-# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.18 2024/05/17 00:30:23 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.19 2024/10/14 01:57:50 djm Exp $
.include <bsd.own.mk>
-SUBDIR= ssh sshd sshd-session \
+SUBDIR= ssh sshd sshd-session sshd-auth \
ssh-add ssh-keygen ssh-agent scp sftp-server \
ssh-keysign ssh-keyscan sftp ssh-pkcs11-helper ssh-sk-helper
-# $OpenBSD: Makefile.inc,v 1.96 2024/09/09 02:39:57 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile.inc,v 1.97 2024/10/14 01:57:50 djm Exp $
.include <bsd.own.mk>
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Werror
.endif
-#CDIAGFLAGS+= -fno-common
-#DEBUG=-g
-#INSTALL_STRIP=
+CDIAGFLAGS+= -fno-common
+DEBUG=-g
+INSTALL_STRIP=
WARNINGS=yes
-/* $OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.62 2024/06/27 22:36:44 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.63 2024/10/14 01:57:50 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
if (nlog_verbose == 0 && level > log_level)
return;
- snprintf(tag, sizeof(tag), "%.48s:%.48s():%d (pid=%ld)",
+ snprintf(tag, sizeof(tag), "%.48s:%.48s():%d (bin=%s, pid=%ld)",
(cp = strrchr(file, '/')) == NULL ? file : cp + 1, func, line,
- (long)getpid());
+ argv0 == NULL ? "UNKNOWN" : argv0, (long)getpid());
for (i = 0; i < nlog_verbose; i++) {
if (match_pattern_list(tag, log_verbose[i], 0) == 1) {
forced = 1;
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.245 2024/09/22 12:56:21 jsg Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.246 2024/10/14 01:57:50 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
/* Imports */
extern ServerOptions options;
extern u_int utmp_len;
+extern struct sshbuf *cfg;
extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
+extern struct include_list includes;
extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; /* XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */
/* State exported from the child */
int mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_term(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_state(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
#ifdef GSSAPI
int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
+ {MONITOR_REQ_STATE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_state},
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
{MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
#endif
};
struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
+ {MONITOR_REQ_STATE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_state},
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
{MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
#endif
ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
- /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+ /* Permit requests for state, moduli and signatures */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_STATE, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_STATE, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
/* Log it */
if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
fatal_f("invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)", level);
- sshlogdirect(level, forced, "%s [preauth]", msg);
+ sshlogdirect(level, forced, "%s [%s]", msg,
+ mon_dispatch == mon_dispatch_postauth20 ? "postauth" : "preauth");
sshbuf_free(logmsg);
free(msg);
hostbased_chost = NULL;
}
+int
+mm_answer_state(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *inc = NULL, *hostkeys = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *opts = NULL, *confdata = NULL;
+ struct include_item *item = NULL;
+ int postauth;
+ int r;
+
+ sshbuf_reset(m);
+
+ debug_f("config len %zu", sshbuf_len(cfg));
+
+ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (inc = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (opts = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (confdata = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+
+ /* XXX unneccessary? */
+ /* pack includes into a string */
+ TAILQ_FOREACH(item, &includes, entry) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(inc, item->selector)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(inc, item->filename)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(inc, item->contents)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose includes");
+ }
+
+ hostkeys = pack_hostkeys();
+
+ /*
+ * Protocol from monitor to unpriv privsep process:
+ * string configuration
+ * uint64 timing_secret XXX move delays to monitor and remove
+ * string host_keys[] {
+ * string public_key
+ * string certificate
+ * }
+ * string server_banner
+ * string client_banner
+ * string included_files[] {
+ * string selector
+ * string filename
+ * string contents
+ * }
+ * string configuration_data (postauth)
+ * string keystate (postauth)
+ * string authenticated_user (postauth)
+ * string session_info (postauth)
+ * string authopts (postauth)
+ */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, cfg)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, options.timing_secret)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, hostkeys)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, ssh->kex->server_version)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, ssh->kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, inc)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose config");
+
+ postauth = (authctxt && authctxt->pw && authctxt->authenticated);
+ if (postauth) {
+ /* XXX shouldn't be reachable */
+ fatal_f("internal error: called in postauth");
+ }
+
+ sshbuf_free(inc);
+ sshbuf_free(opts);
+ sshbuf_free(confdata);
+
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_STATE, m);
+
+ debug3_f("done");
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
int
mm_answer_moduli(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
extern int auth_sock; /* XXX move to state struct? */
- struct sshkey *key;
+ struct sshkey *pubkey, *key;
struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
u_char *p = NULL, *signature = NULL;
char *alg = NULL;
- size_t datlen, siglen, alglen;
- int r, is_proof = 0;
- u_int keyid, compat;
+ size_t datlen, siglen;
+ int r, is_proof = 0, keyid;
+ u_int compat;
const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
debug3_f("entering");
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &keyid)) != 0 ||
+ if ((r = sshkey_froms(m, &pubkey)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &alg, &alglen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &alg, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &compat)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "parse");
- if (keyid > INT_MAX)
- fatal_f("invalid key ID");
+
+ if ((keyid = get_hostkey_index(pubkey, 1, ssh)) == -1)
+ fatal_f("unknown hostkey");
+ debug_f("hostkey %s index %d", sshkey_ssh_name(pubkey), keyid);
+ sshkey_free(pubkey);
/*
* Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.h,v 1.24 2024/05/17 00:30:24 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.h,v 1.25 2024/10/14 01:57:50 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK = 46, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK = 47,
MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC = 48, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC = 49,
MONITOR_REQ_TERM = 50,
+ MONITOR_REQ_STATE = 51, MONITOR_ANS_STATE = 52
};
struct ssh;
/* XXX: should be returned via a monitor call rather than config_fd */
void mm_encode_server_options(struct sshbuf *);
+struct sshbuf *pack_hostkeys(void);
+
#endif /* _MONITOR_H_ */
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.136 2024/06/19 23:24:47 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.137 2024/10/14 01:57:50 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
sshbuf_free(log_msg);
}
-int
-mm_is_monitor(void)
-{
- /*
- * m_pid is only set in the privileged part, and
- * points to the unprivileged child.
