s);
SSL_SESSION_free(s);
- /* ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache
+ /*
+ * ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache
* (we cannot handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical
* session ID in the same cache, which could happen e.g. when
- * two threads concurrently obtain the same session from an external
- * cache) */
+ * two threads concurrently obtain the same session from an
+ * external cache).
+ */
s = NULL;
}
SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx, c);
if (s != NULL) {
- /* existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference
- * count because it already takes into account the cache */
-
+ /*
+ * existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented
+ * reference count because it already takes into account the
+ * cache.
+ */
SSL_SESSION_free(s); /* s == c */
ret = 0;
} else {
- /* new cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large */
+ /*
+ * New cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become
+ * too large.
+ */
ret = 1;
if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0) {
while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) >
- SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) {
+ SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) {
if (!remove_session_lock(ctx,
- ctx->session_cache_tail, 0))
- break;
+ ctx->session_cache_tail, 0))
+ break;
else
ctx->stats.sess_cache_full++;
}
if ((c != NULL) && (c->session_id_length != 0)) {
if (lck)
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- if ((r = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions, c)) == c) {
+ if ((r = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions, c)) == c) {
ret = 1;
r = lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(ctx->sessions, c);
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, c);
}
-
if (lck)
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
if (meth == NULL)
meth = s->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version);
if (meth == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_SSL_METHOD);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION,
+ SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_SSL_METHOD);
return (0);
}
unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
{
if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT,
+ SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
s->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len;
SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *s, long t)
{
long l;
+
if (s == NULL)
return (0);
l = s->session_timeout;
s->session_timeout = t;
+
return (l);
}
}
int
-SSL_set_session_secret_cb(SSL *s, int (*tls_session_secret_cb)(SSL *s, void *secret, int *secret_len,
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers, SSL_CIPHER **cipher, void *arg), void *arg)
+SSL_set_session_secret_cb(SSL *s, int (*tls_session_secret_cb)(SSL *s,
+ void *secret, int *secret_len, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers,
+ SSL_CIPHER **cipher, void *arg), void *arg)
{
if (s == NULL)
return (0);
{
if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) {
free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
- s->tlsext_session_ticket = malloc(sizeof(TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT) + ext_len);
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket =
+ malloc(sizeof(TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT) + ext_len);
if (!s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_TICKET_EXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_TICKET_EXT,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
if (ext_data) {
s->tlsext_session_ticket->length = ext_len;
- s->tlsext_session_ticket->data = s->tlsext_session_ticket + 1;
- memcpy(s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ext_data, ext_len);
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket->data =
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket + 1;
+ memcpy(s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
+ ext_data, ext_len);
} else {
s->tlsext_session_ticket->length = 0;
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data = NULL;
static void
timeout_doall_arg(SSL_SESSION *s, TIMEOUT_PARAM *p)
{
- if ((p->time == 0) || (p->time > (s->time + s->timeout))) /* timeout */
- {
+ if ((p->time == 0) || (p->time > (s->time + s->timeout))) {
+ /* timeout */
/* The reason we don't call SSL_CTX_remove_session() is to
* save on locking overhead */
(void)lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(p->cache, s);
int
ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s)
{
- if ((s->session != NULL) &&
- !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) &&
- !(SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))) {
+ if ((s->session != NULL) && !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) &&
+ !(SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))) {
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
return (1);
} else
static void
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s)
{
- if ((s->next == NULL)
- || (s->prev == NULL)) return;
+ if ((s->next == NULL) || (s->prev == NULL))
+ return;
- if (s->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail))
- { /* last element in list */
- if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head))
- { /* only one element in list */
+ if (s->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail)) {
+ /* last element in list */
+ if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head)) {
+ /* only one element in list */
ctx->session_cache_head = NULL;
ctx->session_cache_tail = NULL;
} else {
ctx->session_cache_tail = s->prev;
- s->prev->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
+ s->prev->next =
+ (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
}
} else {
- if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head))
- { /* first element in list */
+ if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head)) {
+ /* first element in list */
ctx->session_cache_head = s->next;
- s->next->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
- } else
- { /* middle of list */
+ s->next->prev =
+ (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
+ } else {
+ /* middle of list */
s->next->prev = s->prev;
s->prev->next = s->next;
}
ctx->new_session_cb = cb;
}
-int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess)
+int
+(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess)
{
return ctx->new_session_cb;
}
ctx->remove_session_cb = cb;
}
-void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL_CTX * ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess)
+void
+(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL_CTX * ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess)
