#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-#include "kssl_lcl.h"
-#endif
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
unsigned long alg_k;
unsigned char *q;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
- krb5_error_code krb5rc;
- KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
- /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
- krb5_data *enc_ticket;
- krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
- const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
- unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
- unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
- + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
- alg_k, SSL_kKRB5);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- authp = NULL;
-#ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
- if (KRB5SENDAUTH)
- authp = &authenticator;
-#endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
-
- krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp,
- &kssl_err);
- enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
- if (enc == NULL)
- goto err;
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- {
- printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
- if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
- printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text);
- }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if (krb5rc) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
- SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- kssl_err.reason);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
- ** in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
- **
- ** Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
- ** n = krb5_ap_req.length;
- ** memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
- ** if (krb5_ap_req.data)
- ** kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
- **
- ** Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
- ** (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
- ** Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
- ** with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
- ** Example:
- ** KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
- ** Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
- ** optional authenticator omitted.
- */
-
- /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
- s2n(enc_ticket->length, p);
- memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
- p += enc_ticket->length;
- n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
-
- /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
- if (authp && authp->length) {
- s2n(authp->length, p);
- memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
- p += authp->length;
- n += authp->length + 2;
-
- free(authp->data);
- authp->data = NULL;
- authp->length = 0;
- } else {
- s2n(0, p);/* null authenticator length */
- n += 2;
- }
-
- if (RAND_bytes(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf) <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- /* 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
- ** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
- ** EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
- ** kssl_ctx->length);
- ** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
- */
-
- memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv);
- /* per RFC 1510 */
- EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL,
- kssl_ctx->key, iv);
- EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, epms, &outl, tmp_buf,
- sizeof tmp_buf);
- EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(epms[outl]), &padl);
- outl += padl;
- if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
-
- /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
- s2n(outl, p);
- memcpy(p, epms, outl);
- p += outl;
- n += outl + 2;
-
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key,
- tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
-
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
- }
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) {
DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt;
/* clear this, it may get reset by
* send_server_key_exchange */
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
)
/* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
* even when forbidden by protocol specs
ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
- if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s)) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT,
- SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
- SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto end;
- }
- }
-#endif
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
else
i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- && !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
- (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
) {
al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
n -= param_len;
} else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
- n2s(p, i);
- param_len = i + 2;
- if (param_len > n) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (!(s->srp_ctx.N = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- p += i;
-
- n2s(p, i);
- param_len += i + 2;
- if (param_len > n) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (!(s->srp_ctx.g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- p += i;
-
- i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
- p++;
- param_len += i + 1;
- if (param_len > n) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (!(s->srp_ctx.s = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- p += i;
-
- n2s(p, i);
- param_len += i + 2;
- if (param_len > n) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (!(s->srp_ctx.B = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- p += i;
- n -= param_len;
-
- /* We must check if there is a certificate */
- if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[
- SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
- else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[
- SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509);
- } else
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
unsigned long alg_k;
unsigned char *q;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
s, s->session->master_key, tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
- krb5_error_code krb5rc;
- KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
- /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
- krb5_data *enc_ticket;
- krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
- const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
- unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
- unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
- + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
- alg_k, SSL_kKRB5);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- authp = NULL;
-#ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
- if (KRB5SENDAUTH)
- authp = &authenticator;
-#endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
-
- krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket,
- authp, &kssl_err);
- enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
- if (enc == NULL)
- goto err;
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- {
- printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
- if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
- printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n",
- kssl_err.text);
- }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if (krb5rc) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
- SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- kssl_err.reason);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
- * in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
- *
- * Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
- * n = krb5_ap_req.length;
- * memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
- * if (krb5_ap_req.data)
- * kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
- *
- * Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
- * (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
- * Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
- * with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
- * Example:
- * KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
- * Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
- * optional authenticator omitted.
- */
-
- /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
- s2n(enc_ticket->length, p);
- memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
- p += enc_ticket->length;
- n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
-
- /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
- if (authp && authp->length) {
- s2n(authp->length, p);
- memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
- p += authp->length;
- n += authp->length + 2;
-
- free(authp->data);
- authp->data = NULL;
- authp->length = 0;
- } else {
- s2n(0,p);/* null authenticator length */
- n += 2;
- }
-
- tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
- tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
- if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- /*
- * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
- * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
- * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
- * kssl_ctx->length);
- * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
- */
-
- memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv);
- /* per RFC 1510 */
- EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL,
- kssl_ctx->key, iv);
- EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, epms, &outl, tmp_buf,
- sizeof tmp_buf);
- EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(epms[outl]), &padl);
- outl += padl;
- if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
-
- /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
- s2n(outl, p);
- memcpy(p, epms, outl);
- p += outl;
- n += outl + 2;
-
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key,
- tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
-
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
- }
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) {
DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt;
EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
- if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
- /* send off the data */
- n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
- s2n(n, p);
- BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p);
- n += 2;
- } else {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
- free(s->session->srp_username);
- s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
- if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((s->session->master_key_length =
- SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN];
168,
168,
},
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-/* The Kerberos ciphers*/
-/* Cipher 1E */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_LOW,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 56,
- 56,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 1F */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_3DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 168,
- 168,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 20 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_RC4,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 21 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_IDEA,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 22 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_DES,
- SSL_MD5,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_LOW,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 56,
- 56,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 23 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_3DES,
- SSL_MD5,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 168,
- 168,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 24 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_RC4,
- SSL_MD5,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 25 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_IDEA,
- SSL_MD5,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 26 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 40,
- 56,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 27 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_RC2,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 40,
- 128,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 28 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_RC4,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 40,
- 128,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 29 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_DES,
- SSL_MD5,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 40,
- 56,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 2A */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_RC2,
- SSL_MD5,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 40,
- 128,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 2B */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_RC4,
- SSL_MD5,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 40,
- 128,
- },
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
/* New AES ciphersuites */
/* Cipher 2F */
},
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- /* Cipher C01A */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kSRP,
- SSL_aNULL,
- SSL_3DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 168,
- 168,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C01B */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kSRP,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_3DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 168,
- 168,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C01C */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kSRP,
- SSL_aDSS,
- SSL_3DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 168,
- 168,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C01D */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kSRP,
- SSL_aNULL,
- SSL_AES128,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C01E */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kSRP,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_AES128,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C01F */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kSRP,
- SSL_aDSS,
- SSL_AES128,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C020 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kSRP,
- SSL_aNULL,
- SSL_AES256,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C021 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kSRP,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_AES256,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C022 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kSRP,
- SSL_aDSS,
- SSL_AES256,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
/* HMAC based TLS v1.2 ciphersuites from RFC5289 */
s->s3 = s3;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- SSL_SRP_CTX_init(s);
-#endif
s->method->ssl_clear(s);
return (1);
err:
}
if (s->s3->handshake_dgst)
ssl3_free_digest_list(s);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- SSL_SRP_CTX_free(s);
-#endif
OPENSSL_cleanse(s->s3, sizeof *s->s3);
free(s->s3);
s->s3 = NULL;
#endif
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-static char *
-srp_password_from_info_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
-{
- return BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.info);
-}
-#endif
long
ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
return 1;
break;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME:
- ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask|=SSL_kSRP;
- if (ctx->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
- free(ctx->srp_ctx.login);
- ctx->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
- if (parg == NULL)
- break;
- if (strlen((const char *)parg) > 255 ||
- strlen((const char *)parg) < 1) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL,
- SSL_R_INVALID_SRP_USERNAME);
- return 0;
- }
- if ((ctx->srp_ctx.login = BUF_strdup((char *)parg)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- break;
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_PASSWORD:
- ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback =
- srp_password_from_info_cb;
- ctx->srp_ctx.info = parg;
- break;
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_ARG:
- ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask|=SSL_kSRP;
- ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg = parg;
- break;
-
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_STRENGTH:
- ctx->srp_ctx.strength = larg;
- break;
-#endif
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
/* A Thawte special :-) */
unsigned char *, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, HMAC_CTX *, int))fp;
break;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_VERIFY_PARAM_CB:
- ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask|=SSL_kSRP;
- ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback =
- (int (*)(SSL *, void *))fp;
- break;
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME_CB:
- ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask|=SSL_kSRP;
- ctx->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback =
- (int (*)(SSL *, int *, void *))fp;
- break;
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_GIVE_CLIENT_PWD_CB:
- ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask|=SSL_kSRP;
- ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback =
- (char *(*)(SSL *, void *))fp;
- break;
-#endif
#endif
default:
return (0);
mask_a = cert->mask_a;
emask_k = cert->export_mask_k;
emask_a = cert->export_mask_a;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- mask_k = cert->mask_k | s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask;
- emask_k = cert->export_mask_k | s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask;
-#endif
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
/* printf("ssl3_choose_cipher %d alg= %lx\n", i,c->algorithms);*/
alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
- if (!kssl_keytab_is_available(s->kssl_ctx) )
- continue;
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* with PSK there must be server callback set */
if ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
-#endif
#include <openssl/md5.h>
static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
return (NULL);
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-static int
-ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
-{
- int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
-
- *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
-
- if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
- (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
- if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
- /*
- * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
- * we do so if There is no srp login name
- */
- ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
- *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
- } else {
- ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
- }
- }
- return (ret);
-}
-#endif
IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
ssl3_accept, ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method)
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- {
- int al;
- if ((ret =
- ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al))
- < 0) {
- /*
- * Callback indicates further work to
- * be done.
- */
- s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
- goto end;
- }
- if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
-
- /*
- * This is not really an error but the
- * only means for a client to detect
- * whether srp is supported.
- */
- if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
- SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
-
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
-
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
-
- }
- }
-#endif
s->renegotiate = 2;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
* send_server_key_exchange.
*/
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
)
/*
* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary
* hint if provided */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|| ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
- || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
#endif
|| (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
|| (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
n += 2 + pskhintlen;
} else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
- if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
- (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
- goto err;
- }
- r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
- r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
- r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
- r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
- } else
-#endif
{
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
}
for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
- n += 1 + nr[i];
- else
-#endif
n += 2 + nr[i];
}
p = &(d[4]);
for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
- *p = nr[i];
- p++;
- } else
-#endif
s2n(nr[i], p);
BN_bn2bin(r[i], p);
p += nr[i];
BIGNUM *pub = NULL;
DH *dh_srvr;
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
} else
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
- krb5_error_code krb5rc;
- krb5_data enc_ticket;
- krb5_data authenticator;
- krb5_data enc_pms;
- KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
- const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
- unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
- + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
- int padl, outl;
- krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
- krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
-
- if (!kssl_ctx)
- kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
-
- n2s(p, i);
- enc_ticket.length = i;
-
- if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
- p += enc_ticket.length;
-
- n2s(p, i);
- authenticator.length = i;
-
- if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- authenticator.data = (char *)p;
- p += authenticator.length;
-
- n2s(p, i);
- enc_pms.length = i;
- enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
- p += enc_pms.length;
-
- /*
- * Note that the length is checked again below,
- * after decryption
- */
- if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
- enc_pms.length + 6)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
- &kssl_err)) != 0) {
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
- krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
- if (kssl_err.text)
- printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- kssl_err.reason);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
- ** but will return authtime == 0.
- */
- if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
- &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) {
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
- krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
- if (kssl_err.text)
- printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- kssl_err.reason);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- krb5rc);
- goto err;
- }
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
- if (enc == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
-
- if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL,
- kssl_ctx->key, iv)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl,
- (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- outl += padl;
- if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
- /*
- * The premaster secret must contain the same version
- * number as the ClientHello to detect version rollback
- * attacks (strangely, the protocol does not offer such
- * protection for DH ciphersuites).
- * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes
- * instead of the protocol version.
- *
- * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
- * clients.
- * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for
- * the Kerberos cipher)
- */
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
-
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
-
- if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) {
- size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
- if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH ) {
- s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
- memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,
- kssl_ctx->client_princ, len);
- }
- }
-
-
- /*
- * Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, but it caused problems for
- * apache.
- * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
- * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
- */
- } else
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) {
goto f_err;
} else
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
- int param_len;
-
- n2s(p, i);
- param_len = i + 2;
- if (param_len > n) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
- free(s->session->srp_username);
- s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
- if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((s->session->master_key_length =
- SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- p += i;
- } else
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
int ret = 0;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-#include "kssl_lcl.h"
-#endif
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
unsigned long alg_k;
unsigned char *q;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
- krb5_error_code krb5rc;
- KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
- /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
- krb5_data *enc_ticket;
- krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
- const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
- unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
- unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
- + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
- alg_k, SSL_kKRB5);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- authp = NULL;
-#ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
- if (KRB5SENDAUTH)
- authp = &authenticator;
-#endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
-
- krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp,
- &kssl_err);
- enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
- if (enc == NULL)
- goto err;
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- {
- printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
- if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
- printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text);
- }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if (krb5rc) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
- SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- kssl_err.reason);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
- ** in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
- **
- ** Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
- ** n = krb5_ap_req.length;
- ** memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
- ** if (krb5_ap_req.data)
- ** kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
- **
- ** Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
- ** (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
- ** Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
- ** with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
- ** Example:
- ** KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
- ** Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
- ** optional authenticator omitted.