- */
- return (pmonitor && pmonitor->m_pid > 0);
-}
-
static void
mm_reap(void)
{
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *hostkey_alg,
const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, u_int compat)
{
- struct kex *kex = *pmonitor->m_pkex;
struct sshbuf *m;
- u_int ndx = kex->host_key_index(key, 0, ssh);
int r;
debug3_f("entering");
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ndx)) != 0 ||
+ if ((r = sshkey_puts(key, m)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(m, data, datalen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, hostkey_alg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, compat)) != 0)
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, sigp, lenp)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "parse");
sshbuf_free(m);
+ debug3_f("%s signature len=%zu", hostkey_alg, *lenp);
return (0);
}
sshbuf_free(m);
}
+/* Request state information */
+
+void
+mm_get_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct include_list *includes,
+ struct sshbuf *conf, struct sshbuf **confdatap,
+ uint64_t *timing_secretp,
+ struct sshbuf **hostkeysp, struct sshbuf **keystatep,
+ u_char **pw_namep,
+ struct sshbuf **authinfop, struct sshbuf **auth_optsp)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *m, *inc;
+ u_char *cp;
+ size_t len;
+ int r;
+ struct include_item *item;
+
+ debug3_f("entering");
+
+ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (inc = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_STATE, m);
+
+ debug3_f("waiting for MONITOR_ANS_STATE");
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+ MONITOR_ANS_STATE, m);
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &cp, &len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, timing_secretp)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_froms(m, hostkeysp)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, ssh->kex->server_version)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, ssh->kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, inc)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse config");
+
+ /* postauth */
+ if (confdatap) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, confdatap)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_froms(m, keystatep)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, pw_namep, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_froms(m, authinfop)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_froms(m, auth_optsp)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse config postauth");
+ }
+
+ if (conf != NULL && (r = sshbuf_put(conf, cp, len)))
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put");
+
+ while (sshbuf_len(inc) != 0) {
+ item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item));
+ if ((item->contents = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(inc, &item->selector, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(inc, &item->filename, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(inc, item->contents)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse includes");
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(includes, item, entry);
+ }
+
+ free(cp);
+ sshbuf_free(m);
+ sshbuf_free(inc);
+
+ debug3_f("done");
+}
+
static void
mm_chall_setup(char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts,
char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.51 2024/05/17 06:42:04 jsg Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.52 2024/10/14 01:57:50 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
void mm_send_keystate(struct ssh *, struct monitor*);
+/* state */
+struct include_list;
+void mm_get_state(struct ssh *, struct include_list *, struct sshbuf *,
+ struct sshbuf **, uint64_t *, struct sshbuf **, struct sshbuf **,
+ u_char **, struct sshbuf **, struct sshbuf **);
+
/* bsdauth */
int mm_bsdauth_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
int mm_bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
-/* $OpenBSD: pathnames.h,v 1.32 2024/05/17 00:30:24 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: pathnames.h,v 1.33 2024/10/14 01:57:50 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
/* Binary paths for the sshd components */
#define _PATH_SSHD_SESSION "/usr/libexec/sshd-session"
+#define _PATH_SSHD_AUTH "/usr/libexec/sshd-auth"
/*
* The process id of the daemon listening for connections is saved here to
-/* $OpenBSD: sandbox-pledge.c,v 1.2 2020/10/18 11:32:01 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2015 Theo de Raadt <deraadt@openbsd.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/ioctl.h>
-#include <sys/syscall.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-
-#include "log.h"
-#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-
-struct ssh_sandbox {
- pid_t child_pid;
-};
-
-struct ssh_sandbox *
-ssh_sandbox_init(void)
-{
- struct ssh_sandbox *box;
-
- debug3_f("preparing pledge sandbox");
- box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
- box->child_pid = 0;
-
- return box;
-}
-
-void
-ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
-{
- if (pledge("stdio", NULL) == -1)
- fatal_f("pledge()");
-}
-
-void
-ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
-{
- free(box);
- debug3_f("finished");
-}
-
-void
-ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
-{
- box->child_pid = child_pid;
- /* Nothing to do here */
-}
-/* $OpenBSD: sandbox-rlimit.c,v 1.5 2020/10/18 11:32:01 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/time.h>
-#include <sys/resource.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "log.h"
-#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-
-/* Minimal sandbox that sets zero nfiles, nprocs and filesize rlimits */
-
-struct ssh_sandbox {
- pid_t child_pid;
-};
-
-struct ssh_sandbox *
-ssh_sandbox_init(void)
-{
- struct ssh_sandbox *box;
-
- /*
- * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need
- * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API.
