-# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.17 2019/10/31 21:22:01 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.18 2024/05/17 00:30:23 djm Exp $
.include <bsd.own.mk>
-SUBDIR= ssh sshd ssh-add ssh-keygen ssh-agent scp sftp-server \
+SUBDIR= ssh sshd sshd-session \
+ ssh-add ssh-keygen ssh-agent scp sftp-server \
ssh-keysign ssh-keyscan sftp ssh-pkcs11-helper ssh-sk-helper
distribution:
-# $OpenBSD: Makefile.inc,v 1.89 2024/01/11 01:45:36 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile.inc,v 1.90 2024/05/17 00:30:23 djm Exp $
.include <bsd.own.mk>
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wold-style-definition
.endif
-#CDIAGFLAGS+= -Werror
+CDIAGFLAGS+= -Werror
#CDIAGFLAGS+= -fno-common
#DEBUG=-g
#INSTALL_STRIP=
SRCS_KRL+= bitmap.c
SRCS_KRL+= krl.c
+SRCS_MAC+= mac.c
+SRCS_MAC+= hmac.c
+SRCS_MAC+= umac.c
+SRCS_MAC+= umac128.c
+
SRCS_PKT+= canohost.c
SRCS_PKT+= dispatch.c
-SRCS_PKT+= hmac.c
SRCS_PKT+= kex.c
-SRCS_PKT+= mac.c
+SRCS_PKT+= kex-names.c
SRCS_PKT+= packet.c
-SRCS_PKT+= umac.c
-SRCS_PKT+= umac128.c
+SRCS_PKT+= ${SRCS_MAC}
SRCS_PROT+= channels.c
SRCS_PROT+= monitor_fdpass.c
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.57 2022/12/09 00:17:40 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.58 2024/05/17 00:30:23 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
-extern int use_privsep;
/*
* This function processes an rhosts-style file (.rhosts, .shosts, or
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.160 2023/03/05 05:34:09 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.161 2024/05/17 00:30:23 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
extern struct include_list includes;
-extern int use_privsep;
extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts;
/* Debugging messages */
const char *authmsg;
char *extra = NULL;
- if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed)
+ if (!mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed)
return;
/* Raise logging level */
struct connection_info *ci;
u_int i;
- ci = get_connection_info(ssh, 1, options.use_dns);
+ ci = server_get_connection_info(ssh, 1, options.use_dns);
ci->user = user;
parse_server_match_config(&options, &includes, ci);
log_change_level(options.log_level);
log_verbose_reset();
for (i = 0; i < options.num_log_verbose; i++)
log_verbose_add(options.log_verbose[i]);
- process_permitopen(ssh, &options);
+ server_process_permitopen(ssh);
pw = getpwnam(user);
if (pw == NULL) {
return (&fake);
}
-/*
- * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
- * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
- * called.
- * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
- * attacks on based on conflation of hostnames and IP addresses.
- */
-
-static char *
-remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
-{
- struct sockaddr_storage from;
- socklen_t fromlen;
- struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
- char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
- const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
-
- /* Get IP address of client. */
- fromlen = sizeof(from);
- memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
- if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
- (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
- debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- return xstrdup(ntop);
- }
-
- debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
- /* Map the IP address to a host name. */
- if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
- NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
- /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */
- return xstrdup(ntop);
- }
-
- /*
- * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
- * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
- * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5
- */
- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
- hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
- if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
- logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
- name, ntop);
- freeaddrinfo(ai);
- return xstrdup(ntop);
- }
-
- /* Names are stored in lowercase. */
- lowercase(name);
-
- /*
- * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
- * address actually is an address of this host. This is
- * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
- * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
- * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
- * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
- * the domain).
- */
- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
- if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
- logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
- "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
- return xstrdup(ntop);
- }
- /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
- for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
- if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
- sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
- (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
- break;
- }
- freeaddrinfo(aitop);
- /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
- if (ai == NULL) {
- /* Address not found for the host name. */
- logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
- "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
- return xstrdup(ntop);
- }
- return xstrdup(name);
-}
-
/*
* Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
* connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
if (!use_dns)
return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
- else if (dnsname != NULL)
- return dnsname;
- else {
- dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh);
+ if (dnsname != NULL)
return dnsname;
- }
+ dnsname = ssh_remote_hostname(ssh);
+ return dnsname;
}
/* These functions link key/cert options to the auth framework */
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.106 2022/06/15 16:08:25 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.107 2024/05/17 00:30:23 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* the client.