- */
-
- /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
- s2n(enc_ticket->length, p);
- memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
- p += enc_ticket->length;
- n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
-
- /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
- if (authp && authp->length) {
- s2n(authp->length, p);
- memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
- p += authp->length;
- n += authp->length + 2;
-
- free(authp->data);
- authp->data = NULL;
- authp->length = 0;
- } else {
- s2n(0, p);/* null authenticator length */
- n += 2;
- }
-
- if (RAND_bytes(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf) <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- /* 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
- ** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
- ** EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
- ** kssl_ctx->length);
- ** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
- */
-
- memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv);
- /* per RFC 1510 */
- EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL,
- kssl_ctx->key, iv);
- EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, epms, &outl, tmp_buf,
- sizeof tmp_buf);
- EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(epms[outl]), &padl);
- outl += padl;
- if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
-
- /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
- s2n(outl, p);
- memcpy(p, epms, outl);
- p += outl;
- n += outl + 2;
-
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key,
- tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
-
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
- }
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) {
DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt;
/* clear this, it may get reset by
* send_server_key_exchange */
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
)
/* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
* even when forbidden by protocol specs
+++ /dev/null
-/* ssl/kssl.c -*- mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
-/* Written by Vern Staats <staatsvr@asc.hpc.mil> for the OpenSSL project 2000.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-
-/* ssl/kssl.c -- Routines to support (& debug) Kerberos5 auth for openssl
-**
-** 19990701 VRS Started.
-** 200011?? Jeffrey Altman, Richard Levitte
-** Generalized for Heimdal, Newer MIT, & Win32.
-** Integrated into main OpenSSL 0.9.7 snapshots.
-** 20010413 Simon Wilkinson, VRS
-** Real RFC2712 KerberosWrapper replaces AP_REQ.
-*/
-
-#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
-
-#include <string.h>
-
-#define KRB5_PRIVATE 1
-
-#include <openssl/ssl.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
-#include "kssl_lcl.h"
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-
-#ifndef ENOMEM
-#define ENOMEM KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC
-#endif
-
-char *
-kstring(char *string)
-{
- static char *null = "[NULL]";
-
- return ((string == NULL) ? null : string);
-}
-
-/* Given KRB5 enctype (basically DES or 3DES),
-** return closest match openssl EVP_ encryption algorithm.
-** Return NULL for unknown or problematic (krb5_dk_encrypt) enctypes.
-** Assume ENCTYPE_*_RAW (krb5_raw_encrypt) are OK.
-*/
-const EVP_CIPHER *
-kssl_map_enc(krb5_enctype enctype)
-{
- switch (enctype) {
- case ENCTYPE_DES_HMAC_SHA1: /* EVP_des_cbc(); */
- case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
- case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
- case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
- case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW:
- return EVP_des_cbc();
- break;
- case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1: /* EVP_des_ede3_cbc(); */
- case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA:
- case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW:
- return EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
- break;
- default:
- return NULL;
- break;
- }
-}
-
-
-/* Return true:1 if p "looks like" the start of the real authenticator
-** described in kssl_skip_confound() below. The ASN.1 pattern is
-** "62 xx 30 yy" (APPLICATION-2, SEQUENCE), where xx-yy =~ 2, and
-** xx and yy are possibly multi-byte length fields.
-*/
-static int
-kssl_test_confound(unsigned char *p)
-{
- int len = 2;
- int xx = 0, yy = 0;
-
- if (*p++ != 0x62)
- return 0;
- if (*p > 0x82)
- return 0;
- switch (*p) {
- case 0x82:
- p++;
- xx = (*p++ << 8);
- xx += *p++;
- break;
- case 0x81:
- p++;
- xx = *p++;
- break;
- case 0x80:
- return 0;
- default:
- xx = *p++;
- break;
- }
- if (*p++ != 0x30)
- return 0;
- if (*p > 0x82)
- return 0;
- switch (*p) {
- case 0x82:
- p++;
- len += 2;
- yy = (*p++ << 8);
- yy += *p++;
- break;
- case 0x81:
- p++;
- len++;
- yy = *p++;
- break;
- case 0x80:
- return 0;
- default:
- yy = *p++;
- break;
- }
-
- return (xx - len == yy) ? 1 : 0;
-}
-
-/* Allocate, fill, and return cksumlens array of checksum lengths.
-** This array holds just the unique elements from the krb5_cksumarray[].
-** array[n] == 0 signals end of data.
-**
-** The krb5_cksumarray[] was an internal variable that has since been
-** replaced by a more general method for storing the data. It should
-** not be used. Instead we use real API calls and make a guess for
-** what the highest assigned CKSUMTYPE_ constant is. As of 1.2.2
-** it is 0x000c (CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_DES3). So we will use 0x0010.
-*/
-static size_t *
-populate_cksumlens(void)
-{
- int i, j, n;
- static size_t *cklens = NULL;
-
-#ifdef KRB5_MIT_OLD11
- n = krb5_max_cksum;
-#else
- n = 0x0010;
-#endif /* KRB5_MIT_OLD11 */
-
-#ifdef KRB5CHECKAUTH
- if (!cklens && !(cklens = (size_t *)
- calloc(sizeof(int), n + 1))) return NULL;
-
- for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
- if (!valid_cksumtype(i))
- continue; /* array has holes */
- for (j = 0; j < n; j++) {
- if (cklens[j] == 0) {
- cklens[j] = krb5_checksum_size(NULL, i);
- break;
- /* krb5 elem was new: add */
- }
- if (cklens[j] == krb5_checksum_size(NULL, i)) {
- break;
- /* ignore duplicate elements */
- }
- }
- }
-#endif /* KRB5CHECKAUTH */
-
- return cklens;
-}
-
-/* Return pointer to start of real authenticator within authenticator, or
-** return NULL on error.
-** Decrypted authenticator looks like this:
-** [0 or 8 byte confounder] [4-24 byte checksum] [real authent'r]
-** This hackery wouldn't be necessary if MIT KRB5 1.0.6 had the
-** krb5_auth_con_getcksumtype() function advertised in its krb5.h.
-*/
-unsigned char *
-kssl_skip_confound(krb5_enctype etype, unsigned char *a)
-{
- int i, conlen;
- size_t cklen;
- static size_t *cksumlens = NULL;
- unsigned char *test_auth;
-
- conlen = (etype) ? 8 : 0;
-
- if (!cksumlens && !(cksumlens = populate_cksumlens()))
- return NULL;
- for (i = 0; (cklen = cksumlens[i]) != 0; i++) {
- test_auth = a + conlen + cklen;
- if (kssl_test_confound(test_auth))
- return test_auth;
- }
-
- return NULL;
-}
-
-
-/* Set kssl_err error info when reason text is a simple string
-** kssl_err = struct { int reason; char text[KSSL_ERR_MAX]; }
-*/
-void
-kssl_err_set(KSSL_ERR *kssl_err, int reason, char *text)
-{
- if (kssl_err == NULL)
- return;
-
- kssl_err->reason = reason;
- (void) snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX, "%s", text);
- return;
-}
-
-
-/* Display contents of krb5_data struct, for debugging
-*/
-void
-print_krb5_data(char *label, krb5_data *kdata)
-{
- int i;
-
- printf("%s[%d] ", label, kdata->length);
- for (i = 0; i < (int)kdata->length; i++) {
- if (0 && isprint((int) kdata->data[i]))
- printf( "%c ", kdata->data[i]);
- else
- printf( "%02x ", (unsigned char) kdata->data[i]);
- }
- printf("\n");
-}
-
-
-/* Display contents of krb5_authdata struct, for debugging
-*/
-void
-print_krb5_authdata(char *label, krb5_authdata **adata)
-{
- if (adata == NULL) {
- printf("%s, authdata==0\n", label);
- return;
- }
- printf("%s [%p]\n", label, (void *)adata);
-#if 0
- {
- int i;
- printf("%s[at%d:%d] ", label, adata->ad_type, adata->length);
- for (i = 0; i < adata->length; i++) {
- printf((isprint(adata->contents[i]))? "%c ": "%02x",
- adata->contents[i]);
- }
- printf("\n");
- }
-#endif
-}
-
-
-/* Display contents of krb5_keyblock struct, for debugging
-*/
-void
-print_krb5_keyblock(char *label, krb5_keyblock *keyblk)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (keyblk == NULL) {
- printf("%s, keyblk==0\n", label);
- return;
- }
-#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
- printf("%s\n\t[et%d:%d]: ", label, keyblk->keytype,
- keyblk->keyvalue->length);
- for (i = 0; i < (int)keyblk->keyvalue->length; i++) {
- printf("%02x",(unsigned char *)(keyblk->keyvalue->contents)[i]);
- }
- printf("\n");
-#else
- printf("%s\n\t[et%d:%d]: ", label, keyblk->enctype, keyblk->length);
- for (i = 0; i < (int)keyblk->length; i++) {
- printf("%02x", keyblk->contents[i]);
- }
- printf("\n");
-#endif
-}
-
-
-/* Display contents of krb5_principal_data struct, for debugging
-** (krb5_principal is typedef'd == krb5_principal_data *)
-*/
-static void
-print_krb5_princ(char *label, krb5_principal_data *princ)
-{
- int i, ui, uj;
-
- printf("%s principal Realm: ", label);
- if (princ == NULL)
- return;
- for (ui = 0; ui < (int)princ->realm.length; ui++)
- putchar(princ->realm.data[ui]);
- printf(" (nametype %d) has %d strings:\n", princ->type, princ->length);
- for (i = 0; i < (int)princ->length; i++) {
- printf("\t%d [%d]: ", i, princ->data[i].length);
- for (uj = 0; uj < (int)princ->data[i].length; uj++) {
- putchar(princ->data[i].data[uj]);
- }
- printf("\n");
- }
- return;
-}
-
-
-/* Given krb5 service (typically "kssl") and hostname in kssl_ctx,
-** Return encrypted Kerberos ticket for service @ hostname.
-** If authenp is non-NULL, also return encrypted authenticator,
-** whose data should be freed by caller.
-** (Originally was: Create Kerberos AP_REQ message for SSL Client.)
-**
-** 19990628 VRS Started; Returns Kerberos AP_REQ message.
-** 20010409 VRS Modified for RFC2712; Returns enc tkt.
-** 20010606 VRS May also return optional authenticator.
-*/
-krb5_error_code
-kssl_cget_tkt(
- /* UPDATE */ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,
- /* OUT */ krb5_data **enc_ticketp,
- /* UPDATE */ krb5_data *authenp,
- /* OUT */ KSSL_ERR *kssl_err)
-{
- krb5_error_code krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
- krb5_context krb5context = NULL;
- krb5_auth_context krb5auth_context = NULL;
- krb5_ccache krb5ccdef = NULL;
- krb5_creds krb5creds, *krb5credsp = NULL;
- krb5_data krb5_app_req;
-
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, 0, "");
- memset((char *)&krb5creds, 0, sizeof(krb5creds));
-
- if (!kssl_ctx) {
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
- "No kssl_ctx defined.\n");
- goto err;
- } else if (!kssl_ctx->service_host) {
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
- "kssl_ctx service_host undefined.\n");
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((krb5rc = krb5_init_context(&krb5context)) != 0) {
- (void) snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
- "krb5_init_context() fails: %d\n", krb5rc);
- kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT;
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((krb5rc = krb5_sname_to_principal(krb5context,
- kssl_ctx->service_host,
- (kssl_ctx->service_name) ? kssl_ctx->service_name : KRB5SVC,
- KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &krb5creds.server)) != 0) {
- (void) snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
- "krb5_sname_to_principal() fails for %s/%s\n",
- kssl_ctx->service_host, (kssl_ctx->service_name) ?
- kssl_ctx->service_name : KRB5SVC);
- kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT;
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((krb5rc = krb5_cc_default(krb5context, &krb5ccdef)) != 0) {
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_CC_PRINC,
- "krb5_cc_default fails.\n");
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((krb5rc = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb5context, krb5ccdef,
- &krb5creds.client)) != 0) {
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_CC_PRINC,
- "krb5_cc_get_principal() fails.\n");
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((krb5rc = krb5_get_credentials(krb5context, 0, krb5ccdef,
- &krb5creds, &krb5credsp)) != 0) {
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_GET_CRED,
- "krb5_get_credentials() fails.\n");
- goto err;
- }
-
- *enc_ticketp = &krb5credsp->ticket;
-#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
- kssl_ctx->enctype = krb5credsp->session.keytype;
-#else
- kssl_ctx->enctype = krb5credsp->keyblock.enctype;
-#endif
-
- krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
- /* caller should free data of krb5_app_req */
- /* 20010406 VRS deleted for real KerberosWrapper
- ** 20010605 VRS reinstated to offer Authenticator to KerberosWrapper
- */
- krb5_app_req.length = 0;
- if (authenp) {
- krb5_data krb5in_data;
- const unsigned char *p;
- long arlen;
- KRB5_APREQBODY *ap_req;
-
- authenp->length = 0;
- krb5in_data.data = NULL;
- krb5in_data.length = 0;
- if ((krb5rc = krb5_mk_req_extended(krb5context,
- &krb5auth_context, 0, &krb5in_data, krb5credsp,
- &krb5_app_req)) != 0) {
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_MK_REQ,
- "krb5_mk_req_extended() fails.\n");
- goto err;
- }
-
- arlen = krb5_app_req.length;
- p = (unsigned char *)krb5_app_req.data;
- ap_req = (KRB5_APREQBODY *) d2i_KRB5_APREQ(NULL, &p, arlen);
- if (ap_req) {
- authenp->length = i2d_KRB5_ENCDATA(
- ap_req->authenticator, NULL);
- if (authenp->length &&
- (authenp->data = malloc(authenp->length))) {
- unsigned char *adp = (unsigned char *)authenp->data;
- authenp->length = i2d_KRB5_ENCDATA(
- ap_req->authenticator, &adp);
- }
- }
-
- if (ap_req)
- KRB5_APREQ_free((KRB5_APREQ *) ap_req);
- if (krb5_app_req.length)
- kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(krb5context, &krb5_app_req);
- }
-#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
- if (kssl_ctx_setkey(kssl_ctx, &krb5credsp->session)) {
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT,
- "kssl_ctx_setkey() fails.\n");
- }
-#else
- if (kssl_ctx_setkey(kssl_ctx, &krb5credsp->keyblock)) {
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT,
- "kssl_ctx_setkey() fails.\n");
- }
-#endif
- else
- krb5rc = 0;
-
-err:
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if (krb5creds.client)
- krb5_free_principal(krb5context, krb5creds.client);
- if (krb5creds.server)
- krb5_free_principal(krb5context, krb5creds.server);
- if (krb5auth_context)
- krb5_auth_con_free(krb5context, krb5auth_context);
- if (krb5context)
- krb5_free_context(krb5context);
- return (krb5rc);
-}
-
-
-/* Given d2i_-decoded asn1ticket, allocate and return a new krb5_ticket.