- */
- debug3_f("preparing rlimit sandbox");
- box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
- box->child_pid = 0;
-
- return box;
-}
-
-void
-ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
-{
- struct rlimit rl_zero;
-
- rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
-
- if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1)
- fatal_f("setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
- strerror(errno));
- if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero) == -1)
- fatal_f("setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
- strerror(errno));
- if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1)
- fatal_f("setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s",
- strerror(errno));
-}
-
-void
-ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
-{
- free(box);
- debug3_f("finished");
-}
-
-void
-ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
-{
- box->child_pid = child_pid;
- /* Nothing to do here */
-}
-
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.419 2024/09/25 01:24:04 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.420 2024/10/14 01:57:50 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
options->num_channel_timeouts = 0;
options->unused_connection_timeout = -1;
options->sshd_session_path = NULL;
+ options->sshd_auth_path = NULL;
options->refuse_connection = -1;
}
options->unused_connection_timeout = 0;
if (options->sshd_session_path == NULL)
options->sshd_session_path = xstrdup(_PATH_SSHD_SESSION);
+ if (options->sshd_auth_path == NULL)
+ options->sshd_auth_path = xstrdup(_PATH_SSHD_AUTH);
if (options->refuse_connection == -1)
options->refuse_connection = 0;
sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash, sDisableForwarding,
sExposeAuthInfo, sRDomain, sPubkeyAuthOptions, sSecurityKeyProvider,
sRequiredRSASize, sChannelTimeout, sUnusedConnectionTimeout,
- sSshdSessionPath, sRefuseConnection,
+ sSshdSessionPath, sSshdAuthPath, sRefuseConnection,
sDeprecated, sIgnore, sUnsupported
} ServerOpCodes;
{ "channeltimeout", sChannelTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "unusedconnectiontimeout", sUnusedConnectionTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "sshdsessionpath", sSshdSessionPath, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "sshdauthpath", sSshdAuthPath, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "refuseconnection", sRefuseConnection, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
};
charptr = &options->sshd_session_path;
goto parse_filename;
+ case sSshdAuthPath:
+ charptr = &options->sshd_auth_path;
+ goto parse_filename;
+
case sRefuseConnection:
intptr = &options->refuse_connection;
multistate_ptr = multistate_flag;
dump_cfg_string(sPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, o->pubkey_accepted_algos);
dump_cfg_string(sRDomain, o->routing_domain);
dump_cfg_string(sSshdSessionPath, o->sshd_session_path);
+ dump_cfg_string(sSshdAuthPath, o->sshd_auth_path);
dump_cfg_string(sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList, o->per_source_penalty_exempt);
/* string arguments requiring a lookup */
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.168 2024/09/15 01:18:26 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.169 2024/10/14 01:57:50 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
int unused_connection_timeout;
char *sshd_session_path;
+ char *sshd_auth_path;
int refuse_connection;
} ServerOptions;
-/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.338 2024/05/17 00:30:24 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.339 2024/10/14 01:57:50 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
- /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
- destroy_sensitive_data();
+ /* remove keys from memory */
ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
/* Force a password change */
signame, s->forced ? "forced-command" : "subsystem");
goto out;
}
- if (mm_is_monitor()) {
- error_f("session signalling requires privilege separation");
- goto out;
- }
debug_f("signal %s, killpg(%ld, %d)", signame, (long)s->pid, sig);
temporarily_use_uid(s->pw);
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-sandbox.h,v 1.1 2011/06/23 09:34:13 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-struct ssh_sandbox;
-
-struct ssh_sandbox *ssh_sandbox_init(void);
-void ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *);
-void ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *);
-void ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *, pid_t);
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd-auth.c,v 1.1 2024/10/14 01:57:50 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * SSH2 implementation:
+ * Privilege Separation:
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/tree.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/queue.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <paths.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "session.h"
+#include "monitor.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "version.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sk-api.h"
+#include "srclimit.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+
+/* Privsep fds */
+#define PRIVSEP_MONITOR_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
+#define PRIVSEP_LOG_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2)
+#define PRIVSEP_MIN_FREE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 3)
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+/* Server configuration options. */
+ServerOptions options;
+
+/* Name of the server configuration file. */
+char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
+
+/*
+ * Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug
+ * mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system
+ * log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing
+ * the first connection.
+ */
+int debug_flag = 0;
+
+/* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
+static int inetd_flag = 0;
+
+/* Saved arguments to main(). */
+static char **saved_argv;
+
+/* Daemon's agent connection */
+int auth_sock = -1;
+static int have_agent = 0;
+
+u_int num_hostkeys;
+struct sshkey **host_pubkeys; /* all public host keys */
+struct sshkey **host_certificates; /* all public host certificates */
+
+/* record remote hostname or ip */
+u_int utmp_len = HOST_NAME_MAX+1;
+
+/* variables used for privilege separation */
+struct monitor *pmonitor = NULL;
+int privsep_is_preauth = 1;
+
+/* global connection state and authentication contexts */
+Authctxt *the_authctxt = NULL;
+struct ssh *the_active_state;
+
+/* global key/cert auth options. XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */
+struct sshauthopt *auth_opts = NULL;
+
+/* sshd_config buffer */
+struct sshbuf *cfg;
+
+/* Included files from the configuration file */
+struct include_list includes = TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(includes);
+
+/* message to be displayed after login */
+struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
+
+/* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
+static void do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *);
+
+/* XXX stub */
+int
+mm_is_monitor(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+privsep_child_demote(void)
+{
+ gid_t gidset[1];
+ struct passwd *pw;
+
+ /* Demote the child */
+ if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) {
+ if ((pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL)
+ fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
+ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER);
+ pw = pwcopy(pw); /* Ensure mutable */
+ endpwent();
+ freezero(pw->pw_passwd, strlen(pw->pw_passwd));
+
+ /* Change our root directory */
+ if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1)
+ fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR,
+ strerror(errno));
+ if (chdir("/") == -1)
+ fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /*
+ * Drop our privileges
+ * NB. Can't use setusercontext() after chroot.
