correct comment, spotted by tb@

diff --git a/lib/libtls/tls_verify.c b/lib/libtls/tls_verify.c
index 420e278..acc034d 100644 (file)
--- a/lib/libtls/tls_verify.c
+++ b/lib/libtls/tls_verify.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: tls_verify.c,v 1.24 2023/05/28 09:02:01 beck Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: tls_verify.c,v 1.25 2023/05/28 09:06:34 beck Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2014 Jeremie Courreges-Anglas <jca@openbsd.org>
  *
@@ -243,9 +243,9 @@ tls_check_common_name(struct tls *ctx, X509 *cert, const char *name,
        data = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(X509_NAME_get_entry(subject_name,
            lastpos));
        /*
-        * Fail if we cannot encode as UTF-8, or if the UTF-8 encoding of the
-        * string contains a 0 byte. We treat any certificate with such data
-        * in the CN as hostile and fail.
+        * Fail if we cannot encode as UTF-8, if the CN is of invalid length, or
+        * if the UTF-8 encoding of the string contains a 0 byte. We treat any
+        * certificate with such data in the CN as hostile and fail.
         */
        if ((common_name_len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&utf8_bytes, data)) < 0) {
                tls_set_errorx(ctx, "error verifying name '%s': "