-** Return Kerberos error code and kssl_err struct on error.
-** Allocates krb5_ticket and krb5_principal; caller should free these.
-**
-** 20010410 VRS Implemented krb5_decode_ticket() as
-** old_krb5_decode_ticket(). Missing from MIT1.0.6.
-** 20010615 VRS Re-cast as openssl/asn1 d2i_*() functions.
-** Re-used some of the old krb5_decode_ticket()
-** code here. This tkt should alloc/free just
-** like the real thing.
-*/
-static krb5_error_code
-kssl_TKT2tkt(
- /* IN */ krb5_context krb5context,
- /* IN */ KRB5_TKTBODY *asn1ticket,
- /* OUT */ krb5_ticket **krb5ticket,
- /* OUT */ KSSL_ERR *kssl_err )
-{
- krb5_error_code krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
- krb5_ticket *new5ticket = NULL;
- ASN1_GENERALSTRING *gstr_svc, *gstr_host;
-
- *krb5ticket = NULL;
-
- if (asn1ticket == NULL || asn1ticket->realm == NULL ||
- asn1ticket->sname == NULL ||
- sk_ASN1_GENERALSTRING_num(asn1ticket->sname->namestring) < 2) {
- (void) snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
- "Null field in asn1ticket.\n");
- kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
- return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
- }
-
- if ((new5ticket = calloc(1, sizeof(krb5_ticket))) == NULL) {
- (void) snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
- "Unable to allocate new krb5_ticket.\n");
- kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
- return ENOMEM; /* or KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; */
- }
-
- gstr_svc = sk_ASN1_GENERALSTRING_value(asn1ticket->sname->namestring, 0);
- gstr_host = sk_ASN1_GENERALSTRING_value(asn1ticket->sname->namestring, 1);
-
- if ((krb5rc = kssl_build_principal_2(krb5context, &new5ticket->server,
- asn1ticket->realm->length, (char *)asn1ticket->realm->data,
- gstr_svc->length, (char *)gstr_svc->data, gstr_host->length,
- (char *)gstr_host->data)) != 0) {
- free(new5ticket);
- (void) snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
- "Error building ticket server principal.\n");
- kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
- return krb5rc; /* or KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; */
- }
-
- krb5_princ_type(krb5context, new5ticket->server) =
- asn1ticket->sname->nametype->data[0];
- new5ticket->enc_part.enctype = asn1ticket->encdata->etype->data[0];
- new5ticket->enc_part.kvno = asn1ticket->encdata->kvno->data[0];
- new5ticket->enc_part.ciphertext.length =
- asn1ticket->encdata->cipher->length;
- if ((new5ticket->enc_part.ciphertext.data =
- calloc(1, asn1ticket->encdata->cipher->length)) == NULL) {
- free(new5ticket);
- (void) snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
- "Error allocating cipher in krb5ticket.\n");
- kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
- return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
- } else {
- memcpy(new5ticket->enc_part.ciphertext.data,
- asn1ticket->encdata->cipher->data,
- asn1ticket->encdata->cipher->length);
- }
-
- *krb5ticket = new5ticket;
- return 0;
-}
-
-
-/* Given krb5 service name in KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx (typically "kssl"),
-** and krb5 AP_REQ message & message length,
-** Return Kerberos session key and client principle
-** to SSL Server in KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx.
-**
-** 19990702 VRS Started.
-*/
-krb5_error_code
-kssl_sget_tkt(
- /* UPDATE */ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,
- /* IN */ krb5_data *indata,
- /* OUT */ krb5_ticket_times *ttimes,
- /* OUT */ KSSL_ERR *kssl_err )
-{
- krb5_error_code krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
- static krb5_context krb5context = NULL;
- static krb5_auth_context krb5auth_context = NULL;
- krb5_ticket *krb5ticket = NULL;
- KRB5_TKTBODY *asn1ticket = NULL;
- const unsigned char *p;
- krb5_keytab krb5keytab = NULL;
- krb5_keytab_entry kt_entry;
- krb5_principal krb5server;
- krb5_rcache rcache = NULL;
-
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, 0, "");
-
- if (!kssl_ctx) {
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
- "No kssl_ctx defined.\n");
- goto err;
- }
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("in kssl_sget_tkt(%s)\n", kstring(kssl_ctx->service_name));
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if (!krb5context && (krb5rc = krb5_init_context(&krb5context))) {
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
- "krb5_init_context() fails.\n");
- goto err;
- }
- if (krb5auth_context &&
- (krb5rc = krb5_auth_con_free(krb5context, krb5auth_context))) {
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
- "krb5_auth_con_free() fails.\n");
- goto err;
- } else
- krb5auth_context = NULL;
- if (!krb5auth_context &&
- (krb5rc = krb5_auth_con_init(krb5context, &krb5auth_context))) {
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
- "krb5_auth_con_init() fails.\n");
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((krb5rc = krb5_auth_con_getrcache(krb5context, krb5auth_context,
- &rcache))) {
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
- "krb5_auth_con_getrcache() fails.\n");
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((krb5rc = krb5_sname_to_principal(krb5context, NULL,
- (kssl_ctx->service_name) ? kssl_ctx->service_name : KRB5SVC,
- KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &krb5server)) != 0) {
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
- "krb5_sname_to_principal() fails.\n");
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (rcache == NULL) {
- if ((krb5rc = krb5_get_server_rcache(krb5context,
- krb5_princ_component(krb5context, krb5server, 0),
- &rcache))) {
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
- "krb5_get_server_rcache() fails.\n");
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if ((krb5rc = krb5_auth_con_setrcache(krb5context, krb5auth_context,
- rcache))) {
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
- "krb5_auth_con_setrcache() fails.\n");
- goto err;
- }
-
-
- /* kssl_ctx->keytab_file == NULL ==> use Kerberos default
- */
- if (kssl_ctx->keytab_file) {
- krb5rc = krb5_kt_resolve(krb5context, kssl_ctx->keytab_file,
- &krb5keytab);
- if (krb5rc) {
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
- "krb5_kt_resolve() fails.\n");
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- krb5rc = krb5_kt_default(krb5context, &krb5keytab);
- if (krb5rc) {
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
- "krb5_kt_default() fails.\n");
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- /* Actual Kerberos5 krb5_recvauth() has initial conversation here
- ** o check KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS
- ** unless KRB5_RECVAUTH_SKIP_VERSION
- ** o check KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS
- ** o send "0" msg if all OK
- */
-
- /* 20010411 was using AP_REQ instead of true KerberosWrapper
- **
- ** if ((krb5rc = krb5_rd_req(krb5context, &krb5auth_context,
- ** &krb5in_data, krb5server, krb5keytab,
- ** &ap_option, &krb5ticket)) != 0) { Error }
- */
-
- p = (unsigned char *)indata->data;
- if ((asn1ticket = (KRB5_TKTBODY *) d2i_KRB5_TICKET(NULL, &p,
- (long)indata->length)) == NULL) {
- (void) snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
- "d2i_KRB5_TICKET() ASN.1 decode failure.\n");
- kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Was: krb5rc = krb5_decode_ticket(krb5in_data,&krb5ticket)) != 0) */
- if ((krb5rc = kssl_TKT2tkt(krb5context, asn1ticket, &krb5ticket,
- kssl_err)) != 0) {
- (void) snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
- "Error converting ASN.1 ticket to krb5_ticket.\n");
- kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!krb5_principal_compare(krb5context, krb5server,
- krb5ticket->server)) {
- krb5rc = KRB5_PRINC_NOMATCH;
- (void) snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
- "server principal != ticket principal\n");
- kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
- goto err;
- }
- if ((krb5rc = krb5_kt_get_entry(krb5context, krb5keytab,
- krb5ticket->server, krb5ticket->enc_part.kvno,
- krb5ticket->enc_part.enctype, &kt_entry)) != 0) {
- (void) snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
- "krb5_kt_get_entry() fails with %x.\n", krb5rc);
- kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
- goto err;
- }
- if ((krb5rc = krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(krb5context, &kt_entry.key,
- krb5ticket)) != 0) {
- (void) snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
- "krb5_decrypt_tkt_part() failed.\n");
- kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
- goto err;
- } else {
- krb5_kt_free_entry(krb5context, &kt_entry);
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- {
- int i;
- krb5_address **paddr = krb5ticket->enc_part2->caddrs;
- printf("Decrypted ticket fields:\n");
- printf("\tflags: %X, transit-type: %X",
- krb5ticket->enc_part2->flags,
- krb5ticket->enc_part2->transited.tr_type);
- print_krb5_data("\ttransit-data: ",
- &(krb5ticket->enc_part2->transited.tr_contents));
- printf("\tcaddrs: %p, authdata: %p\n",
- krb5ticket->enc_part2->caddrs,
- krb5ticket->enc_part2->authorization_data);
- if (paddr) {
- printf("\tcaddrs:\n");
- for (i = 0; paddr[i] != NULL; i++) {
- krb5_data d;
- d.length = paddr[i]->length;
- d.data = paddr[i]->contents;
- print_krb5_data("\t\tIP: ", &d);
- }
- }
- printf("\tstart/auth/end times: %d / %d / %d\n",
- krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.starttime,
- krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime,
- krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.endtime);
- }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- }
-
- krb5rc = KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED;
- if (!krb5ticket || !krb5ticket->enc_part2 ||
- !krb5ticket->enc_part2->client ||
- !krb5ticket->enc_part2->client->data ||
- !krb5ticket->enc_part2->session) {
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET,
- "bad ticket from krb5_rd_req.\n");
- } else if (kssl_ctx_setprinc(kssl_ctx, KSSL_CLIENT,
- &krb5ticket->enc_part2->client->realm,
- krb5ticket->enc_part2->client->data,
- krb5ticket->enc_part2->client->length)) {
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET,
- "kssl_ctx_setprinc() fails.\n");
- } else if (kssl_ctx_setkey(kssl_ctx, krb5ticket->enc_part2->session)) {
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET,
- "kssl_ctx_setkey() fails.\n");
- } else if (krb5ticket->enc_part2->flags & TKT_FLG_INVALID) {
- krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_INVALID;
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET,
- "invalid ticket from krb5_rd_req.\n");
- } else
- krb5rc = 0;
-
- kssl_ctx->enctype = krb5ticket->enc_part.enctype;
- ttimes->authtime = krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime;
- ttimes->starttime = krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.starttime;
- ttimes->endtime = krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.endtime;
- ttimes->renew_till = krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till;
-
-err:
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if (asn1ticket)
- KRB5_TICKET_free((KRB5_TICKET *) asn1ticket);
- if (krb5keytab)
- krb5_kt_close(krb5context, krb5keytab);
- if (krb5ticket)
- krb5_free_ticket(krb5context, krb5ticket);
- if (krb5server)
- krb5_free_principal(krb5context, krb5server);
- return (krb5rc);
-}
-
-
-/* Allocate & return a new kssl_ctx struct.
-*/
-KSSL_CTX *
-kssl_ctx_new(void)
-{
- return (calloc(1, sizeof(KSSL_CTX)));
-}
-
-
-/* Frees a kssl_ctx struct and any allocated memory it holds.
-** Returns NULL.
-*/
-KSSL_CTX *
-kssl_ctx_free(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx)
-{
- if (kssl_ctx == NULL)
- return kssl_ctx;
-
- if (kssl_ctx->key)
- OPENSSL_cleanse(kssl_ctx->key, kssl_ctx->length);
- if (kssl_ctx->key)
- free(kssl_ctx->key);
- if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
- free(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
- if (kssl_ctx->service_host)
- free(kssl_ctx->service_host);
- if (kssl_ctx->service_name)
- free(kssl_ctx->service_name);
- if (kssl_ctx->keytab_file)
- free(kssl_ctx->keytab_file);
-
- free(kssl_ctx);
- return (KSSL_CTX *) NULL;
-}
-
-
-/* Given an array of (krb5_data *) entity (and optional realm),
-** set the plain (char *) client_princ or service_host member
-** of the kssl_ctx struct.
-*/
-krb5_error_code
-kssl_ctx_setprinc(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, int which, krb5_data *realm,
- krb5_data *entity, int nentities)
-{
- char **princ;
- int length;
- int i;
-
- if (kssl_ctx == NULL || entity == NULL)
- return KSSL_CTX_ERR;
-
- switch (which) {
- case KSSL_CLIENT:
- princ = &kssl_ctx->client_princ;
- break;
- case KSSL_SERVER:
- princ = &kssl_ctx->service_host;
- break;
- default:
- return KSSL_CTX_ERR;
- break;
- }
- free(*princ);
- *princ = NULL;
-
- /* Add up all the entity->lengths */
- length = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < nentities; i++) {
- length += entity[i].length;
- }
- /* Add in space for the '/' character(s) (if any) */
- length += nentities - 1;
- /* Space for the ('@'+realm+NULL | NULL) */
- length += ((realm) ? realm->length + 2 : 1);
-
- if ((*princ = calloc(1, length)) == NULL)
- return KSSL_CTX_ERR;
- else {
- for (i = 0; i < nentities; i++) {
- strncat(*princ, entity[i].data, entity[i].length);
- if (i < nentities - 1) {
- strcat (*princ, "/");
- }
- }
- if (realm) {
- strcat (*princ, "@");
- (void) strncat(*princ, realm->data, realm->length);
- }
- }
-
- return KSSL_CTX_OK;
-}
-
-
-/* Set one of the plain (char *) string members of the kssl_ctx struct.