+ */
+ debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
+ (u_int)pw->pw_gid);
+ gidset[0] = pw->pw_gid;
+ if (setgroups(1, gidset) == -1)
+ fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ permanently_set_uid(pw);
+ }
+
+ /* sandbox ourselves */
+ if (pledge("stdio", NULL) == -1)
+ fatal_f("pledge()");
+}
+
+static void
+append_hostkey_type(struct sshbuf *b, const char *s)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if (match_pattern_list(s, options.hostkeyalgorithms, 0) != 1) {
+ debug3_f("%s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms", s);
+ return;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s", sshbuf_len(b) > 0 ? "," : "", s)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
+}
+
+static char *
+list_hostkey_types(void)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *b;
+ struct sshkey *key;
+ char *ret;
+ u_int i;
+
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ key = host_pubkeys[i];
+ if (key == NULL)
+ continue;
+ switch (key->type) {
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ /* for RSA we also support SHA2 signatures */
+ append_hostkey_type(b, "rsa-sha2-512");
+ append_hostkey_type(b, "rsa-sha2-256");
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ case KEY_XMSS:
+ append_hostkey_type(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
+ break;
+ }
+ /* If the private key has a cert peer, then list that too */
+ key = host_certificates[i];
+ if (key == NULL)
+ continue;
+ switch (key->type) {
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ /* for RSA we also support SHA2 signatures */
+ append_hostkey_type(b,
+ "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com");
+ append_hostkey_type(b,
+ "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com");
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
+ case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
+ append_hostkey_type(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed");
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ debug_f("%s", ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+struct sshkey *
+get_hostkey_public_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ u_int i;
+ struct sshkey *key;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ switch (type) {
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
+ case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
+ key = host_certificates[i];
+ break;
+ default:
+ key = host_pubkeys[i];
+ break;
+ }
+ if (key == NULL || key->type != type)
+ continue;
+ switch (type) {
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ if (key->ecdsa_nid != nid)
+ continue;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default:
+ return key;
+ }
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* XXX remove */
+struct sshkey *
+get_hostkey_private_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* XXX remove */
+struct sshkey *
+get_hostkey_by_index(int ind)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+struct sshkey *
+get_hostkey_public_by_index(int ind, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ if (ind < 0 || (u_int)ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
+ return (NULL);
+ return host_pubkeys[ind];
+}
+
+int
+get_hostkey_index(struct sshkey *key, int compare, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+ if (key == host_certificates[i] ||
+ (compare && host_certificates[i] &&
+ sshkey_equal(key, host_certificates[i])))
+ return (i);
+ } else {
+ if (key == host_pubkeys[i] ||
+ (compare && host_pubkeys[i] &&
+ sshkey_equal(key, host_pubkeys[i])))
+ return (i);
+ }
+ }
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n", SSH_VERSION, SSH_OPENSSL_VERSION);
+ fprintf(stderr,
+"usage: sshd [-46DdeGiqTtV] [-C connection_spec] [-c host_cert_file]\n"
+" [-E log_file] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]\n"
+" [-h host_key_file] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]\n"
+ );
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+static void
+parse_hostkeys(struct sshbuf *hostkeys)
+{
+ int r;
+ u_int num_keys = 0;
+ struct sshkey *k;
+ const u_char *cp;
+ size_t len;
+
+ while (sshbuf_len(hostkeys) != 0) {
+ if (num_keys > 2048)
+ fatal_f("too many hostkeys");
+ host_pubkeys = xrecallocarray(host_pubkeys,
+ num_keys, num_keys + 1, sizeof(*host_pubkeys));
+ host_certificates = xrecallocarray(host_certificates,
+ num_keys, num_keys + 1, sizeof(*host_certificates));
+ /* public key */
+ k = NULL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(hostkeys, &cp, &len)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "extract pubkey");
+ if (len != 0 && (r = sshkey_from_blob(cp, len, &k)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse pubkey");
+ host_pubkeys[num_keys] = k;
+ if (k)
+ debug2_f("key %u: %s", num_keys, sshkey_ssh_name(k));
+ /* certificate */
+ k = NULL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(hostkeys, &cp, &len)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "extract pubkey");
+ if (len != 0 && (r = sshkey_from_blob(cp, len, &k)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse pubkey");
+ host_certificates[num_keys] = k;
+ if (k)
+ debug2_f("cert %u: %s", num_keys, sshkey_ssh_name(k));
+ num_keys++;
+ }
+ num_hostkeys = num_keys;
+}
+
+static void
+recv_privsep_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *conf,
+ uint64_t *timing_secretp)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *hostkeys;
+
+ debug3_f("begin");
+
+ mm_get_state(ssh, &includes, conf, NULL, timing_secretp,
+ &hostkeys, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ parse_hostkeys(hostkeys);
+
+ sshbuf_free(hostkeys);
+
+ debug3_f("done");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Main program for the daemon.