*/
+struct authmethod_cfg {
+ const char *name;
+ const char *synonym;
+ int *enabled;
+};
+
struct Authmethod {
- char *name;
- char *synonym;
+ struct authmethod_cfg *cfg;
int (*userauth)(struct ssh *, const char *);
- int *enabled;
};
/*
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.34 2023/03/31 04:22:27 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.35 2024/05/17 00:30:23 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
#define SSH_GSSAPI_MAX_MECHS 2048
extern ServerOptions options;
+extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_gssapi;
static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
return (0);
}
- if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, &goid)))) {
+ if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, &goid))) {
if (ctxt != NULL)
ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
free(doid);
size_t len;
int r;
- if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
recv_tok.value = p;
recv_tok.length = len;
- maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gssctxt, &recv_tok,
- &send_tok, &flags));
+ maj_status = mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gssctxt, &recv_tok,
+ &send_tok, &flags);
free(p);
u_char *p;
size_t len;
- if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
recv_tok.length = len;
/* Push the error token into GSSAPI to see what it says */
- maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gssctxt, &recv_tok,
- &send_tok, NULL));
+ maj_status = mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gssctxt, &recv_tok,
+ &send_tok, NULL);
free(recv_tok.value);
int r, authenticated;
const char *displayname;
- if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
/*
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
-
- if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
- (displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
- auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname);
+ authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
authctxt->postponed = 0;
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
u_char *p;
size_t len;
- if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
fatal_f("sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed");
gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
- if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
+ if (!GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic)))
+ authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
else
logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
sshbuf_free(b);
free(mic.value);
- if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
- (displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
- auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname);
-
authctxt->postponed = 0;
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
}
Authmethod method_gssapi = {
- "gssapi-with-mic",
- NULL,
+ &methodcfg_gssapi,
userauth_gssapi,
- &options.gss_authentication
};
#endif
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.52 2023/03/05 05:34:09 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.53 2024/05/17 00:30:23 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
+extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_hostbased;
static int
userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
/* test for allowed key and correct signature */
authenticated = 0;
- if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, cuser,
- chost, key)) &&
- PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
- sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), pkalg, ssh->compat, NULL)) == 0)
+ if (mm_hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, cuser,
+ chost, key) &&
+ mm_sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
+ sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), pkalg, ssh->compat, NULL) == 0)
authenticated = 1;
auth2_record_key(authctxt, authenticated, key);
}
Authmethod method_hostbased = {
- "hostbased",
- NULL,
+ &methodcfg_hostbased,
userauth_hostbased,
- &options.hostbased_authentication
};
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-kbdint.c,v 1.14 2021/12/19 22:12:07 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-kbdint.c,v 1.15 2024/05/17 00:30:23 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
+extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_kbdint;
static int
userauth_kbdint(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
}
Authmethod method_kbdint = {
- "keyboard-interactive",
- NULL,
+ &methodcfg_kbdint,
userauth_kbdint,
- &options.kbd_interactive_authentication
};
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-none.c,v 1.25 2023/03/05 05:34:09 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-none.c,v 1.26 2024/05/17 00:30:23 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
+extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_none;
-/* "none" is allowed only one time */
-static int none_enabled = 1;
+extern int none_enabled;
static int
userauth_none(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
if (options.permit_empty_passwd && options.password_authentication)
- return (PRIVSEP(auth_password(ssh, "")));
+ return mm_auth_password(ssh, "");
return (0);
}
Authmethod method_none = {
- "none",
- NULL,
+ &methodcfg_none,
userauth_none,
- &none_enabled
};
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-passwd.c,v 1.21 2022/05/27 04:29:40 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-passwd.c,v 1.22 2024/05/17 00:30:23 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
+extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_passwd;
static int
userauth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
if (change)
logit("password change not supported");
- else if (PRIVSEP(auth_password(ssh, password)) == 1)
+ else if (mm_auth_password(ssh, password) == 1)
authenticated = 1;
freezero(password, len);
return authenticated;
}
Authmethod method_passwd = {
- "password",
- NULL,
+ &methodcfg_passwd,
userauth_passwd,
- &options.password_authentication
};
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.119 2023/07/27 22:25:17 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.120 2024/05/17 00:30:23 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
+extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_pubkey;
static char *
format_key(const struct sshkey *key)
#endif