-** Default values should be:
-** which == KSSL_SERVICE => "khost" (KRB5SVC)
-** which == KSSL_KEYTAB => "/etc/krb5.keytab" (KRB5KEYTAB)
-*/
-krb5_error_code
-kssl_ctx_setstring(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, int which, char *text)
-{
- char **string;
-
- if (!kssl_ctx)
- return KSSL_CTX_ERR;
-
- switch (which) {
- case KSSL_SERVICE:
- string = &kssl_ctx->service_name;
- break;
- case KSSL_SERVER:
- string = &kssl_ctx->service_host;
- break;
- case KSSL_CLIENT:
- string = &kssl_ctx->client_princ;
- break;
- case KSSL_KEYTAB:
- string = &kssl_ctx->keytab_file;
- break;
- default:
- return KSSL_CTX_ERR;
- break;
- }
- free(*string);
- *string = NULL;
-
- if (text && (*string = strdup(text)) == NULL)
- return KSSL_CTX_ERR;
-
- return KSSL_CTX_OK;
-}
-
-
-/* Copy the Kerberos session key from a (krb5_keyblock *) to a kssl_ctx
-** struct. Clear kssl_ctx->key if Kerberos session key is NULL.
-*/
-krb5_error_code
-kssl_ctx_setkey(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, krb5_keyblock *session)
-{
- int length;
- krb5_enctype enctype;
- krb5_octet FAR *contents = NULL;
-
- if (!kssl_ctx)
- return KSSL_CTX_ERR;
-
- if (kssl_ctx->key) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(kssl_ctx->key, kssl_ctx->length);
- free(kssl_ctx->key);
- kssl_ctx->key = NULL;
- }
-
- if (session) {
-
-#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
- length = session->keyvalue->length;
- enctype = session->keytype;
- contents = session->keyvalue->contents;
-#else
- length = session->length;
- enctype = session->enctype;
- contents = session->contents;
-#endif
- kssl_ctx->enctype = enctype;
- kssl_ctx->length = length;
- } else {
- kssl_ctx->enctype = ENCTYPE_UNKNOWN;
- kssl_ctx->length = 0;
- return KSSL_CTX_OK;
- }
-
- if ((kssl_ctx->key = calloc(1, kssl_ctx->length)) == NULL) {
- kssl_ctx->length = 0;
- return KSSL_CTX_ERR;
- } else
- memcpy(kssl_ctx->key, contents, length);
-
- return KSSL_CTX_OK;
-}
-
-
-/* Display contents of kssl_ctx struct
-*/
-void
-kssl_ctx_show(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx)
-{
- int i;
-
- printf("kssl_ctx: ");
- if (kssl_ctx == NULL) {
- printf("NULL\n");
- return;
- } else
- printf("%p\n", (void *)kssl_ctx);
-
- printf("\tservice:\t%s\n",
- (kssl_ctx->service_name) ? kssl_ctx->service_name : "NULL");
- printf("\tclient:\t%s\n",
- (kssl_ctx->client_princ) ? kssl_ctx->client_princ : "NULL");
- printf("\tserver:\t%s\n",
- (kssl_ctx->service_host) ? kssl_ctx->service_host : "NULL");
- printf("\tkeytab:\t%s\n",
- (kssl_ctx->keytab_file) ? kssl_ctx->keytab_file : "NULL");
- printf("\tkey [%d:%d]:\t",
- kssl_ctx->enctype, kssl_ctx->length);
-
- for (i = 0; i < kssl_ctx->length && kssl_ctx->key; i++) {
- printf("%02x", kssl_ctx->key[i]);
- }
- printf("\n");
- return;
-}
-
-int
-kssl_keytab_is_available(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx)
-{
- krb5_context krb5context = NULL;
- krb5_keytab krb5keytab = NULL;
- krb5_keytab_entry entry;
- krb5_principal princ = NULL;
- krb5_error_code krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
- int rc = 0;
-
- if ((krb5rc = krb5_init_context(&krb5context)))
- return (0);
-
- /* kssl_ctx->keytab_file == NULL ==> use Kerberos default
- */
- if (kssl_ctx->keytab_file) {
- krb5rc = krb5_kt_resolve(krb5context, kssl_ctx->keytab_file,
- &krb5keytab);
- if (krb5rc)
- goto exit;
- } else {
- krb5rc = krb5_kt_default(krb5context, &krb5keytab);
- if (krb5rc)
- goto exit;
- }
-
- /* the host key we are looking for */
- krb5rc = krb5_sname_to_principal(krb5context, NULL,
- kssl_ctx->service_name ? kssl_ctx->service_name : KRB5SVC,
- KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &princ);
-
- if (krb5rc)
- goto exit;
-
- krb5rc = krb5_kt_get_entry(krb5context, krb5keytab, princ,
- 0 /* IGNORE_VNO */,
- 0 /* IGNORE_ENCTYPE */,
- &entry);
- if (krb5rc == KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND) {
- rc = 1;
- goto exit;
- } else if (krb5rc)
- goto exit;
-
- krb5_kt_free_entry(krb5context, &entry);
- rc = 1;
-
-exit:
- if (krb5keytab)
- krb5_kt_close(krb5context, krb5keytab);
- if (princ)
- krb5_free_principal(krb5context, princ);
- if (krb5context)
- krb5_free_context(krb5context);
- return (rc);
-}
-
-int
-kssl_tgt_is_available(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx)
-{
- krb5_error_code krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
- krb5_context krb5context = NULL;
- krb5_ccache krb5ccdef = NULL;
- krb5_creds krb5creds, *krb5credsp = NULL;
- int rc = 0;
-
- memset((char *)&krb5creds, 0, sizeof(krb5creds));
-
- if (!kssl_ctx)
- return (0);
-
- if (!kssl_ctx->service_host)
- return (0);
-
- if ((krb5rc = krb5_init_context(&krb5context)) != 0)
- goto err;
-
- if ((krb5rc = krb5_sname_to_principal(
- krb5context, kssl_ctx->service_host,
- (kssl_ctx->service_name) ? kssl_ctx->service_name : KRB5SVC,
- KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &krb5creds.server)) != 0)
- goto err;
-
- if ((krb5rc = krb5_cc_default(krb5context, &krb5ccdef)) != 0)
- goto err;
-
- if ((krb5rc = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb5context, krb5ccdef,
- &krb5creds.client)) != 0)
- goto err;
-
- if ((krb5rc = krb5_get_credentials(krb5context, 0, krb5ccdef,
- &krb5creds, &krb5credsp)) != 0)
- goto err;
-
- rc = 1;
-
-err:
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if (krb5creds.client)
- krb5_free_principal(krb5context, krb5creds.client);
- if (krb5creds.server)
- krb5_free_principal(krb5context, krb5creds.server);
- if (krb5context)
- krb5_free_context(krb5context);
- return (rc);
-}
-
-void
-kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(krb5_context context, krb5_data *data)
-{
-#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
- data->length = 0;
- if (data->data)
- free(data->data);
-#elif defined(KRB5_MIT_OLD11)
- if (data->data) {
- krb5_xfree(data->data);
- data->data = 0;
- }
-#else
- krb5_free_data_contents(NULL, data);
-#endif
-}
-
-/* Given pointers to KerberosTime and struct tm structs, convert the
-** KerberosTime string to struct tm. Note that KerberosTime is a
-** ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME value, constrained to GMT with no fractional
-** seconds as defined in RFC 1510.
-** Return pointer to the (partially) filled in struct tm on success,
-** return NULL on failure.
-*/
-static struct tm *
-k_gmtime(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *gtime, struct tm *k_tm)
-{
- char c, *p;
-
- if (!k_tm)
- return NULL;
- if (gtime == NULL || gtime->length < 14)
- return NULL;
- if (gtime->data == NULL)
- return NULL;
-
- p = (char *)>ime->data[14];
-
- c = *p;
- *p = '\0';
- p -= 2;
- k_tm->tm_sec = atoi(p);
- *(p + 2) = c;
- c = *p;
- *p = '\0';
- p -= 2;
- k_tm->tm_min = atoi(p);
- *(p + 2) = c;
- c = *p;
- *p = '\0';
- p -= 2;
- k_tm->tm_hour = atoi(p);
- *(p + 2) = c;
- c = *p;
- *p = '\0';
- p -= 2;
- k_tm->tm_mday = atoi(p);
- *(p + 2) = c;
- c = *p;
- *p = '\0';
- p -= 2;
- k_tm->tm_mon = atoi(p) - 1;
- *(p + 2) = c;
- c = *p;
- *p = '\0';
- p -= 4;
- k_tm->tm_year = atoi(p) - 1900;
- *(p + 4) = c;
-
- return k_tm;
-}
-
-
-/* Helper function for kssl_validate_times().
-** We need context->clockskew, but krb5_context is an opaque struct.
-** So we try to sneek the clockskew out through the replay cache.
-** If that fails just return a likely default (300 seconds).
-*/
-static krb5_deltat
-get_rc_clockskew(krb5_context context)
-{
- krb5_rcache rc;
- krb5_deltat clockskew;
-
- if (krb5_rc_default(context, &rc))
- return KSSL_CLOCKSKEW;
- if (krb5_rc_initialize(context, rc, 0))
- return KSSL_CLOCKSKEW;
- if (krb5_rc_get_lifespan(context, rc, &clockskew)) {
- clockskew = KSSL_CLOCKSKEW;
- }
- (void)krb5_rc_destroy(context, rc);
- return clockskew;
-}
-
-
-/* kssl_validate_times() combines (and more importantly exposes)
-** the MIT KRB5 internal function krb5_validate_times() and the
-** in_clock_skew() macro. The authenticator client time is checked
-** to be within clockskew secs of the current time and the current
-** time is checked to be within the ticket start and expire times.
-** Either check may be omitted by supplying a NULL value.
-** Returns 0 for valid times, SSL_R_KRB5* error codes otherwise.
-** See Also: (Kerberos source)/krb5/lib/krb5/krb/valid_times.c
-** 20010420 VRS
-*/
-krb5_error_code
-kssl_validate_times(krb5_timestamp atime, krb5_ticket_times *ttimes)
-{
- krb5_deltat skew;
- krb5_timestamp start, now;
- krb5_error_code rc;
- krb5_context context;
-
- if ((rc = krb5_init_context(&context)))
- return SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET;
- skew = get_rc_clockskew(context);
-
- if ((rc = krb5_timeofday(context, &now)))
- return SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET;
- krb5_free_context(context);
-
- if (atime && labs(atime - now) >= skew)
- return SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_SKEW;
-
- if (!ttimes)
- return 0;
-
- start = (ttimes->starttime != 0) ? ttimes->starttime : ttimes->authtime;
- if (start - now > skew)
- return SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_NYV;
- if ((now - ttimes->endtime) > skew)
- return SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_EXPIRED;
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("kssl_validate_times: %d |<- | %d - %d | < %d ->| %d\n",
- start, atime, now, skew, ttimes->endtime);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-
-/* Decode and decrypt given DER-encoded authenticator, then pass
-** authenticator ctime back in *atimep (or 0 if time unavailable).
-** Returns krb5_error_code and kssl_err on error. A NULL
-** authenticator (authentp->length == 0) is not considered an error.
-** Note that kssl_check_authent() makes use of the KRB5 session key;
-** you must call kssl_sget_tkt() to get the key before calling this routine.
-*/
-krb5_error_code
-kssl_check_authent(
- /* IN */ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,
- /* IN */ krb5_data *authentp,
- /* OUT */ krb5_timestamp *atimep,
- /* OUT */ KSSL_ERR *kssl_err )
-{
- krb5_error_code krb5rc = 0;
- KRB5_ENCDATA *dec_authent = NULL;
- KRB5_AUTHENTBODY *auth = NULL;
- krb5_enctype enctype;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
- const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
- unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- const unsigned char *p;
- unsigned char *unenc_authent;
- int outl, unencbufsize;
- struct tm tm_time, *tm_l, *tm_g;
- time_t now, tl, tg, tr, tz_offset;
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
- *atimep = 0;
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, 0, "");
-
-#ifndef KRB5CHECKAUTH
- authentp = NULL;
-#else
-#if KRB5CHECKAUTH == 0
- authentp = NULL;
-#endif
-#endif /* KRB5CHECKAUTH */
-
- if (authentp == NULL || authentp->length == 0)
- return 0;
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- {
- unsigned int ui;
- printf("kssl_check_authent: authenticator[%d]:\n", authentp->length);
- p = authentp->data;
-
- for (ui = 0; ui < authentp->length; ui++) printf("%02x ", p[ui]);
- printf("\n");
- }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- unencbufsize = 2 * authentp->length;
- if ((unenc_authent = calloc(1, unencbufsize)) == NULL) {
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
- "Unable to allocate authenticator buffer.\n");
- krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
- goto err;
- }
-
- p = (unsigned char *)authentp->data;
- if ((dec_authent = d2i_KRB5_ENCDATA(NULL, &p,
- (long)authentp->length)) == NULL) {
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
- "Error decoding authenticator.\n");
- krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
- goto err;
- }
-
- enctype = dec_authent->etype->data[0]; /* should = kssl_ctx->enctype */
-#if !defined(KRB5_MIT_OLD11)
- switch (enctype ) {
- case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1: /* EVP_des_ede3_cbc(); */
- case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA:
- case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW:
- krb5rc = 0;
- /* Skip, can't handle derived keys */
- goto err;
- }
-#endif
- enc = kssl_map_enc(enctype);
- memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv);
- /* per RFC 1510 */
-
- if (enc == NULL) {
- /* Disable kssl_check_authent for ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1.
- ** This enctype indicates the authenticator was encrypted
- ** using key-usage derived keys which openssl cannot decrypt.