+ */
+int
+main(int ac, char **av)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
+ extern char *optarg;
+ extern int optind;
+ int r, opt, have_key = 0;
+ int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, rexeced_flag = 0;
+ char *line, *logfile = NULL;
+ u_int i;
+ mode_t new_umask;
+ Authctxt *authctxt;
+ struct connection_info *connection_info = NULL;
+ sigset_t sigmask;
+ uint64_t timing_secret = 0;
+
+ closefrom(PRIVSEP_MIN_FREE_FD);
+ sigemptyset(&sigmask);
+ sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &sigmask, NULL);
+
+ /* Save argv. */
+ saved_argv = av;
+
+ /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+ sanitise_stdfd();
+
+ /* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */
+ initialize_server_options(&options);
+
+ /* Parse command-line arguments. */
+ while ((opt = getopt(ac, av,
+ "C:E:b:c:f:g:h:k:o:p:u:46DGQRTdeiqrtV")) != -1) {
+ switch (opt) {
+ case '4':
+ options.address_family = AF_INET;
+ break;
+ case '6':
+ options.address_family = AF_INET6;
+ break;
+ case 'f':
+ config_file_name = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'c':
+ servconf_add_hostcert("[command-line]", 0,
+ &options, optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'd':
+ if (debug_flag == 0) {
+ debug_flag = 1;
+ options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+ } else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
+ options.log_level++;
+ break;
+ case 'D':
+ /* ignore */
+ break;
+ case 'E':
+ logfile = optarg;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case 'e':
+ /* ignore */
+ break;
+ case 'i':
+ inetd_flag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'r':
+ /* ignore */
+ break;
+ case 'R':
+ rexeced_flag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'Q':
+ /* ignored */
+ break;
+ case 'q':
+ options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
+ break;
+ case 'b':
+ /* protocol 1, ignored */
+ break;
+ case 'p':
+ options.ports_from_cmdline = 1;
+ if (options.num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "too many ports.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg);
+ if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] <= 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Bad port number.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ break;
+ case 'g':
+ if ((options.login_grace_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Invalid login grace time.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ break;
+ case 'k':
+ /* protocol 1, ignored */
+ break;
+ case 'h':
+ servconf_add_hostkey("[command-line]", 0,
+ &options, optarg, 1);
+ break;
+ case 't':
+ case 'T':
+ case 'G':
+ fatal("test/dump modes not supported");
+ break;
+ case 'C':
+ connection_info = server_get_connection_info(ssh, 0, 0);
+ if (parse_server_match_testspec(connection_info,
+ optarg) == -1)
+ exit(1);
+ break;
+ case 'u':
+ utmp_len = (u_int)strtonum(optarg, 0, HOST_NAME_MAX+1+1, NULL);
+ if (utmp_len > HOST_NAME_MAX+1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Invalid utmp length.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ break;
+ case 'o':
+ line = xstrdup(optarg);
+ if (process_server_config_line(&options, line,
+ "command-line", 0, NULL, NULL, &includes) != 0)
+ exit(1);
+ free(line);
+ break;
+ case 'V':
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n",
+ SSH_VERSION, SSH_OPENSSL_VERSION);
+ exit(0);
+ default:
+ usage();
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!rexeced_flag)
+ fatal("sshd-auth should not be executed directly");
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+#endif
+
+ /* If requested, redirect the logs to the specified logfile. */
+ if (logfile != NULL) {
+ char *cp, pid_s[32];
+
+ snprintf(pid_s, sizeof(pid_s), "%ld", (unsigned long)getpid());
+ cp = percent_expand(logfile,
+ "p", pid_s,
+ "P", "sshd-auth",
+ (char *)NULL);
+ log_redirect_stderr_to(cp);
+ free(cp);
+ }
+
+ log_init(__progname,
+ options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ?
+ SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
+ options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ?
+ SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility, 1);
+
+ /* XXX can't use monitor_init(); it makes fds */
+ pmonitor = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*pmonitor));
+ pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
+ pmonitor->m_recvfd = PRIVSEP_MONITOR_FD;
+ pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = PRIVSEP_LOG_FD;
+ set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
+
+ /* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */
+ if (optind < ac) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ debug("sshd version %s, %s", SSH_VERSION, SSH_OPENSSL_VERSION);
+
+ /* Connection passed by stdin/out */
+ if (inetd_flag) {
+ /*
+ * NB. must be different fd numbers for the !socket case,
+ * as packet_connection_is_on_socket() depends on this.
+ */
+ sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
+ sock_out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
+ } else {
+ /* rexec case; accept()ed socket in ancestor listener */
+ sock_in = sock_out = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
+ }
+
+ if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, 0) == -1)
+ error("stdfd_devnull failed");
+ debug("network sockets: %d, %d", sock_in, sock_out);
+
+ /*
+ * Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do
+ * not have a key.
+ */
+ if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, sock_in, sock_out)) == NULL)
+ fatal("Unable to create connection");
+ the_active_state = ssh;
+ ssh_packet_set_server(ssh);
+ pmonitor->m_pkex = &ssh->kex;
+
+ /* Fetch our configuration */
+ if ((cfg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("sshbuf_new config buf failed");
+ setproctitle("%s", "[session-auth early]");
+ recv_privsep_state(ssh, cfg, &timing_secret);
+ parse_server_config(&options, "rexec", cfg, &includes, NULL, 1);
+ /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
+ fill_default_server_options(&options);
+ options.timing_secret = timing_secret; /* XXX eliminate from unpriv */
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ if (options.moduli_file != NULL)
+ dh_set_moduli_file(options.moduli_file);
+#endif
+
+ if (options.host_key_agent) {
+ if (strcmp(options.host_key_agent, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME))
+ setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME,
+ options.host_key_agent, 1);
+ if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(NULL)) == 0)
+ have_agent = 1;
+ else
+ error_r(r, "Could not connect to agent \"%s\"",
+ options.host_key_agent);
+ }
+
+ if (options.num_host_key_files != num_hostkeys) {
+ fatal("internal error: hostkeys confused (config %u recvd %u)",
+ options.num_host_key_files, num_hostkeys);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ if (host_pubkeys[i] != NULL) {
+ have_key = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!have_key)
+ fatal("internal error: recieved no hostkeys");
+
+ /* Ensure that umask disallows at least group and world write */
+ new_umask = umask(0077) | 0022;
+ (void) umask(new_umask);
+
+ /* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */
+ log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, 1);
+ set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_log_verbose; i++)
+ log_verbose_add(options.log_verbose[i]);
+
+ /*
+ * Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
+ * unmounted if desired.
+ */
+ if (chdir("/") == -1)
+ error("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /* This is the child authenticating a new connection. */
+ setproctitle("%s", "[session-auth]");
+
+ /* Executed child processes don't need these. */
+ fcntl(sock_out, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+ fcntl(sock_in, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+
+ ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+ ssh_signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+
+ /* Prepare the channels layer */
+ channel_init_channels(ssh);
+ channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family);
+ server_process_channel_timeouts(ssh);
+ server_process_permitopen(ssh);
+
+ ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(ssh);
+
+ /* allocate authentication context */
+ authctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*authctxt));
+ ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
+
+ /* XXX global for cleanup, access from other modules */
+ the_authctxt = authctxt;
+
+ /* Set default key authentication options */
+ if ((auth_opts = sshauthopt_new_with_keys_defaults()) == NULL)
+ fatal("allocation failed");
+
+ /* prepare buffer to collect messages to display to user after login */
+ if ((loginmsg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("sshbuf_new loginmsg failed");
+ auth_debug_reset();
+
+ /* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */
+ privsep_challenge_enable();
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ /* Cache supported mechanism OIDs for later use */
+ ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
+#endif
+
+ privsep_child_demote();
+
+ /* perform the key exchange */
+ /* authenticate user and start session */
+ do_ssh2_kex(ssh);
+ do_authentication2(ssh);
+
+ /*
+ * The unprivileged child now transfers the current keystate and exits.