/* test for correct signature */
authenticated = 0;
- if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 1, &authopts)) &&
- PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
+ if (mm_user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 1, &authopts) &&
+ mm_sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b),
(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE) == 0 ? pkalg : NULL,
- ssh->compat, &sig_details)) == 0) {
+ ssh->compat, &sig_details) == 0) {
authenticated = 1;
}
if (authenticated == 1 && sig_details != NULL) {
* if a user is not allowed to login. is this an
* issue? -markus
*/
- if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 0, NULL))) {
+ if (mm_user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 0, NULL)) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK))
!= 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, pkalg)) != 0 ||
}
Authmethod method_pubkey = {
- "publickey",
- "publickey-hostbound-v00@openssh.com",
+ &methodcfg_pubkey,
userauth_pubkey,
- &options.pubkey_authentication
};
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.168 2023/12/18 14:45:49 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.169 2024/05/17 00:30:23 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
if (options.banner == NULL)
return;
- if ((banner = PRIVSEP(auth2_read_banner())) == NULL)
+ if ((banner = mm_auth2_read_banner()) == NULL)
goto done;
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER)) != 0 ||
auth_maxtries_exceeded(ssh);
if (authctxt->attempt++ == 0) {
/* setup auth context */
- authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(ssh, user));
+ authctxt->pw = mm_getpwnamallow(ssh, user);
if (authctxt->pw && strcmp(service, "ssh-connection")==0) {
authctxt->valid = 1;
debug2_f("setting up authctxt for %s", user);
}
ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s",
authctxt->valid ? "authenticating " : "invalid ", user);
- setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
- use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
+ setproctitle("%s [net]", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown");
authctxt->user = xstrdup(user);
authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
- if (use_privsep)
- mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
+ mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
userauth_banner(ssh);
if ((r = kex_server_update_ext_info(ssh)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "kex_server_update_ext_info failed");
/* prefer primary authmethod name to possible synonym */
if ((m = authmethod_byname(method)) == NULL)
fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: bad method %s", method);
- method = m->name;
+ method = m->cfg->name;
}
/* Special handling for root */
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) {
- if (strcmp(authmethods[i]->name, "none") == 0)
+ if (strcmp(authmethods[i]->cfg->name, "none") == 0)
continue;
- if (authmethods[i]->enabled == NULL ||
- *(authmethods[i]->enabled) == 0)
+ if (authmethods[i]->cfg->enabled == NULL ||
+ *(authmethods[i]->cfg->enabled) == 0)
continue;
- if (!auth2_method_allowed(authctxt, authmethods[i]->name,
+ if (!auth2_method_allowed(authctxt, authmethods[i]->cfg->name,
NULL))
continue;
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s", sshbuf_len(b) ? "," : "",
- authmethods[i]->name)) != 0)
+ authmethods[i]->cfg->name)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
}
if ((list = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL)
if (name == NULL)
fatal_f("NULL authentication method name");
for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) {
- if (strcmp(name, authmethods[i]->name) == 0 ||
- (authmethods[i]->synonym != NULL &&
- strcmp(name, authmethods[i]->synonym) == 0))
+ if (strcmp(name, authmethods[i]->cfg->name) == 0 ||
+ (authmethods[i]->cfg->synonym != NULL &&
+ strcmp(name, authmethods[i]->cfg->synonym) == 0))
return authmethods[i];
}
debug_f("unrecognized authentication method name: %s", name);
if ((method = authmethod_byname(name)) == NULL)
return NULL;
- if (method->enabled == NULL || *(method->enabled) == 0) {
+ if (method->cfg->enabled == NULL || *(method->cfg->enabled) == 0) {
debug3_f("method %s not enabled", name);
return NULL;
}
- if (!auth2_method_allowed(authctxt, method->name, NULL)) {
+ if (!auth2_method_allowed(authctxt, method->cfg->name, NULL)) {
debug3_f("method %s not allowed "
"by AuthenticationMethods", name);
return NULL;
return method;
}
-/*
- * Check a comma-separated list of methods for validity. Is need_enable is
- * non-zero, then also require that the methods are enabled.
- * Returns 0 on success or -1 if the methods list is invalid.
- */
-int
-auth2_methods_valid(const char *_methods, int need_enable)
-{
- char *methods, *omethods, *method, *p;
- u_int i, found;
- int ret = -1;
-
- if (*_methods == '\0') {
- error("empty authentication method list");
- return -1;
- }
- omethods = methods = xstrdup(_methods);
- while ((method = strsep(&methods, ",")) != NULL) {
- for (found = i = 0; !found && authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) {
- if ((p = strchr(method, ':')) != NULL)
- *p = '\0';
- if (strcmp(method, authmethods[i]->name) != 0)
- continue;
- if (need_enable) {
- if (authmethods[i]->enabled == NULL ||
- *(authmethods[i]->enabled) == 0) {
- error("Disabled method \"%s\" in "
- "AuthenticationMethods list \"%s\"",
- method, _methods);
- goto out;
- }
- }
- found = 1;
- break;
- }
- if (!found) {
- error("Unknown authentication method \"%s\" in list",
- method);
- goto out;
- }
- }
- ret = 0;
- out:
- free(omethods);
- return ret;
-}
-
/*
* Prune the AuthenticationMethods supplied in the configuration, removing
* any methods lists that include disabled methods. Note that this might
-/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.437 2024/03/06 02:59:59 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.438 2024/05/17 00:30:23 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
/* -- agent forwarding */
#define NUM_SOCKS 10
-/* -- tcp forwarding */
-/* special-case port number meaning allow any port */
-#define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT 0
-
-/* special-case wildcard meaning allow any host */
-#define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST "*"
-
/* -- X11 forwarding */
/* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
#define MAX_DISPLAYS 1000