- */
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!EVP_CipherInit(&ciph_ctx, enc, kssl_ctx->key, iv, 0)) {
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
- "EVP_CipherInit error decrypting authenticator.\n");
- krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
- goto err;
- }
- outl = dec_authent->cipher->length;
- if (!EVP_Cipher(&ciph_ctx, unenc_authent, dec_authent->cipher->data, outl)) {
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
- "EVP_Cipher error decrypting authenticator.\n");
- krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
- goto err;
- }
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- {
- int padl;
- printf("kssl_check_authent: decrypted authenticator[%d] =\n", outl);
- for (padl = 0; padl < outl; padl++) printf("%02x ", unenc_authent[padl]);
- printf("\n");
- }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if ((p = kssl_skip_confound(enctype, unenc_authent)) == NULL) {
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
- "confounded by authenticator.\n");
- krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
- goto err;
- }
- outl -= p - unenc_authent;
-
- if ((auth = (KRB5_AUTHENTBODY *)d2i_KRB5_AUTHENT(NULL, &p,
- (long)outl)) == NULL) {
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
- "Error decoding authenticator body.\n");
- krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
- goto err;
- }
-
- memset(&tm_time, 0, sizeof(struct tm));
- if (k_gmtime(auth->ctime, &tm_time) &&
- ((tr = mktime(&tm_time)) != (time_t)(-1))) {
- now = time(&now);
- tm_l = localtime(&now);
- tl = mktime(tm_l);
- tm_g = gmtime(&now);
- tg = mktime(tm_g);
- tz_offset = tg - tl;
-
- *atimep = (krb5_timestamp)(tr - tz_offset);
- }
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("kssl_check_authent: returns %d for client time ", *atimep);
- if (auth && auth->ctime && auth->ctime->length && auth->ctime->data)
- printf("%.*s\n", auth->ctime->length, auth->ctime->data);
- else
- printf("NULL\n");
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-err:
- if (auth)
- KRB5_AUTHENT_free((KRB5_AUTHENT *) auth);
- if (dec_authent)
- KRB5_ENCDATA_free(dec_authent);
- if (unenc_authent)
- free(unenc_authent);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
- return krb5rc;
-}
-
-
-/* Replaces krb5_build_principal_ext(), with varargs length == 2 (svc, host),
-** because I dont't know how to stub varargs.
-** Returns krb5_error_code == ENOMEM on alloc error, otherwise
-** passes back newly constructed principal, which should be freed by caller.
-*/
-krb5_error_code
-kssl_build_principal_2(
- /* UPDATE */ krb5_context context,
- /* OUT */ krb5_principal *princ,
- /* IN */ int rlen, const char *realm,
- /* IN */ int slen, const char *svc,
- /* IN */ int hlen, const char *host)
-{
- krb5_data *p_data = NULL;
- krb5_principal new_p = NULL;
- char *new_r = NULL;
-
- if ((p_data = calloc(2, sizeof(krb5_data))) == NULL ||
- (new_p = calloc(1, sizeof(krb5_principal_data))) == NULL)
- goto err;
- new_p->length = 2;
- new_p->data = p_data;
-
- if ((new_r = calloc(1, rlen + 1)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- memcpy(new_r, realm, rlen);
- krb5_princ_set_realm_length(context, new_p, rlen);
- krb5_princ_set_realm_data(context, new_p, new_r);
-
- if ((new_p->data[0].data = calloc(1, slen + 1)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- memcpy(new_p->data[0].data, svc, slen);
- new_p->data[0].length = slen;
-
- if ((new_p->data[1].data = calloc(1, hlen + 1)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- memcpy(new_p->data[1].data, host, hlen);
- new_p->data[1].length = hlen;
-
- krb5_princ_type(context, new_p) = KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN;
- *princ = new_p;
- return 0;
-
-err:
- if (new_p && new_p[0].data)
- free(new_p[0].data);
- if (new_p && new_p[1].data)
- free(new_p[1].data);
- if (new_p)
- free(new_p);
- if (new_r)
- free(new_r);
- return ENOMEM;
-}
-
-void
-SSL_set0_kssl_ctx(SSL *s, KSSL_CTX *kctx)
-{
- s->kssl_ctx = kctx;
-}
-
-KSSL_CTX *
-SSL_get0_kssl_ctx(SSL *s)
-{
- return s->kssl_ctx;
-}
-
-char *
-kssl_ctx_get0_client_princ(KSSL_CTX *kctx)
-{
- if (kctx)
- return kctx->client_princ;
- return NULL;
-}
-
-#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <ctype.h>
-#include <krb5.h>
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/*
-** Depending on which KRB5 implementation used, some types from
-** the other may be missing. Resolve that here and now
-*/
-#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
-typedef unsigned char krb5_octet;
-#define FAR
-#else
-
-#ifndef FAR
-#define FAR
-#endif
-
-#endif
-
-/* Uncomment this to debug kssl problems or
-** to trace usage of the Kerberos session key
-**
-** #define KSSL_DEBUG
-*/
-
-#ifndef KRB5SVC
-#define KRB5SVC "host"
-#endif
-
-#ifndef KRB5KEYTAB
-#define KRB5KEYTAB "/etc/krb5.keytab"
-#endif
-
-#ifndef KRB5SENDAUTH
-#define KRB5SENDAUTH 1
-#endif
-
-#ifndef KRB5CHECKAUTH
-#define KRB5CHECKAUTH 1
-#endif
-
-#ifndef KSSL_CLOCKSKEW
-#define KSSL_CLOCKSKEW 300;
-#endif
-
-#define KSSL_ERR_MAX 256
-typedef struct kssl_err_st {
- int reason;
- char text[KSSL_ERR_MAX];
-} KSSL_ERR;
-
-
-/* Context for passing
-** (1) Kerberos session key to SSL, and
-** (2) Config data between application and SSL lib
-*/
-typedef struct kssl_ctx_st {
- /* used by: disposition: */
- char *service_name; /* C,S default ok (kssl) */
- char *service_host; /* C input, REQUIRED */
- char *client_princ; /* S output from krb5 ticket */
- char *keytab_file; /* S NULL (/etc/krb5.keytab) */
- char *cred_cache; /* C NULL (default) */
- krb5_enctype enctype;
- int length;
- krb5_octet FAR *key;
-} KSSL_CTX;
-
-#define KSSL_CLIENT 1
-#define KSSL_SERVER 2
-#define KSSL_SERVICE 3
-#define KSSL_KEYTAB 4
-
-#define KSSL_CTX_OK 0
-#define KSSL_CTX_ERR 1
-#define KSSL_NOMEM 2
-
-/* Public (for use by applications that use OpenSSL with Kerberos 5 support */
-krb5_error_code kssl_ctx_setstring(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, int which, char *text);
-KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx_new(void);
-KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx_free(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx);
-void kssl_ctx_show(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx);
-krb5_error_code kssl_ctx_setprinc(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, int which,
- krb5_data *realm, krb5_data *entity, int nentities);
-krb5_error_code kssl_cget_tkt(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, krb5_data **enc_tktp,
- krb5_data *authenp, KSSL_ERR *kssl_err);
-krb5_error_code kssl_sget_tkt(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, krb5_data *indata,
- krb5_ticket_times *ttimes, KSSL_ERR *kssl_err);
-krb5_error_code kssl_ctx_setkey(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, krb5_keyblock *session);
-void kssl_err_set(KSSL_ERR *kssl_err, int reason, char *text);
-void kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(krb5_context context, krb5_data *data);
-krb5_error_code kssl_build_principal_2(krb5_context context,
- krb5_principal *princ, int rlen, const char *realm, int slen,
- const char *svc, int hlen, const char *host);
-krb5_error_code kssl_validate_times(krb5_timestamp atime,
- krb5_ticket_times *ttimes);
-krb5_error_code kssl_check_authent(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, krb5_data *authentp,
- krb5_timestamp *atimep, KSSL_ERR *kssl_err);
-unsigned char *kssl_skip_confound(krb5_enctype enctype, unsigned char *authn);
-
-void SSL_set0_kssl_ctx(SSL *s, KSSL_CTX *kctx);
-KSSL_CTX *SSL_get0_kssl_ctx(SSL *s);
-char *kssl_ctx_get0_client_princ(KSSL_CTX *kctx);
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#endif /* KSSL_H */
#include <openssl/kssl.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/* Private (internal to OpenSSL) */
-void print_krb5_data(char *label, krb5_data *kdata);
-void print_krb5_authdata(char *label, krb5_authdata **adata);
-void print_krb5_keyblock(char *label, krb5_keyblock *keyblk);
-
-char *kstring(char *string);
-char *knumber(int len, krb5_octet *contents);
-
-const EVP_CIPHER *kssl_map_enc(krb5_enctype enctype);
-
-int kssl_keytab_is_available(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx);
-int kssl_tgt_is_available(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx);
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#endif /* KSSL_LCL_H */
ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
- if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s)) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT,
- SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
- SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto end;
- }
- }
-#endif
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
else
i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- && !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
- (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
) {
al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
n -= param_len;
} else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
- n2s(p, i);
- param_len = i + 2;
- if (param_len > n) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (!(s->srp_ctx.N = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- p += i;
-
- n2s(p, i);
- param_len += i + 2;
- if (param_len > n) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (!(s->srp_ctx.g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- p += i;
-
- i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
- p++;
- param_len += i + 1;
- if (param_len > n) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (!(s->srp_ctx.s = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- p += i;
-
- n2s(p, i);
- param_len += i + 2;
- if (param_len > n) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (!(s->srp_ctx.B = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- p += i;
- n -= param_len;
-
- /* We must check if there is a certificate */
- if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[
- SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
- else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[
- SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509);
- } else
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
unsigned long alg_k;
unsigned char *q;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
s, s->session->master_key, tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
- krb5_error_code krb5rc;
- KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
- /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
- krb5_data *enc_ticket;
- krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
- const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
- unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
- unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
- + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
- alg_k, SSL_kKRB5);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- authp = NULL;
-#ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
- if (KRB5SENDAUTH)
- authp = &authenticator;
-#endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
-
- krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket,
- authp, &kssl_err);
- enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
- if (enc == NULL)
- goto err;
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- {
- printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
- if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
- printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n",
- kssl_err.text);
- }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if (krb5rc) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
- SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- kssl_err.reason);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
- * in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
- *
- * Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
- * n = krb5_ap_req.length;
- * memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
- * if (krb5_ap_req.data)
- * kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
- *
- * Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
- * (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
- * Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
- * with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
- * Example:
- * KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
- * Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
- * optional authenticator omitted.
- */
-
- /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
- s2n(enc_ticket->length, p);
- memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
- p += enc_ticket->length;
- n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
-
- /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
- if (authp && authp->length) {
- s2n(authp->length, p);
- memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
- p += authp->length;
- n += authp->length + 2;
-
- free(authp->data);
- authp->data = NULL;
- authp->length = 0;
- } else {
- s2n(0,p);/* null authenticator length */
- n += 2;
- }
-
- tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
- tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
- if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- /*
- * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
- * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
- * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
- * kssl_ctx->length);
- * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
- */
-
- memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv);
- /* per RFC 1510 */
- EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL,
- kssl_ctx->key, iv);
- EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, epms, &outl, tmp_buf,
- sizeof tmp_buf);
- EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(epms[outl]), &padl);
- outl += padl;
- if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
-
- /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
- s2n(outl, p);
- memcpy(p, epms, outl);
- p += outl;
- n += outl + 2;
-
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key,
- tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
-
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
- }
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) {
DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt;
EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
- if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
- /* send off the data */
- n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
- s2n(n, p);
- BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p);
- n += 2;
- } else {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
- free(s->session->srp_username);
- s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
- if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((s->session->master_key_length =
- SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN];
168,
168,
},
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-/* The Kerberos ciphers*/
-/* Cipher 1E */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_LOW,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 56,
- 56,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 1F */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_3DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 168,
- 168,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 20 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_RC4,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 21 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_IDEA,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 22 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_DES,
- SSL_MD5,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_LOW,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 56,
- 56,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 23 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_3DES,
- SSL_MD5,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 168,
- 168,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 24 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_RC4,
- SSL_MD5,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 25 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_IDEA,
- SSL_MD5,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 26 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 40,
- 56,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 27 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_RC2,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 40,
- 128,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 28 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_RC4,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 40,
- 128,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 29 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_DES,
- SSL_MD5,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 40,
- 56,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 2A */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_RC2,
- SSL_MD5,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 40,
- 128,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 2B */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_RC4,
- SSL_MD5,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 40,
- 128,
- },
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
/* New AES ciphersuites */
/* Cipher 2F */
},
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- /* Cipher C01A */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kSRP,
- SSL_aNULL,
- SSL_3DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 168,
- 168,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C01B */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kSRP,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_3DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 168,
- 168,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C01C */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kSRP,
- SSL_aDSS,
- SSL_3DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 168,
- 168,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C01D */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kSRP,
- SSL_aNULL,
- SSL_AES128,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C01E */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kSRP,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_AES128,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C01F */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kSRP,
- SSL_aDSS,
- SSL_AES128,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C020 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kSRP,
- SSL_aNULL,
- SSL_AES256,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C021 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kSRP,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_AES256,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C022 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kSRP,
- SSL_aDSS,
- SSL_AES256,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
/* HMAC based TLS v1.2 ciphersuites from RFC5289 */
s->s3 = s3;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- SSL_SRP_CTX_init(s);
-#endif
s->method->ssl_clear(s);
return (1);
err:
}
if (s->s3->handshake_dgst)
ssl3_free_digest_list(s);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- SSL_SRP_CTX_free(s);
-#endif
OPENSSL_cleanse(s->s3, sizeof *s->s3);
free(s->s3);
s->s3 = NULL;
#endif
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-static char *
-srp_password_from_info_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
-{
- return BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.info);
-}
-#endif
long
ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
return 1;
break;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME:
- ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask|=SSL_kSRP;
- if (ctx->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
- free(ctx->srp_ctx.login);
- ctx->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
- if (parg == NULL)
- break;
- if (strlen((const char *)parg) > 255 ||
- strlen((const char *)parg) < 1) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL,
- SSL_R_INVALID_SRP_USERNAME);
- return 0;
- }
- if ((ctx->srp_ctx.login = BUF_strdup((char *)parg)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- break;
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_PASSWORD:
- ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback =
- srp_password_from_info_cb;
- ctx->srp_ctx.info = parg;
- break;
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_ARG:
- ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask|=SSL_kSRP;
- ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg = parg;
- break;
-
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_STRENGTH:
- ctx->srp_ctx.strength = larg;
- break;
-#endif
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
/* A Thawte special :-) */
unsigned char *, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, HMAC_CTX *, int))fp;
break;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_VERIFY_PARAM_CB:
- ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask|=SSL_kSRP;
- ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback =
- (int (*)(SSL *, void *))fp;
- break;
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME_CB:
- ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask|=SSL_kSRP;
- ctx->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback =
- (int (*)(SSL *, int *, void *))fp;
- break;
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_GIVE_CLIENT_PWD_CB:
- ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask|=SSL_kSRP;
- ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback =
- (char *(*)(SSL *, void *))fp;
- break;
-#endif
#endif
default:
return (0);
mask_a = cert->mask_a;
emask_k = cert->export_mask_k;
emask_a = cert->export_mask_a;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- mask_k = cert->mask_k | s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask;
- emask_k = cert->export_mask_k | s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask;
-#endif
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
/* printf("ssl3_choose_cipher %d alg= %lx\n", i,c->algorithms);*/
alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
- if (!kssl_keytab_is_available(s->kssl_ctx) )
- continue;
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* with PSK there must be server callback set */
if ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
-#endif
#include <openssl/md5.h>
static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
return (NULL);
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-static int
-ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
-{
- int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
-
- *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
-
- if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
- (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
- if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
- /*
- * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
- * we do so if There is no srp login name
- */
- ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
- *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
- } else {
- ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
- }
- }
- return (ret);
-}
-#endif
IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
ssl3_accept, ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method)
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- {
- int al;
- if ((ret =
- ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al))
- < 0) {
- /*
- * Callback indicates further work to
- * be done.