+ */
+ mm_send_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
+ ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+int
+sshd_hostkey_sign(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *privkey,
+ struct sshkey *pubkey, u_char **signature, size_t *slenp,
+ const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg)
+{
+ if (privkey) {
+ if (mm_sshkey_sign(ssh, privkey, signature, slenp,
+ data, dlen, alg, options.sk_provider, NULL,
+ ssh->compat) < 0)
+ fatal_f("privkey sign failed");
+ } else {
+ if (mm_sshkey_sign(ssh, pubkey, signature, slenp,
+ data, dlen, alg, options.sk_provider, NULL,
+ ssh->compat) < 0)
+ fatal_f("pubkey sign failed");
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* SSH2 key exchange */
+static void
+do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ char *hkalgs = NULL, *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX];
+ const char *compression = NULL;
+ struct kex *kex;
+ int r;
+
+ if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
+ ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit,
+ options.rekey_interval);
+
+ if (options.compression == COMP_NONE)
+ compression = "none";
+ hkalgs = list_hostkey_types();
+
+ kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal, options.kex_algorithms,
+ options.ciphers, options.macs, compression, hkalgs);
+
+ free(hkalgs);
+
+ /* start key exchange */
+ if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "kex_setup");
+ kex_set_server_sig_algs(ssh, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
+ kex = ssh->kex;
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
+#endif
+ kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
+ kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
+ kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
+ kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
+
+ ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done);
+ kex_proposal_free_entries(myproposal);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "markus")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
+ (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "send test");
+#endif
+ debug("KEX done");
+}
+
+/* server specific fatal cleanup */
+void
+cleanup_exit(int i)
+{
+ _exit(i);
+}
--- /dev/null
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.1 2024/10/14 01:57:50 djm Exp $
+
+.PATH: ${.CURDIR}/..
+
+SRCS= sshd-auth.c auth2-methods.c \
+ auth-rhosts.c auth-passwd.c sshpty.c sshlogin.c servconf.c \
+ serverloop.c auth.c auth2.c auth-options.c session.c auth2-chall.c \
+ groupaccess.c auth-bsdauth.c auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c \
+ auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c auth2-pubkey.c auth2-pubkeyfile.c \
+ monitor_wrap.c \
+ sftp-server.c sftp-common.c sftp-realpath.c
+SRCS+= authfd.c compat.c dns.c fatal.c hostfile.c readpass.c utf8.c uidswap.c
+SRCS+= ${SRCS_BASE} ${SRCS_KEX} ${SRCS_KEXS} ${SRCS_KEY} ${SRCS_KEYP} \
+ ${SRCS_KRL} ${SRCS_PROT} ${SRCS_PKT} ${SRCS_UTL} ${SRCS_PKCS11} \
+ ${SRCS_SK_CLIENT}
+
+PROG= sshd-auth
+BINDIR= /usr/libexec
+BINMODE=511
+NOMAN= 1
+
+.include <bsd.own.mk> # for KERBEROS and AFS
+
+KERBEROS5=no
+
+.if (${KERBEROS5:L} == "yes")
+CFLAGS+=-DKRB5 -I${DESTDIR}/usr/include/kerberosV -DGSSAPI
+SRCS+= auth-krb5.c auth2-gss.c gss-serv.c gss-serv-krb5.c
+.endif
+
+.include <bsd.prog.mk>
+
+.if (${KERBEROS5:L} == "yes")
+LDADD+= -lgssapi -lkrb5 -lasn1
+LDADD+= -lwind -lroken -lcom_err -lpthread -lheimbase -lkafs
+DPADD+= ${LIBGSSAPI} ${LIBKRB5}
+.endif
+
+.if (${OPENSSL:L} == "yes")
+LDADD+= -lcrypto
+DPADD+= ${LIBCRYPTO}
+.endif
+
+LDADD+= -lutil
+DPADD+= ${LIBUTIL}
+
+.if (${ZLIB:L} == "yes")
+LDADD+= -lz
+DPADD+= ${LIBZ}
+.endif
+
+# The random relink kit, used on OpenBSD by /etc/rc
+
+CLEANFILES+= ${PROG}.tar install.sh
+
+install.sh: Makefile
+ echo "set -o errexit" > $@
+ echo "${CC} ${LDFLAGS} ${LDSTATIC} -o ${PROG}" \
+ "\`echo " ${OBJS} "| tr ' ' '\\\n' | sort -R\`" ${LDADD} >> $@
+ echo "./${PROG} -V # test it works" >> $@
+ echo "install -c -s -o root -g bin -m ${BINMODE} ${PROG} " \
+ "${BINDIR}/${PROG}" >> $@
+
+${PROG}.tar: ${OBJS} install.sh
+ tar cf $@ ${OBJS} install.sh
+
+afterinstall: ${PROG}.tar
+ install -d -o root -g wheel -m 755 \
+ ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/relink/${BINDIR}/${PROG}
+ install -o ${BINOWN} -g ${BINGRP} -m 640 \
+ ${PROG}.tar ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/relink/${BINDIR}/${PROG}/${PROG}.tar
-/* $OpenBSD: sshd-session.c,v 1.9 2024/09/09 02:39:57 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd-session.c,v 1.10 2024/10/14 01:57:50 djm Exp $ */
/*
* SSH2 implementation:
* Privilege Separation:
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "version.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#define REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 3)
#define REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 4)
+/* Privsep fds */
+#define PRIVSEP_MONITOR_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
+#define PRIVSEP_LOG_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2)
+#define PRIVSEP_MIN_FREE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 3)
+
extern char *__progname;
/* Server configuration options. */
/* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
void demote_sensitive_data(void);
-static void do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *);
+
+/* XXX reduce to stub once postauth split */
+int
+mm_is_monitor(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * m_pid is only set in the privileged part, and
+ * points to the unprivileged child.