{
return ctx->remove_session_cb;
}
void
-SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- SSL_SESSION *(*cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl,
-unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy))
+SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *(*cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl,
+ unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy))
{
ctx->get_session_cb = cb;
}
-SSL_SESSION * (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl,
- unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy)
+SSL_SESSION *
+(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *data,
+ int len, int *copy)
{
return ctx->get_session_cb;
}
ctx->info_callback = cb;
}
-void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx))(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)
+void
+(*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx))(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)
{
return ctx->info_callback;
}
ctx->client_cert_cb = cb;
}
-int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL * ssl, X509 ** x509 , EVP_PKEY **pkey)
+int
+(*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL * ssl, X509 ** x509,
+ EVP_PKEY **pkey)
{
return ctx->client_cert_cb;
}
SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_CTX *ctx, ENGINE *e)
{
if (!ENGINE_init(e)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE,
+ ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
return 0;
}
if (!ENGINE_get_ssl_client_cert_function(e)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_METHOD);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE,
+ SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_METHOD);
ENGINE_finish(e);
return 0;
}
-/* $OpenBSD: ssl_sess.c,v 1.36 2014/07/11 09:24:44 beck Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssl_sess.c,v 1.37 2014/07/12 23:59:11 jsing Exp $ */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* OTHERWISE.
*/
-#include <stdio.h>
#include <openssl/lhash.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#endif
+
#include "ssl_locl.h"
static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl)
{
SSL_SESSION *sess;
- /* Need to lock this all up rather than just use CRYPTO_add so that
+
+ /*
+ * Need to lock this all up rather than just use CRYPTO_add so that
* somebody doesn't free ssl->session between when we check it's
- * non-null and when we up the reference count. */
+ * non-null and when we up the reference count.
+ */
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
sess = ssl->session;
if (sess)
sess->references++;
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+
return (sess);
}
SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
{
- return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, argl, argp,
- new_func, dup_func, free_func);
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION,
+ argl, argp, new_func, dup_func, free_func);
}
int
ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
+
CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
+
return (ss);
}
return 0;
}
-/* Even with SSLv2, we have 16 bytes (128 bits) of session ID space. SSLv3/TLSv1
- * has 32 bytes (256 bits). As such, filling the ID with random gunk repeatedly
- * until we have no conflict is going to complete in one iteration pretty much
- * "most" of the time (btw: understatement). So, if it takes us 10 iterations
- * and we still can't avoid a conflict - well that's a reasonable point to call
- * it quits. Either the RAND code is broken or someone is trying to open roughly
- * very close to 2^128 (or 2^256) SSL sessions to our server. How you might
- * store that many sessions is perhaps a more interesting question ... */
+/*
+ * Even with SSLv2, we have 16 bytes (128 bits) of session ID space.
+ * SSLv3/TLSv1 has 32 bytes (256 bits). As such, filling the ID with random
+ * gunk repeatedly until we have no conflict is going to complete in one
+ * iteration pretty much "most" of the time (btw: understatement). So, if it
+ * takes us 10 iterations and we still can't avoid a conflict - well that's a
+ * reasonable point to call it quits. Either the RAND code is broken or someone
+ * is trying to open roughly very close to 2^128 (or 2^256) SSL sessions to our
+ * server. How you might store that many sessions is perhaps a more interesting
+ * question...
+ */
#define MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS 10
+
static int
-def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
- unsigned int *id_len)
+def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id, unsigned int *id_len)
{
unsigned int retry = 0;
- do
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0)
- return 0;
- while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) &&
- (++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS));
+
+ do {
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ } while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) &&
+ (++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS));
+
if (retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)
return 1;
+
/* else - woops a session_id match */
/* XXX We should also check the external cache --
* but the probability of a collision is negligible, and
int
ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session)
{
- /* This gets used by clients and servers. */
-
unsigned int tmp;
SSL_SESSION *ss = NULL;
GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id;
- if ((ss = SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL) return (0);
+ /* This gets used by clients and servers. */
+
+ if ((ss = SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL)
+ return (0);
/* If the context has a default timeout, use it */
if (s->session_ctx->session_timeout == 0)
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
return (0);
}
- /* If RFC4507 ticket use empty session ID */
+
+ /* If RFC4507 ticket use empty session ID. */
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
ss->session_id_length = 0;
goto sess_id_done;
}
- /* Choose which callback will set the session ID */
+
+ /* Choose which callback will set the session ID. */
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
if (s->generate_session_id)
cb = s->generate_session_id;
else if (s->session_ctx->generate_session_id)
cb = s->session_ctx->generate_session_id;
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- /* Choose a session ID */
+
+ /* Choose a session ID. */
tmp = ss->session_id_length;
if (!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp)) {
/* The callback failed */
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
return (0);
}
- /* Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero.