- */
- s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
- goto end;
- }
- if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
-
- /*
- * This is not really an error but the
- * only means for a client to detect
- * whether srp is supported.
- */
- if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
- SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
-
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
-
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
-
- }
- }
-#endif
s->renegotiate = 2;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
* send_server_key_exchange.
*/
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
)
/*
* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary
* hint if provided */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|| ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
- || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
#endif
|| (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
|| (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
n += 2 + pskhintlen;
} else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
- if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
- (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
- goto err;
- }
- r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
- r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
- r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
- r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
- } else
-#endif
{
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
}
for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
- n += 1 + nr[i];
- else
-#endif
n += 2 + nr[i];
}
p = &(d[4]);
for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
- *p = nr[i];
- p++;
- } else
-#endif
s2n(nr[i], p);
BN_bn2bin(r[i], p);
p += nr[i];
BIGNUM *pub = NULL;
DH *dh_srvr;
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
} else
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
- krb5_error_code krb5rc;
- krb5_data enc_ticket;
- krb5_data authenticator;
- krb5_data enc_pms;
- KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
- const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
- unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
- + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
- int padl, outl;
- krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
- krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
-
- if (!kssl_ctx)
- kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
-
- n2s(p, i);
- enc_ticket.length = i;
-
- if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
- p += enc_ticket.length;
-
- n2s(p, i);
- authenticator.length = i;
-
- if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- authenticator.data = (char *)p;
- p += authenticator.length;
-
- n2s(p, i);
- enc_pms.length = i;
- enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
- p += enc_pms.length;
-
- /*
- * Note that the length is checked again below,
- * after decryption
- */
- if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
- enc_pms.length + 6)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
- &kssl_err)) != 0) {
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
- krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
- if (kssl_err.text)
- printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- kssl_err.reason);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
- ** but will return authtime == 0.
- */
- if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
- &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) {
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
- krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
- if (kssl_err.text)
- printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- kssl_err.reason);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- krb5rc);
- goto err;
- }
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
- if (enc == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
-
- if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL,
- kssl_ctx->key, iv)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl,
- (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- outl += padl;
- if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
- /*
- * The premaster secret must contain the same version
- * number as the ClientHello to detect version rollback
- * attacks (strangely, the protocol does not offer such
- * protection for DH ciphersuites).
- * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes
- * instead of the protocol version.
- *
- * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
- * clients.
- * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for
- * the Kerberos cipher)
- */
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
-
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
-
- if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) {
- size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
- if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH ) {
- s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
- memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,
- kssl_ctx->client_princ, len);
- }
- }
-
-
- /*
- * Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, but it caused problems for
- * apache.
- * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
- * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
- */
- } else
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) {
goto f_err;
} else
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
- int param_len;
-
- n2s(p, i);
- param_len = i + 2;
- if (param_len > n) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
- free(s->session->srp_username);
- s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
- if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((s->session->master_key_length =
- SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- p += i;
- } else
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
int ret = 0;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
unsigned int sid_ctx_length;
unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH];
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- unsigned int krb5_client_princ_len;
- unsigned char krb5_client_princ[SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH];
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
char *psk_identity_hint;
char *psk_identity;
size_t tlsext_ticklen; /* Session ticket length */
long tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint; /* Session lifetime hint in seconds */
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- char *srp_username;
-#endif
};
#endif
#define SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(ctx, arg) SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx), SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG, 0, (arg))
#define SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(ssl, arg) SSL_ctrl((ssl), SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG, 0, (arg))
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
-
-typedef struct srp_ctx_st {
- /* param for all the callbacks */
- void *SRP_cb_arg;
- /* set client Hello login callback */
- int (*TLS_ext_srp_username_callback)(SSL *, int *, void *);
- /* set SRP N/g param callback for verification */
- int (*SRP_verify_param_callback)(SSL *, void *);
- /* set SRP client passwd callback */
- char *(*SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback)(SSL *, void *);
-
- char *login;
- BIGNUM *N, *g, *s, *B, *A;
- BIGNUM *a, *b, *v;
- char *info;
- int strength;
-
- unsigned long srp_Mask;
-} SRP_CTX;
-
-#endif
-
-/* see tls_srp.c */
-int SSL_SRP_CTX_init(SSL *s);
-int SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(SSL_CTX *ctx);
-int SSL_SRP_CTX_free(SSL *ctx);
-int SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *ctx);
-int SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(SSL *s, int *ad);
-int SRP_generate_server_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *master_key);
-int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s);
-int SRP_generate_client_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *master_key);
-
-#endif
#define SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT 1024*100 /* 100k max cert list :-) */
unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len);
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- SRP_CTX srp_ctx; /* ctx for SRP authentication */
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
int error; /* error bytes to be written */
int error_code; /* actual code */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx; /* Kerberos 5 context */
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
unsigned int (*psk_client_callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
* 2 if we are a server and are inside a handshake
* (i.e. not just sending a HelloRequest) */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- SRP_CTX srp_ctx; /* ctx for SRP authentication */
-#endif
};
#endif
int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm);
int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *name);
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *password);
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_strength(SSL_CTX *ctx, int strength);
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *(*cb)(SSL *, void *));
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_verify_param_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *, void *));
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *, int *, void *));
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg);
-
-int SSL_set_srp_server_param(SSL *s, const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g, BIGNUM *sa, BIGNUM *v, char *info);
-int SSL_set_srp_server_param_pw(SSL *s, const char *user, const char *pass, const char *grp);
-
-BIGNUM *SSL_get_srp_g(SSL *s);
-BIGNUM *SSL_get_srp_N(SSL *s);
-
-char *SSL_get_srp_username(SSL *s);
-char *SSL_get_srp_userinfo(SSL *s);
-#endif
void SSL_free(SSL *ssl);
int SSL_accept(SSL *ssl);
ASN1_OCTET_STRING master_key;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING session_id;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING session_id_context;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING krb5_princ;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
ASN1_INTEGER time;
ASN1_INTEGER timeout;
ASN1_INTEGER verify_result;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING psk_identity_hint;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING psk_identity;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING srp_username;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
} SSL_SESSION_ASN1;
int
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
unsigned char cbuf;
int v11 = 0;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- int v12 = 0;
#endif
long l;
SSL_SESSION_ASN1 a;
a.session_id_context.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
a.session_id_context.data = in->sid_ctx;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (in->krb5_client_princ_len) {
- a.krb5_princ.length = in->krb5_client_princ_len;
- a.krb5_princ.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
- a.krb5_princ.data = in->krb5_client_princ;
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
if (in->time != 0L) {
a.time.length = LSIZE2;
a.psk_identity.data = (unsigned char *)(in->psk_identity);
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (in->srp_username) {
- a.srp_username.length = strlen(in->srp_username);
- a.srp_username.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
- a.srp_username.data = (unsigned char *)(in->srp_username);
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.version), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER);
M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.ssl_version), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER);
M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.cipher), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.session_id), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.master_key), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (in->krb5_client_princ_len)
- M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.krb5_princ), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
if (in->time != 0L)
M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.time), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER, 1, v1);
if (in->timeout != 0L)
if (in->psk_identity)
M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.psk_identity), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 8, v8);
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (in->srp_username)
- M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.srp_username), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 12, v12);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
M_ASN1_I2D_seq_total();
M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.cipher), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.session_id), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.master_key), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (in->krb5_client_princ_len)
- M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.krb5_princ), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
if (in->time != 0L)
M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.time), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER, 1, v1);
if (in->timeout != 0L)
if (in->compress_meth)
M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.comp_id), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 11, v11);
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (in->srp_username)
- M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.srp_username), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 12, v12);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
M_ASN1_I2D_finish();
}
os.length = 0;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- os.length = 0;
- M_ASN1_D2I_get_opt(osp, d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
- if (os.data) {
- if (os.length > SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH)
- ret->krb5_client_princ_len = 0;
- else
- ret->krb5_client_princ_len = os.length;
- memcpy(ret->krb5_client_princ, os.data, ret->krb5_client_princ_len);
- free(os.data);
- os.data = NULL;
- os.length = 0;
- } else
- ret->krb5_client_princ_len = 0;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
ai.length = 0;
M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(aip, d2i_ASN1_INTEGER, 1); /* XXX 2038 */
}
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- os.length = 0;
- os.data = NULL;
- M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp, d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 12);
- if (os.data) {
- ret->srp_username = BUF_strndup((char *)os.data, os.length);
- free(os.data);
- os.data = NULL;
- os.length = 0;
- } else
- ret->srp_username = NULL;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
M_ASN1_D2I_Finish(a, SSL_SESSION_free, SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION);
}
*mkey |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH;
*auth |= SSL_aDH;
#endif
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
*mkey |= SSL_kKRB5;
*auth |= SSL_aKRB5;
-#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
*auth |= SSL_aECDSA;
#endif
*mkey |= SSL_kPSK;
*auth |= SSL_aPSK;
#endif
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
*mkey |= SSL_kSRP;
-#endif
/* Check for presence of GOST 34.10 algorithms, and if they
* do not present, disable appropriate auth and key exchange */
if (!get_optional_pkey_id("gost94")) {
if (s == NULL)
goto err;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- s->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
s->options = ctx->options;
s->mode = ctx->mode;
if (s->ctx)
SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (s->kssl_ctx != NULL)
- kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
if (s->next_proto_negotiated)
int i, j = 0;
SSL_CIPHER *c;
unsigned char *q;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- int nokrb5 = !kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
if (sk == NULL)
return (0);
if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) &&
(TLS1_get_client_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION))
continue;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) ||
- (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) && nokrb5)
- continue;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* with PSK there must be client callback set */
if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK) ||
ret->psk_client_callback = NULL;
ret->psk_server_callback = NULL;
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(ret);
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
ret->client_cert_engine = NULL;
#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO
if (a->psk_identity_hint)
free(a->psk_identity_hint);
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(a);
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
if (a->client_cert_engine)
ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine);
mask_a|=SSL_aNULL;
emask_a|=SSL_aNULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- mask_k|=SSL_kKRB5;
- mask_a|=SSL_aKRB5;
- emask_k|=SSL_kKRB5;
- emask_a|=SSL_aKRB5;
-#endif
/*
* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
ss->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
ss->psk_identity = NULL;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- ss->srp_username = NULL;
#endif
return (ss);
}
free(ss->psk_identity_hint);
if (ss->psk_identity != NULL)
free(ss->psk_identity);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (ss->srp_username != NULL)
- free(ss->srp_username);
#endif
OPENSSL_cleanse(ss, sizeof(*ss));
free(ss);
return (0);
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (s->kssl_ctx && !s->kssl_ctx->client_princ &&
- session->krb5_client_princ_len > 0) {
- s->kssl_ctx->client_princ = malloc(session->krb5_client_princ_len + 1);
- memcpy(s->kssl_ctx->client_princ, session->krb5_client_princ,
- session->krb5_client_princ_len);
- s->kssl_ctx->client_princ[session->krb5_client_princ_len] = '\0';
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
/* CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);*/
CRYPTO_add(&session->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", x->master_key[i]) <= 0)
goto err;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n Krb5 Principal: ") <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (x->krb5_client_princ_len == 0) {
- if (BIO_puts(bp, "None") <= 0)
- goto err;
- } else {
- for (i = 0; i < x->krb5_client_princ_len; i++) {
- if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", x->krb5_client_princ[i]) <= 0)
- goto err;
- }
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n PSK identity: ") <= 0)
goto err;
if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s", x->psk_identity_hint ? x->psk_identity_hint : "None") <= 0)
goto err;
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n SRP username: ") <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s", x->srp_username ? x->srp_username : "None") <= 0)
- goto err;
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (x->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint) {
if (BIO_printf(bp,
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-#include <openssl/srp.h>
-#endif
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#define _XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED 1
unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len);
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-/* SRP client */
-/* This is a context that we pass to all callbacks */
-typedef struct srp_client_arg_st {
- char *srppassin;
- char *srplogin;
-} SRP_CLIENT_ARG;
-
-#define PWD_STRLEN 1024
-
-static char *
-ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
-{
- SRP_CLIENT_ARG *srp_client_arg = (SRP_CLIENT_ARG *)arg;
- return BUF_strdup((char *)srp_client_arg->srppassin);
-}
-
-/* SRP server */
-/* This is a context that we pass to SRP server callbacks */
-typedef struct srp_server_arg_st {
- char *expected_user;
- char *pass;
-} SRP_SERVER_ARG;
-
-static int
-ssl_srp_server_param_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
-{
- SRP_SERVER_ARG *p = (SRP_SERVER_ARG *) arg;
-
- if (strcmp(p->expected_user, SSL_get_srp_username(s)) != 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "User %s doesn't exist\n", SSL_get_srp_username(s));
- return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
- }
- if (SSL_set_srp_server_param_pw(s, p->expected_user, p->pass, "1024") < 0) {
- *ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
- }
- return SSL_ERROR_NONE;
-}
-#endif
static BIO *bio_err = NULL;
static BIO *bio_stdout = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
fprintf(stderr, " -psk arg - PSK in hex (without 0x)\n");
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- fprintf(stderr, " -srpuser user - SRP username to use\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -srppass arg - password for 'user'\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -ssl3 - use SSLv3\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -tls1 - use TLSv1\n");
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- /* client */
- SRP_CLIENT_ARG srp_client_arg = {NULL, NULL};
- /* server */
- SRP_SERVER_ARG srp_server_arg = {NULL, NULL};
#endif
int no_dhe = 0;
int no_ecdhe = 0;
no_psk = 1;
#endif
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srpuser") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- srp_server_arg.expected_user = srp_client_arg.srplogin= *(++argv);
- tls1 = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srppass") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- srp_server_arg.pass = srp_client_arg.srppassin= *(++argv);
- tls1 = 1;
- }
-#endif
else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ssl2") == 0)
ssl2 = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "-tls1") == 0)
}
#endif
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (srp_client_arg.srplogin) {
- if (!SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(c_ctx, srp_client_arg.srplogin)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unable to set SRP username\n");
- goto end;
- }
- SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(c_ctx, &srp_client_arg);
- SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(c_ctx, ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb);
- /*SSL_CTX_set_srp_strength(c_ctx, srp_client_arg.strength);*/
- }
-
- if (srp_server_arg.expected_user != NULL) {
- SSL_CTX_set_verify(s_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, verify_callback);
- SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(s_ctx, &srp_server_arg);
- SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(s_ctx, ssl_srp_server_param_cb);
- }
-#endif
c_ssl = SSL_new(c_ctx);
s_ssl = SSL_new(s_ctx);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (c_ssl && c_ssl->kssl_ctx) {
- char localhost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 2];
-
- if (gethostname(localhost, sizeof localhost - 1) == 0) {
- localhost[sizeof localhost - 1] = '\0';
- if (strlen(localhost) == sizeof localhost - 1) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "localhost name too long\n");
- goto end;
- }
- kssl_ctx_setstring(c_ssl->kssl_ctx, KSSL_SERVER,
- localhost);
- }
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
for (i = 0; i < number; i++) {
if (!reuse)
ret += el;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- /* Add SRP username if there is one */
- if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
- /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
-
- int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
-
- if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- /* check for enough space.