+ */
+ return (pmonitor && pmonitor->m_pid > 0);
+}
/*
* Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired.
}
}
-static void
-privsep_preauth_child(void)
+struct sshbuf *
+pack_hostkeys(void)
{
- gid_t gidset[1];
- struct passwd *pw;
-
- /* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */
- privsep_challenge_enable();
-
-#ifdef GSSAPI
- /* Cache supported mechanism OIDs for later use */
- ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
-#endif
-
- /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
- demote_sensitive_data();
+ struct sshbuf *keybuf = NULL, *hostkeys = NULL;
+ int r;
+ u_int i;
- /* Demote the child */
- if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) {
- if ((pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL)
- fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
- SSH_PRIVSEP_USER);
- pw = pwcopy(pw); /* Ensure mutable */
- endpwent();
- freezero(pw->pw_passwd, strlen(pw->pw_passwd));
-
- /* Change our root directory */
- if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1)
- fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR,
- strerror(errno));
- if (chdir("/") == -1)
- fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));
+ if ((hostkeys = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
- /*
- * Drop our privileges
- * NB. Can't use setusercontext() after chroot.
- */
- debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
- (u_int)pw->pw_gid);
- gidset[0] = pw->pw_gid;
- if (setgroups(1, gidset) == -1)
- fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- permanently_set_uid(pw);
+ /* pack hostkeys into a string. Empty key slots get empty strings */
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ /* public key */
+ if (sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] != NULL) {
+ if ((r = sshkey_puts(sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i],
+ hostkeys)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose hostkey public");
+ } else {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(hostkeys, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose hostkey empty public");
+ }
+ /* cert */
+ if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] != NULL) {
+ if ((r = sshkey_puts(
+ sensitive_data.host_certificates[i],
+ hostkeys)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose host cert");
+ } else {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(hostkeys, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose host cert empty");
+ }
}
+
+ sshbuf_free(keybuf);
+ return hostkeys;
}
static int
{
int status, r;
pid_t pid;
- struct ssh_sandbox *box = NULL;
/* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */
pmonitor = monitor_init();
/* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */
pmonitor->m_pkex = &ssh->kex;
- box = ssh_sandbox_init();
- pid = fork();
- if (pid == -1) {
+ if ((pid = fork()) == -1)
fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
- } else if (pid != 0) {
+ else if (pid != 0) {
debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid);
-
pmonitor->m_pid = pid;
if (have_agent) {
r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock);
have_agent = 0;
}
}
- if (box != NULL)
- ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(box, pid);
monitor_child_preauth(ssh, pmonitor);
/* Wait for the child's exit status */
} else if (WIFSIGNALED(status))
fatal_f("preauth child terminated by signal %d",
WTERMSIG(status));
- if (box != NULL)
- ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(box);
return 1;
} else {
/* child */
close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
- /* Arrange for logging to be sent to the monitor */
- set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
-
- privsep_preauth_child();
- setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
- if (box != NULL)
- ssh_sandbox_child(box);
+ /*
+ * Arrange unpriv-preauth child process fds:
+ * 0, 1 network socket
+ * 2 optional stderr
+ * 3 reserved
+ * 4 monitor message socket
+ * 5 monitor logging socket
+ *
+ * We know that the monitor sockets will have fds > 4 because
+ * of the reserved fds in main()
+ */
- return 0;
+ if (ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh) != STDIN_FILENO &&
+ dup2(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), STDIN_FILENO) == -1)
+ fatal("dup2 stdin failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh) != STDOUT_FILENO &&
+ dup2(ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh),
+ STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)
+ fatal("dup2 stdout failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+ /* leave stderr as-is */
+ log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL); /* dup can clobber log fd */
+ if (pmonitor->m_recvfd != PRIVSEP_MONITOR_FD &&
+ dup2(pmonitor->m_recvfd, PRIVSEP_MONITOR_FD) == -1)
+ fatal("dup2 monitor fd: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd != PRIVSEP_LOG_FD &&
+ dup2(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd, PRIVSEP_LOG_FD) == -1)
+ fatal("dup2 log fd: %s", strerror(errno));
+ closefrom(PRIVSEP_MIN_FREE_FD);
+
+ saved_argv[0] = options.sshd_auth_path;
+ execv(options.sshd_auth_path, saved_argv);
+
+ fatal_f("exec of %s failed: %s",
+ options.sshd_auth_path, strerror(errno));
}
}
ssh_packet_set_authenticated(ssh);
}
-static void
-append_hostkey_type(struct sshbuf *b, const char *s)
-{
- int r;
-
- if (match_pattern_list(s, options.hostkeyalgorithms, 0) != 1) {
- debug3_f("%s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms", s);
- return;
- }
- if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s", sshbuf_len(b) > 0 ? "," : "", s)) != 0)
- fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
-}
-
-static char *
-list_hostkey_types(void)
-{
- struct sshbuf *b;
- struct sshkey *key;
- char *ret;
- u_int i;
-
- if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
- key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
- if (key == NULL)
- key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i];
- if (key == NULL)
- continue;
- switch (key->type) {
- case KEY_RSA:
- /* for RSA we also support SHA2 signatures */
- append_hostkey_type(b, "rsa-sha2-512");
- append_hostkey_type(b, "rsa-sha2-256");
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- case KEY_DSA:
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- case KEY_ED25519:
- case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
- case KEY_ED25519_SK:
- case KEY_XMSS:
- append_hostkey_type(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
- break;
- }
- /* If the private key has a cert peer, then list that too */
- key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i];
- if (key == NULL)
- continue;
- switch (key->type) {