- * nor set it higher than it was. */
+
+ /*
+ * Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero.
+ * nor set it higher than it was.
+ */
if (!tmp || (tmp > ss->session_id_length)) {
/* The callback set an illegal length */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
return (0);
}
ss->session_id_length = tmp;
- /* Finally, check for a conflict */
+
+ /* Finally, check for a conflict. */
if (SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id,
ss->session_id_length)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
return (0);
}
- sess_id_done:
+
+sess_id_done:
if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
ss->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
if (ss->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
return 0;
}
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
return 0;
}
+
memcpy(ss->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
ss->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length;
s->session = ss;
return (1);
}
-/* ssl_get_prev attempts to find an SSL_SESSION to be used to resume this
+/*
+ * ssl_get_prev attempts to find an SSL_SESSION to be used to resume this
* connection. It is only called by servers.
*
* session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
* 0: a session may have been found.
*
* Side effects:
- * - If a session is found then s->session is pointed at it (after freeing an
- * existing session if need be) and s->verify_result is set from the session.
- * - Both for new and resumed sessions, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 1
- * if the server should issue a new session ticket (to 0 otherwise).
+ * - If a session is found then s->session is pointed at it (after freeing
+ * an existing session if need be) and s->verify_result is set from the
+ * session.
+ * - Both for new and resumed sessions, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set
+ * to 1 if the server should issue a new session ticket (to 0 otherwise).
*/
int
ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
const unsigned char *limit)
{
- /* This is used only by servers. */
-
SSL_SESSION *ret = NULL;
int fatal = 0;
int try_session_cache = 1;
int r;
+ /* This is used only by servers. */
+
if (len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)
goto err;
if (len == 0)
try_session_cache = 0;
- r = tls1_process_ticket(s, session_id, len, limit, &ret); /* sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected */
+ /* Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected. */
+ r = tls1_process_ticket(s, session_id, len, limit, &ret);
switch (r) {
case -1: /* Error during processing */
fatal = 1;
abort();
}
- if (try_session_cache &&
- ret == NULL &&
- !(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) {
+ if (try_session_cache && ret == NULL &&
+ !(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode &
+ SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) {
SSL_SESSION data;
data.ssl_version = s->version;
data.session_id_length = len;
if (len == 0)
return 0;
memcpy(data.session_id, session_id, len);
+
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
ret = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(s->session_ctx->sessions, &data);
if (ret != NULL) {
- /* don't allow other threads to steal it: */
- CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+ /* Don't allow other threads to steal it. */
+ CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1,
+ CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
}
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+
if (ret == NULL)
s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
}
- if (try_session_cache &&
- ret == NULL &&
- s->session_ctx->get_session_cb != NULL) {
+ if (try_session_cache && ret == NULL &&
+ s->session_ctx->get_session_cb != NULL) {
int copy = 1;
- if ((ret = s->session_ctx->get_session_cb(s, session_id, len, ©))) {
+ if ((ret = s->session_ctx->get_session_cb(s, session_id,
+ len, ©))) {
s->session_ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit++;
- /* Increment reference count now if the session callback
- * asks us to do so (note that if the session structures
- * returned by the callback are shared between threads,
- * it must handle the reference count itself [i.e. copy == 0],
- * or things won't be thread-safe). */
+ /*
+ * Increment reference count now if the session
+ * callback asks us to do so (note that if the session
+ * structures returned by the callback are shared
+ * between threads, it must handle the reference count
+ * itself [i.e. copy == 0], or things won't be
+ * thread-safe).