- 4 for the srp type type and entension length
- 1 for the srp user identity
- + srp user identity length
- */
- if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
- return NULL;
-
-
- /* fill in the extension */
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
- s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
- (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
- memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
- ret += login_len;
- }
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
}
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
- if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if ((s->srp_ctx.login = malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
- return -1;
- memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
- s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
-
- if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
+++ /dev/null
-/* ssl/tls_srp.c */
-/* Written by Christophe Renou (christophe.renou@edelweb.fr) with
- * the precious help of Peter Sylvester (peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr)
- * for the EdelKey project and contributed to the OpenSSL project 2004.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2011 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/srp.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-
-int
-SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx)
-{
- if (ctx == NULL)
- return 0;
- free(ctx->srp_ctx.login);
- BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.N);
- BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.g);
- BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.s);
- BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.B);
- BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.A);
- BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.a);
- BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.b);
- BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.v);
- ctx->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback = NULL;
- ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg = NULL;
- ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback = NULL;
- ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback = NULL;
- ctx->srp_ctx.N = NULL;
- ctx->srp_ctx.g = NULL;
- ctx->srp_ctx.s = NULL;
- ctx->srp_ctx.B = NULL;
- ctx->srp_ctx.A = NULL;
- ctx->srp_ctx.a = NULL;
- ctx->srp_ctx.b = NULL;
- ctx->srp_ctx.v = NULL;
- ctx->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
- ctx->srp_ctx.info = NULL;
- ctx->srp_ctx.strength = SRP_MINIMAL_N;
- ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask = 0;
- return (1);
-}
-
-int
-SSL_SRP_CTX_free(struct ssl_st *s)
-{
- if (s == NULL)
- return 0;
- free(s->srp_ctx.login);
- BN_free(s->srp_ctx.N);
- BN_free(s->srp_ctx.g);
- BN_free(s->srp_ctx.s);
- BN_free(s->srp_ctx.B);
- BN_free(s->srp_ctx.A);
- BN_free(s->srp_ctx.a);
- BN_free(s->srp_ctx.b);
- BN_free(s->srp_ctx.v);
- s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback = NULL;
- s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg = NULL;
- s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback = NULL;
- s->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback = NULL;
- s->srp_ctx.N = NULL;
- s->srp_ctx.g = NULL;
- s->srp_ctx.s = NULL;
- s->srp_ctx.B = NULL;
- s->srp_ctx.A = NULL;
- s->srp_ctx.a = NULL;
- s->srp_ctx.b = NULL;
- s->srp_ctx.v = NULL;
- s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
- s->srp_ctx.info = NULL;
- s->srp_ctx.strength = SRP_MINIMAL_N;
- s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask = 0;
- return (1);
-}
-
-int
-SSL_SRP_CTX_init(struct ssl_st *s)
-{
- SSL_CTX *ctx;
-
- if ((s == NULL) || ((ctx = s->ctx) == NULL))
- return 0;
- s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg = ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg;
- /* set client Hello login callback */
- s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback = ctx->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback;
- /* set SRP N/g param callback for verification */
- s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback = ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback;
- /* set SRP client passwd callback */
- s->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback = ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback;
-
- s->srp_ctx.N = NULL;
- s->srp_ctx.g = NULL;
- s->srp_ctx.s = NULL;
- s->srp_ctx.B = NULL;
- s->srp_ctx.A = NULL;
- s->srp_ctx.a = NULL;
- s->srp_ctx.b = NULL;
- s->srp_ctx.v = NULL;
- s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
- s->srp_ctx.info = ctx->srp_ctx.info;
- s->srp_ctx.strength = ctx->srp_ctx.strength;
-
- if (((ctx->srp_ctx.N != NULL) &&
- ((s->srp_ctx.N = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.N)) == NULL)) ||
- ((ctx->srp_ctx.g != NULL) &&
- ((s->srp_ctx.g = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.g)) == NULL)) ||
- ((ctx->srp_ctx.s != NULL) &&
- ((s->srp_ctx.s = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.s)) == NULL)) ||
- ((ctx->srp_ctx.B != NULL) &&
- ((s->srp_ctx.B = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.B)) == NULL)) ||
- ((ctx->srp_ctx.A != NULL) &&
- ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.A)) == NULL)) ||
- ((ctx->srp_ctx.a != NULL) &&
- ((s->srp_ctx.a = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.a)) == NULL)) ||
- ((ctx->srp_ctx.v != NULL) &&
- ((s->srp_ctx.v = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.v)) == NULL)) ||
- ((ctx->srp_ctx.b != NULL) &&
- ((s->srp_ctx.b = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.b)) == NULL))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SRP_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if ((ctx->srp_ctx.login != NULL) &&
- ((s->srp_ctx.login = BUF_strdup(ctx->srp_ctx.login)) == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SRP_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask = ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask;
-
- return (1);
-err:
- free(s->srp_ctx.login);
- BN_free(s->srp_ctx.N);
- BN_free(s->srp_ctx.g);
- BN_free(s->srp_ctx.s);
- BN_free(s->srp_ctx.B);
- BN_free(s->srp_ctx.A);
- BN_free(s->srp_ctx.a);
- BN_free(s->srp_ctx.b);
- BN_free(s->srp_ctx.v);
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx)
-{
- if (ctx == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg = NULL;
- /* set client Hello login callback */
- ctx->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback = NULL;
- /* set SRP N/g param callback for verification */
- ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback = NULL;
- /* set SRP client passwd callback */
- ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback = NULL;
-
- ctx->srp_ctx.N = NULL;
- ctx->srp_ctx.g = NULL;
- ctx->srp_ctx.s = NULL;
- ctx->srp_ctx.B = NULL;
- ctx->srp_ctx.A = NULL;
- ctx->srp_ctx.a = NULL;
- ctx->srp_ctx.b = NULL;
- ctx->srp_ctx.v = NULL;
- ctx->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
- ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask = 0;
- ctx->srp_ctx.info = NULL;
- ctx->srp_ctx.strength = SRP_MINIMAL_N;
-
- return (1);
-}
-
-/* server side */
-int
-SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(SSL *s, int *ad)
-{
- unsigned char b[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
- int al;
-
- *ad = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
- if ((s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback !=NULL) &&
- ((al = s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback(s, ad,
- s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg)) != SSL_ERROR_NONE))
- return al;
-
- *ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
- (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.v == NULL))
- return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
-
- if (RAND_bytes(b, sizeof(b)) <= 0)
- return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
- s->srp_ctx.b = BN_bin2bn(b, sizeof(b), NULL);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(b, sizeof(b));
-
- /* Calculate: B = (kv + g^b) % N */
-
- return ((s->srp_ctx.B = SRP_Calc_B(s->srp_ctx.b, s->srp_ctx.N, s->srp_ctx.g, s->srp_ctx.v)) != NULL) ? SSL_ERROR_NONE : SSL3_AL_FATAL;
-}
-
-/* If the server just has the raw password, make up a verifier entry on the fly */
-int
-SSL_set_srp_server_param_pw(SSL *s, const char *user, const char *pass, const char *grp)
-{
- SRP_gN *GN = SRP_get_default_gN(grp);
- if (GN == NULL)
- return -1;
- s->srp_ctx.N = BN_dup(GN->N);
- s->srp_ctx.g = BN_dup(GN->g);
- if (s->srp_ctx.v != NULL) {
- BN_clear_free(s->srp_ctx.v);
- s->srp_ctx.v = NULL;
- }
- if (s->srp_ctx.s != NULL) {
- BN_clear_free(s->srp_ctx.s);
- s->srp_ctx.s = NULL;
- }
- if (!SRP_create_verifier_BN(user, pass, &s->srp_ctx.s, &s->srp_ctx.v,
- GN->N, GN->g))
- return -1;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-int
-SSL_set_srp_server_param(SSL *s, const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g,
- BIGNUM *sa, BIGNUM *v, char *info)
-{
- if (N != NULL) {
- if (s->srp_ctx.N != NULL) {
- if (!BN_copy(s->srp_ctx.N, N)) {
- BN_free(s->srp_ctx.N);
- s->srp_ctx.N = NULL;
- }
- } else
- s->srp_ctx.N = BN_dup(N);
- }
- if (g != NULL) {
- if (s->srp_ctx.g != NULL) {
- if (!BN_copy(s->srp_ctx.g, g)) {
- BN_free(s->srp_ctx.g);
- s->srp_ctx.g = NULL;
- }
- } else
- s->srp_ctx.g = BN_dup(g);
- }
- if (sa != NULL) {
- if (s->srp_ctx.s != NULL) {
- if (!BN_copy(s->srp_ctx.s, sa)) {
- BN_free(s->srp_ctx.s);
- s->srp_ctx.s = NULL;
- }
- } else
- s->srp_ctx.s = BN_dup(sa);
- }
- if (v != NULL) {
- if (s->srp_ctx.v != NULL) {
- if (!BN_copy(s->srp_ctx.v, v)) {
- BN_free(s->srp_ctx.v);
- s->srp_ctx.v = NULL;
- }
- } else
- s->srp_ctx.v = BN_dup(v);
- }
- s->srp_ctx.info = info;
-
- if (!(s->srp_ctx.N) || !(s->srp_ctx.g) ||
- !(s->srp_ctx.s) || !(s->srp_ctx.v))
- return -1;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-int
-SRP_generate_server_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *master_key)
-{
- BIGNUM *K = NULL, *u = NULL;
- int ret = -1, tmp_len;
- unsigned char *tmp = NULL;
-
- if (!SRP_Verify_A_mod_N(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N))
- goto err;
- if (!(u = SRP_Calc_u(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.B, s->srp_ctx.N)))
- goto err;
- if (!(K = SRP_Calc_server_key(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.v, u, s->srp_ctx.b, s->srp_ctx.N)))
- goto err;
-
- tmp_len = BN_num_bytes(K);
- if ((tmp = malloc(tmp_len)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- BN_bn2bin(K, tmp);
- ret = s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, master_key, tmp, tmp_len);
-err:
- if (tmp) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp, tmp_len);
- free(tmp);
- }
- BN_clear_free(K);
- BN_clear_free(u);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/* client side */
-int
-SRP_generate_client_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *master_key)
-{
- BIGNUM *x = NULL, *u = NULL, *K = NULL;
- int ret = -1, tmp_len;
- char *passwd = NULL;
- unsigned char *tmp = NULL;
-
- /* Checks if b % n == 0
- */
- if (SRP_Verify_B_mod_N(s->srp_ctx.B, s->srp_ctx.N) == 0)
- goto err;
- if (!(u = SRP_Calc_u(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.B, s->srp_ctx.N)))
- goto err;
- if (s->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (!(passwd = s->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback(s,
- s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg)))
- goto err;
- if (!(x = SRP_Calc_x(s->srp_ctx.s, s->srp_ctx.login, passwd)))
- goto err;
- if (!(K = SRP_Calc_client_key(s->srp_ctx.N, s->srp_ctx.B, s->srp_ctx.g,
- x, s->srp_ctx.a, u)))
- goto err;
-
- tmp_len = BN_num_bytes(K);
- if ((tmp = malloc(tmp_len)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- BN_bn2bin(K, tmp);
- ret = s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, master_key,
- tmp, tmp_len);
-err:
- if (tmp) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp, tmp_len);
- free(tmp);
- }
- BN_clear_free(K);
- BN_clear_free(x);
- if (passwd) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(passwd, strlen(passwd));
- free(passwd);
- }
- BN_clear_free(u);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int
-SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned char rnd[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
-
- if (BN_num_bits(s->srp_ctx.N) < s->srp_ctx.strength)
- return -1;
-
- if (s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback ==NULL &&
- !SRP_check_known_gN_param(s->srp_ctx.g, s->srp_ctx.N))
- return -1;
-
- RAND_bytes(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
- s->srp_ctx.a = BN_bin2bn(rnd, sizeof(rnd), s->srp_ctx.a);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
-
- if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = SRP_Calc_A(s->srp_ctx.a, s->srp_ctx.N,
- s->srp_ctx.g)))
- return -1;
-
- /* We can have a callback to verify SRP param!! */
- if (s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback !=NULL)
- return s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback(s,
- s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-BIGNUM *
-SSL_get_srp_g(SSL *s)
-{
- if (s->srp_ctx.g != NULL)
- return s->srp_ctx.g;
- return s->ctx->srp_ctx.g;
-}
-
-BIGNUM *
-SSL_get_srp_N(SSL *s)
-{
- if (s->srp_ctx.N != NULL)
- return s->srp_ctx.N;
- return s->ctx->srp_ctx.N;
-}
-
-char *
-SSL_get_srp_username(SSL *s)
-{
- if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
- return s->srp_ctx.login;
- return s->ctx->srp_ctx.login;
-}
-
-char *
-SSL_get_srp_userinfo(SSL *s)
-{
- if (s->srp_ctx.info != NULL)
- return s->srp_ctx.info;
- return s->ctx->srp_ctx.info;
-}
-
-#define tls1_ctx_ctrl ssl3_ctx_ctrl
-#define tls1_ctx_callback_ctrl ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl
-
-int
-SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *name)
-{
- return tls1_ctx_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME, 0, name);
-}
-
-int
-SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *password)
-{
- return tls1_ctx_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_PASSWORD, 0, password);
-}
-
-int
-SSL_CTX_set_srp_strength(SSL_CTX *ctx, int strength)
-{
- return tls1_ctx_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_STRENGTH, strength,
- NULL);
-}
-
-int
-SSL_CTX_set_srp_verify_param_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *, void *))
-{
- return tls1_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_VERIFY_PARAM_CB,
- (void (*)(void))cb);
-}
-
-int
-SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg)
-{
- return tls1_ctx_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_ARG, 0, arg);
-}
-
-int
-SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- int (*cb)(SSL *, int *, void *))
-{
- return tls1_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME_CB,
- (void (*)(void))cb);
-}
-
-int
-SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *(*cb)(SSL *, void *))
-{
- return tls1_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_GIVE_CLIENT_PWD_CB,
- (void (*)(void))cb);
-}
-
-#endif
unsigned int sid_ctx_length;
unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH];
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- unsigned int krb5_client_princ_len;
- unsigned char krb5_client_princ[SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH];
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
char *psk_identity_hint;
char *psk_identity;
size_t tlsext_ticklen; /* Session ticket length */
long tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint; /* Session lifetime hint in seconds */
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- char *srp_username;
-#endif
};
#endif
#define SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(ctx, arg) SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx), SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG, 0, (arg))
#define SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(ssl, arg) SSL_ctrl((ssl), SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG, 0, (arg))
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
-
-typedef struct srp_ctx_st {
- /* param for all the callbacks */
- void *SRP_cb_arg;
- /* set client Hello login callback */
- int (*TLS_ext_srp_username_callback)(SSL *, int *, void *);
- /* set SRP N/g param callback for verification */
- int (*SRP_verify_param_callback)(SSL *, void *);
- /* set SRP client passwd callback */
- char *(*SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback)(SSL *, void *);
-
- char *login;
- BIGNUM *N, *g, *s, *B, *A;
- BIGNUM *a, *b, *v;
- char *info;
- int strength;
-
- unsigned long srp_Mask;
-} SRP_CTX;
-
-#endif
-
-/* see tls_srp.c */
-int SSL_SRP_CTX_init(SSL *s);
-int SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(SSL_CTX *ctx);
-int SSL_SRP_CTX_free(SSL *ctx);
-int SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *ctx);
-int SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(SSL *s, int *ad);
-int SRP_generate_server_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *master_key);
-int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s);
-int SRP_generate_client_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *master_key);
-
-#endif
#define SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT 1024*100 /* 100k max cert list :-) */
unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len);
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- SRP_CTX srp_ctx; /* ctx for SRP authentication */
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
int error; /* error bytes to be written */
int error_code; /* actual code */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx; /* Kerberos 5 context */
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
unsigned int (*psk_client_callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
* 2 if we are a server and are inside a handshake
* (i.e. not just sending a HelloRequest) */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- SRP_CTX srp_ctx; /* ctx for SRP authentication */
-#endif
};
#endif
int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm);
int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *name);
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *password);
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_strength(SSL_CTX *ctx, int strength);
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *(*cb)(SSL *, void *));
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_verify_param_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *, void *));
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *, int *, void *));
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg);
-
-int SSL_set_srp_server_param(SSL *s, const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g, BIGNUM *sa, BIGNUM *v, char *info);
-int SSL_set_srp_server_param_pw(SSL *s, const char *user, const char *pass, const char *grp);
-
-BIGNUM *SSL_get_srp_g(SSL *s);
-BIGNUM *SSL_get_srp_N(SSL *s);
-
-char *SSL_get_srp_username(SSL *s);
-char *SSL_get_srp_userinfo(SSL *s);
-#endif
void SSL_free(SSL *ssl);
int SSL_accept(SSL *ssl);
-# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.40 2014/04/23 05:13:57 beck Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.41 2014/05/05 15:03:22 tedu Exp $
LIB= ssl
ssl_lib.c ssl_err2.c ssl_cert.c ssl_sess.c \
ssl_ciph.c ssl_stat.c ssl_rsa.c \
ssl_asn1.c ssl_txt.c ssl_algs.c \
- bio_ssl.c ssl_err.c kssl.c tls_srp.c t1_reneg.c
+ bio_ssl.c ssl_err.c t1_reneg.c
SRCS+= s3_cbc.c
HDRS= srtp.h ssl.h ssl2.h ssl3.h ssl23.h tls1.h dtls1.h kssl.h
ASN1_OCTET_STRING master_key;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING session_id;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING session_id_context;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING krb5_princ;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
ASN1_INTEGER time;
ASN1_INTEGER timeout;
ASN1_INTEGER verify_result;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING psk_identity_hint;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING psk_identity;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING srp_username;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
} SSL_SESSION_ASN1;
int
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
unsigned char cbuf;
int v11 = 0;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- int v12 = 0;
#endif
long l;
SSL_SESSION_ASN1 a;
a.session_id_context.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
a.session_id_context.data = in->sid_ctx;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (in->krb5_client_princ_len) {
- a.krb5_princ.length = in->krb5_client_princ_len;
- a.krb5_princ.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
- a.krb5_princ.data = in->krb5_client_princ;
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
if (in->time != 0L) {
a.time.length = LSIZE2;
a.psk_identity.data = (unsigned char *)(in->psk_identity);
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (in->srp_username) {
- a.srp_username.length = strlen(in->srp_username);
- a.srp_username.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
- a.srp_username.data = (unsigned char *)(in->srp_username);
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.version), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER);
M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.ssl_version), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER);
M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.cipher), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.session_id), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.master_key), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (in->krb5_client_princ_len)
- M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.krb5_princ), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
if (in->time != 0L)
M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.time), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER, 1, v1);
if (in->timeout != 0L)
if (in->psk_identity)
M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.psk_identity), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 8, v8);
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (in->srp_username)
- M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.srp_username), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 12, v12);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
M_ASN1_I2D_seq_total();
M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.cipher), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.session_id), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.master_key), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (in->krb5_client_princ_len)
- M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.krb5_princ), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
if (in->time != 0L)
M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.time), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER, 1, v1);
if (in->timeout != 0L)
if (in->compress_meth)
M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.comp_id), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 11, v11);
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (in->srp_username)
- M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.srp_username), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 12, v12);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
M_ASN1_I2D_finish();
}
os.length = 0;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- os.length = 0;
- M_ASN1_D2I_get_opt(osp, d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
- if (os.data) {
- if (os.length > SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH)
- ret->krb5_client_princ_len = 0;
- else
- ret->krb5_client_princ_len = os.length;
- memcpy(ret->krb5_client_princ, os.data, ret->krb5_client_princ_len);
- free(os.data);
- os.data = NULL;
- os.length = 0;
- } else
- ret->krb5_client_princ_len = 0;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
ai.length = 0;
M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(aip, d2i_ASN1_INTEGER, 1); /* XXX 2038 */
}
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- os.length = 0;
- os.data = NULL;
- M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp, d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 12);
- if (os.data) {
- ret->srp_username = BUF_strndup((char *)os.data, os.length);
- free(os.data);
- os.data = NULL;
- os.length = 0;
- } else
- ret->srp_username = NULL;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
M_ASN1_D2I_Finish(a, SSL_SESSION_free, SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION);
}
*mkey |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH;
*auth |= SSL_aDH;
#endif
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
*mkey |= SSL_kKRB5;
*auth |= SSL_aKRB5;
-#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
*auth |= SSL_aECDSA;
#endif
*mkey |= SSL_kPSK;
*auth |= SSL_aPSK;
#endif
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
*mkey |= SSL_kSRP;
-#endif
/* Check for presence of GOST 34.10 algorithms, and if they
* do not present, disable appropriate auth and key exchange */
if (!get_optional_pkey_id("gost94")) {
if (s == NULL)
goto err;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- s->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
s->options = ctx->options;
s->mode = ctx->mode;
if (s->ctx)
SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (s->kssl_ctx != NULL)
- kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
if (s->next_proto_negotiated)
int i, j = 0;
SSL_CIPHER *c;
unsigned char *q;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- int nokrb5 = !kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
if (sk == NULL)
return (0);
if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) &&
(TLS1_get_client_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION))
continue;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) ||
- (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) && nokrb5)
- continue;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* with PSK there must be client callback set */
if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK) ||
ret->psk_client_callback = NULL;
ret->psk_server_callback = NULL;
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(ret);
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
ret->client_cert_engine = NULL;
#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO
if (a->psk_identity_hint)
free(a->psk_identity_hint);
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(a);
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
if (a->client_cert_engine)
ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine);
mask_a|=SSL_aNULL;
emask_a|=SSL_aNULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- mask_k|=SSL_kKRB5;
- mask_a|=SSL_aKRB5;
- emask_k|=SSL_kKRB5;
- emask_a|=SSL_aKRB5;
-#endif
/*
* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
ss->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
ss->psk_identity = NULL;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- ss->srp_username = NULL;
#endif
return (ss);
}
free(ss->psk_identity_hint);
if (ss->psk_identity != NULL)
free(ss->psk_identity);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (ss->srp_username != NULL)
- free(ss->srp_username);
#endif
OPENSSL_cleanse(ss, sizeof(*ss));
free(ss);
return (0);
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (s->kssl_ctx && !s->kssl_ctx->client_princ &&
- session->krb5_client_princ_len > 0) {
- s->kssl_ctx->client_princ = malloc(session->krb5_client_princ_len + 1);
- memcpy(s->kssl_ctx->client_princ, session->krb5_client_princ,
- session->krb5_client_princ_len);
- s->kssl_ctx->client_princ[session->krb5_client_princ_len] = '\0';
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
/* CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);*/
CRYPTO_add(&session->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", x->master_key[i]) <= 0)
goto err;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n Krb5 Principal: ") <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (x->krb5_client_princ_len == 0) {
- if (BIO_puts(bp, "None") <= 0)
- goto err;
- } else {
- for (i = 0; i < x->krb5_client_princ_len; i++) {
- if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", x->krb5_client_princ[i]) <= 0)
- goto err;
- }
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n PSK identity: ") <= 0)
goto err;
if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s", x->psk_identity_hint ? x->psk_identity_hint : "None") <= 0)
goto err;
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n SRP username: ") <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s", x->srp_username ? x->srp_username : "None") <= 0)
- goto err;
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (x->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint) {
if (BIO_printf(bp,
ret += el;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- /* Add SRP username if there is one */
- if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
- /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
-
- int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
-
- if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- /* check for enough space.
- 4 for the srp type type and entension length
- 1 for the srp user identity
- + srp user identity length
- */
- if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
- return NULL;
-
-
- /* fill in the extension */
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
- s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
- (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
- memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
- ret += login_len;
- }
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
}
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
- if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if ((s->srp_ctx.login = malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
- return -1;
- memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
- s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
-
- if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
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