- case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- /* for RSA we also support SHA2 signatures */
- append_hostkey_type(b,
- "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com");
- append_hostkey_type(b,
- "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com");
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
- case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
- case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
- case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
- case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
- append_hostkey_type(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
- break;
- }
- }
- if ((ret = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL)
- fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed");
- sshbuf_free(b);
- debug_f("%s", ret);
- return ret;
-}
-
static struct sshkey *
get_hostkey_by_type(int type, int nid, int need_private, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
extern char *optarg;
extern int optind;
- int r, opt, on = 1, remote_port;
+ int devnull, r, opt, on = 1, remote_port;
int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, rexeced_flag = 0, have_key = 0;
const char *remote_ip, *rdomain;
char *line, *laddr, *logfile = NULL;
closefrom(REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD);
+ /* Reserve fds we'll need later for reexec things */
+ if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1)
+ fatal("open %s: %s", _PATH_DEVNULL, strerror(errno));
+ while (devnull < PRIVSEP_MIN_FREE_FD) {
+ if ((devnull = dup(devnull)) == -1)
+ fatal("dup %s: %s", _PATH_DEVNULL, strerror(errno));
+ }
+
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
#endif
fatal("sshbuf_new config buf failed");
setproctitle("%s", "[rexeced]");
recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, cfg, &timing_secret);
- close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
+ /* close the fd, but keep the slot reserved */
+ if (dup2(devnull, REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD) == -1)
+ fatal("dup2 devnull->config fd: %s", strerror(errno));
parse_server_config(&options, "rexec", cfg, &includes, NULL, 1);
/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
fill_default_server_options(&options);
options.timing_secret = timing_secret;
- if (!debug_flag) {
- startup_pipe = dup(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
- close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
+ if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag) {
+ if ((startup_pipe = dup(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD)) == -1)
+ fatal("internal error: no startup pipe");
+ /* close the fd, but keep the slot reserved */
+ if (dup2(devnull, REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD) == -1)
+ fatal("dup2 devnull->startup fd: %s", strerror(errno));
+
/*
* Signal parent that this child is at a point where
* they can go away if they have a SIGHUP pending.
fatal("sshbuf_new loginmsg failed");
auth_debug_reset();
- if (privsep_preauth(ssh) == 1)
- goto authenticated;
+ if (privsep_preauth(ssh) != 1)
+ fatal("privsep_preauth failed");
- /* perform the key exchange */
- /* authenticate user and start session */
- do_ssh2_kex(ssh);
- do_authentication2(ssh);
+ /* Now user is authenticated */
- /*
- * The unprivileged child now transfers the current keystate and exits.
- */
- mm_send_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
- ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
- exit(0);
-
- authenticated:
/*
* Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for
* authentication.
return 0;
}
-/* SSH2 key exchange */
-static void
-do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
-{
- char *hkalgs = NULL, *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX];
- const char *compression = NULL;
- struct kex *kex;
- int r;
-
- if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
- ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit,
- options.rekey_interval);
-
- if (options.compression == COMP_NONE)
- compression = "none";
- hkalgs = list_hostkey_types();
-
- kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal, options.kex_algorithms,
- options.ciphers, options.macs, compression, hkalgs);
-
- free(hkalgs);
-
- /* start key exchange */
- if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)
- fatal_r(r, "kex_setup");
- kex_set_server_sig_algs(ssh, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
- kex = ssh->kex;
-
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
-#endif
- kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
- kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
- kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
- kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
- kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
-
- ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done);
- kex_proposal_free_entries(myproposal);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
- if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "markus")) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
- (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal_fr(r, "send test");
-#endif
- debug("KEX done");
-}
-
/* server specific fatal cleanup */
void
cleanup_exit(int i)
-# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.3 2024/05/17 14:42:00 naddy Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.4 2024/10/14 01:57:50 djm Exp $
.PATH: ${.CURDIR}/..
groupaccess.c auth-bsdauth.c auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c \
auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c auth2-pubkey.c auth2-pubkeyfile.c \
monitor.c monitor_wrap.c \
- sftp-server.c sftp-common.c sftp-realpath.c sandbox-pledge.c srclimit.c
+ sftp-server.c sftp-common.c sftp-realpath.c srclimit.c
SRCS+= authfd.c compat.c dns.c fatal.c hostfile.c readpass.c utf8.c uidswap.c
SRCS+= ${SRCS_BASE} ${SRCS_KEX} ${SRCS_KEXS} ${SRCS_KEY} ${SRCS_KEYP} \
${SRCS_KRL} ${SRCS_PROT} ${SRCS_PKT} ${SRCS_UTL} ${SRCS_PKCS11} \
-/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.612 2024/09/15 01:11:26 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.613 2024/10/14 01:57:50 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
fatal("%s does not exist or is not executable", rexec_argv[0]);
debug3("using %s for re-exec", rexec_argv[0]);
+ /* Ensure that the privsep binary exists now too. */
+ if (stat(options.sshd_auth_path, &sb) != 0 ||
+ !(sb.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR))) {
+ fatal("%s does not exist or is not executable",
+ options.sshd_auth_path);
+ }
+
listener_proctitle = prepare_proctitle(ac, av);
/* Ensure that umask disallows at least group and world write */
projects / openbsd / commitdiff