+ */
if (copy)
- CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
-
- /* Add the externally cached session to the internal
- * cache as well if and only if we are supposed to. */
- if (!(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE))
- /* The following should not return 1, otherwise,
- * things are very strange */
- SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, ret);
+ CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1,
+ CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+
+ /*
+ * Add the externally cached session to the internal
+ * cache as well if and only if we are supposed to.
+ */
+ if (!(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode &
+ SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE))
+ /*
+ * The following should not return 1,
+ * otherwise, things are very strange.
+ */
+ SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, ret);
}
}
/* Now ret is non-NULL and we own one of its reference counts. */
- if (ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length
- || timingsafe_memcmp(ret->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, ret->sid_ctx_length) != 0) {
+ if (ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length ||
+ timingsafe_memcmp(ret->sid_ctx,
+ s->sid_ctx, ret->sid_ctx_length) != 0) {
/* We have the session requested by the client, but we don't
* want to use it in this context. */
goto err; /* treat like cache miss */
}
if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && s->sid_ctx_length == 0) {
- /* We can't be sure if this session is being used out of
+ /*
+ * We can't be sure if this session is being used out of
* context, which is especially important for SSL_VERIFY_PEER.
- * The application should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context.
+ * The application should have used
+ * SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context.
*
* For this error case, we generate an error instead of treating
* the event like a cache miss (otherwise it would be easy for
* applications to effectively disable the session cache by
* accident without anyone noticing).
*/
-
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION, SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,
+ SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED);
fatal = 1;
goto err;
}
p = buf;
l = ret->cipher_id;
l2n(l, p);
+
if ((ret->ssl_version >> 8) >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
ret->cipher = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &(buf[2]));
else
ret->cipher = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &(buf[1]));
+
if (ret->cipher == NULL)
goto err;
}
- if (ret->timeout < (time(NULL) - ret->time)) /* timeout */
- {
+ if (ret->timeout < (time(NULL) - ret->time)) {
+ /* timeout */
s->session_ctx->stats.sess_timeout++;
if (try_session_cache) {
/* session was from the cache, so remove it */
s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
return 1;
- err:
+err:
if (ret != NULL) {
SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
if (!try_session_cache) {
- /* The session was from a ticket, so we should
- * issue a ticket for the new session */
+ /*
+ * The session was from a ticket, so we should
+ * issue a ticket for the new session.
+ */
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
}
}
int ret = 0;
SSL_SESSION *s;
- /* add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache
+ /*
+ * Add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache
* even though it has two ways of access: each session is in a
- * doubly linked list and an lhash */
+ * doubly linked list and an lhash.
+ */
CRYPTO_add(&c->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
- /* if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later */
+ /*
+ * If session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment
+ * later.
+ */
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
s = lh_SSL_SESSION_insert(ctx->sessions, c);
- /* s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID.
+ /*
+ * s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID.
* In this case, s == c should hold (then we did not really modify
- * ctx->sessions), or we're in trouble. */
+ * ctx->sessions), or we're in trouble.
+ */
if (s != NULL && s != c) {
/* We *are* in trouble ... */
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s);
SSL_SESSION_free(s);
- /* ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache
+ /*
+ * ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache
* (we cannot handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical
* session ID in the same cache, which could happen e.g. when
- * two threads concurrently obtain the same session from an external
- * cache) */
+ * two threads concurrently obtain the same session from an
+ * external cache).
+ */
s = NULL;
}
SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx, c);
if (s != NULL) {
- /* existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference
- * count because it already takes into account the cache */
-
+ /*
+ * existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented
+ * reference count because it already takes into account the
+ * cache.
+ */
SSL_SESSION_free(s); /* s == c */
ret = 0;
} else {
- /* new cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large */
+ /*
+ * New cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become
+ * too large.
