Clean up DH_check_pub_key() and ensure that y^q (mod p) == 1.

This aligns our behavior with OpenSSL 1.1.1 which includes a mitigation
for small subgroup attacks. This did not affect LibreSSL since we do
not support X9.42 style parameter files or RFC 5114.

The meat of this commit is from Matt Caswell, OpenSSL b128abc3

ok inoguchi jsing

diff --git a/lib/libcrypto/dh/dh_check.c b/lib/libcrypto/dh/dh_check.c
index b06e971..7b9fcbd 100644 (file)
--- a/lib/libcrypto/dh/dh_check.c
+++ b/lib/libcrypto/dh/dh_check.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: dh_check.c,v 1.20 2021/11/29 19:54:07 tb Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: dh_check.c,v 1.21 2021/11/29 20:02:14 tb Exp $ */
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -187,22 +187,57 @@ DH_check(const DH *dh, int *flags)
 }
 
 int
-DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
+DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *flags)
 {
-       BIGNUM *q = NULL;
-
-       *ret = 0;
-       q = BN_new();
-       if (q == NULL)
-               return 0;
-       BN_set_word(q, 1);
-       if (BN_cmp(pub_key, q) <= 0)
-               *ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL;
-       BN_copy(q, dh->p);
-       BN_sub_word(q, 1);
-       if (BN_cmp(pub_key, q) >= 0)
-               *ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE;
-
-       BN_free(q);
-       return 1;
+       BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+       BIGNUM *max_pub_key;
+       int ok = 0;
+
+       *flags = 0;
+
+       if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+               goto err;
+       BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+       if ((max_pub_key = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+               goto err;
+
+       /*
+        * Check that 1 < pub_key < dh->p - 1
+        */
+
+       if (BN_cmp(pub_key, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
+               *flags |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL;
+
+       /* max_pub_key = dh->p - 1 */
+       if (BN_copy(max_pub_key, dh->p) == NULL)
+               goto err;
+       if (!BN_sub_word(max_pub_key, 1))
+               goto err;
+
+       if (BN_cmp(pub_key, max_pub_key) >= 0)
+               *flags |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE;
+
+       /*
+        * If dh->q is set, check that pub_key^q == 1 mod p
+        */
+
+       if (dh->q != NULL) {
+               BIGNUM *residue;
+
+               if ((residue = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+                       goto err;
+
+               if (!BN_mod_exp_ct(residue, pub_key, dh->q, dh->p, ctx))
+                       goto err;
+               if (!BN_is_one(residue))
+                       *flags = DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
+       }
+
+       ok = 1;
+
+ err:
+       BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+       BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+       return ok;
 }