+ */
ret = 1;
if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0) {
while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) >
- SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) {
+ SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) {
if (!remove_session_lock(ctx,
- ctx->session_cache_tail, 0))
- break;
+ ctx->session_cache_tail, 0))
+ break;
else
ctx->stats.sess_cache_full++;
}
if ((c != NULL) && (c->session_id_length != 0)) {
if (lck)
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- if ((r = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions, c)) == c) {
+ if ((r = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions, c)) == c) {
ret = 1;
r = lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(ctx->sessions, c);
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, c);
}
-
if (lck)
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
if (meth == NULL)
meth = s->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version);
if (meth == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_SSL_METHOD);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION,
+ SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_SSL_METHOD);
return (0);
}
unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
{
if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT,
+ SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
s->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len;
SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *s, long t)
{
long l;
+
if (s == NULL)
return (0);
l = s->session_timeout;
s->session_timeout = t;
+
return (l);
}
}
int
-SSL_set_session_secret_cb(SSL *s, int (*tls_session_secret_cb)(SSL *s, void *secret, int *secret_len,
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers, SSL_CIPHER **cipher, void *arg), void *arg)
+SSL_set_session_secret_cb(SSL *s, int (*tls_session_secret_cb)(SSL *s,
+ void *secret, int *secret_len, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers,
+ SSL_CIPHER **cipher, void *arg), void *arg)
{
if (s == NULL)
return (0);
{
if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) {
free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
- s->tlsext_session_ticket = malloc(sizeof(TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT) + ext_len);
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket =
+ malloc(sizeof(TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT) + ext_len);
if (!s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_TICKET_EXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_TICKET_EXT,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
if (ext_data) {
s->tlsext_session_ticket->length = ext_len;
- s->tlsext_session_ticket->data = s->tlsext_session_ticket + 1;
- memcpy(s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ext_data, ext_len);
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket->data =
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket + 1;
+ memcpy(s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
+ ext_data, ext_len);
} else {
s->tlsext_session_ticket->length = 0;
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data = NULL;
static void
timeout_doall_arg(SSL_SESSION *s, TIMEOUT_PARAM *p)
{
- if ((p->time == 0) || (p->time > (s->time + s->timeout))) /* timeout */
- {
+ if ((p->time == 0) || (p->time > (s->time + s->timeout))) {
+ /* timeout */
/* The reason we don't call SSL_CTX_remove_session() is to
* save on locking overhead */
(void)lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(p->cache, s);
int
ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s)
{
- if ((s->session != NULL) &&
- !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) &&
- !(SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))) {
+ if ((s->session != NULL) && !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) &&
+ !(SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))) {
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
return (1);
} else
static void
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s)
{
- if ((s->next == NULL)
- || (s->prev == NULL)) return;
+ if ((s->next == NULL) || (s->prev == NULL))
+ return;
- if (s->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail))
- { /* last element in list */
- if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head))
- { /* only one element in list */
+ if (s->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail)) {
+ /* last element in list */
+ if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head)) {
+ /* only one element in list */
ctx->session_cache_head = NULL;
ctx->session_cache_tail = NULL;
} else {
ctx->session_cache_tail = s->prev;
- s->prev->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
+ s->prev->next =
+ (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
}
} else {
- if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head))
- { /* first element in list */
+ if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head)) {
+ /* first element in list */
ctx->session_cache_head = s->next;
- s->next->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
- } else
- { /* middle of list */
+ s->next->prev =
+ (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
+ } else {
+ /* middle of list */
s->next->prev = s->prev;
s->prev->next = s->next;
}
ctx->new_session_cb = cb;
}
-int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess)
+int
+(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess)
{
return ctx->new_session_cb;
}
ctx->remove_session_cb = cb;
}
-void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL_CTX * ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess)
+void
+(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL_CTX * ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess)
{
return ctx->remove_session_cb;
}
void
-SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- SSL_SESSION *(*cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl,
-unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy))
+SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *(*cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl,
+ unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy))
{
ctx->get_session_cb = cb;
}
-SSL_SESSION * (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl,
- unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy)
+SSL_SESSION *
+(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *data,
+ int len, int *copy)
{
return ctx->get_session_cb;
}
ctx->info_callback = cb;
}
-void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx))(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)
+void
+(*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx))(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)
{
return ctx->info_callback;
}
ctx->client_cert_cb = cb;
}
-int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL * ssl, X509 ** x509 , EVP_PKEY **pkey)
+int
+(*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL * ssl, X509 ** x509,
+ EVP_PKEY **pkey)
{
return ctx->client_cert_cb;
}
SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_CTX *ctx, ENGINE *e)
{
if (!ENGINE_init(e)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE,
+ ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
return 0;
}
if (!ENGINE_get_ssl_client_cert_function(e)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_METHOD);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE,
+ SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_METHOD);
ENGINE_finish(e);
return 0;
}
projects / openbsd / commitdiff