}
}
-/* returns port number, FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT or -1 on error */
-int
-permitopen_port(const char *p)
-{
- int port;
-
- if (strcmp(p, "*") == 0)
- return FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT;
- if ((port = a2port(p)) > 0)
- return port;
- return -1;
-}
-
/* Try to start non-blocking connect to next host in cctx list */
static int
connect_next(struct channel_connect *cctx)
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.185 2024/01/08 00:34:33 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.186 2024/05/17 00:30:23 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
"languages stoc",
};
-struct kexalg {
- char *name;
- u_int type;
- int ec_nid;
- int hash_alg;
-};
-static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- { KEX_DH1, KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
- { KEX_DH14_SHA1, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
- { KEX_DH14_SHA256, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
- { KEX_DH16_SHA512, KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
- { KEX_DH18_SHA512, KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
- { KEX_DHGEX_SHA1, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
- { KEX_DHGEX_SHA256, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
- { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256, KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
- NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
- { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp384r1,
- SSH_DIGEST_SHA384 },
- { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp521r1,
- SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
-#endif
- { KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
- { KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256_OLD, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
- { KEX_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512, KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512, 0,
- SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
- { NULL, 0, -1, -1},
-};
-
-char *
-kex_alg_list(char sep)
-{
- char *ret = NULL, *tmp;
- size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
- const struct kexalg *k;
-
- for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
- if (ret != NULL)
- ret[rlen++] = sep;
- nlen = strlen(k->name);
- if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) {
- free(ret);
- return NULL;
- }
- ret = tmp;
- memcpy(ret + rlen, k->name, nlen + 1);
- rlen += nlen;
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-static const struct kexalg *
-kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
-{
- const struct kexalg *k;
-
- for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
- if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
- return k;
- }
- return NULL;
-}
-
-/* Validate KEX method name list */
-int
-kex_names_valid(const char *names)
-{
- char *s, *cp, *p;
-
- if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
- return 0;
- if ((s = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL)
- return 0;
- for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
- (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
- if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
- error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
- free(s);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- debug3("kex names ok: [%s]", names);
- free(s);
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */
-static int
-has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs)
-{
- char *cp;
-
- if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL)
- return 0;
- free(cp);
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Concatenate algorithm names, avoiding duplicates in the process.
- * Caller must free returned string.
- */
-char *
-kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
-{
- char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p;
- size_t len;
-
- if (a == NULL || *a == '\0')
- return strdup(b);
- if (b == NULL || *b == '\0')
- return strdup(a);
- if (strlen(b) > 1024*1024)
- return NULL;
- len = strlen(a) + strlen(b) + 2;
- if ((tmp = cp = strdup(b)) == NULL ||
- (ret = calloc(1, len)) == NULL) {
- free(tmp);
- return NULL;
- }
- strlcpy(ret, a, len);
- for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
- if (has_any_alg(ret, p))
- continue; /* Algorithm already present */
- if (strlcat(ret, ",", len) >= len ||
- strlcat(ret, p, len) >= len) {
- free(tmp);
- free(ret);
- return NULL; /* Shouldn't happen */
- }
- }
- free(tmp);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Assemble a list of algorithms from a default list and a string from a
- * configuration file. The user-provided string may begin with '+' to
- * indicate that it should be appended to the default, '-' that the
- * specified names should be removed, or '^' that they should be placed
- * at the head.
- */
-int
-kex_assemble_names(char **listp, const char *def, const char *all)
-{
- char *cp, *tmp, *patterns;
- char *list = NULL, *ret = NULL, *matching = NULL, *opatterns = NULL;
- int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-
- if (listp == NULL || def == NULL || all == NULL)
- return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-
- if (*listp == NULL || **listp == '\0') {
- if ((*listp = strdup(def)) == NULL)
- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- return 0;
- }
-
- list = *listp;
- *listp = NULL;
- if (*list == '+') {
- /* Append names to default list */
- if ((tmp = kex_names_cat(def, list + 1)) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto fail;
- }
- free(list);
- list = tmp;
- } else if (*list == '-') {
- /* Remove names from default list */
- if ((*listp = match_filter_denylist(def, list + 1)) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto fail;
- }
- free(list);
- /* filtering has already been done */
- return 0;
- } else if (*list == '^') {
- /* Place names at head of default list */
- if ((tmp = kex_names_cat(list + 1, def)) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto fail;
- }
- free(list);
- list = tmp;
- } else {
- /* Explicit list, overrides default - just use "list" as is */
- }
-
- /*
- * The supplied names may be a pattern-list. For the -list case,
- * the patterns are applied above. For the +list and explicit list
- * cases we need to do it now.
- */
- ret = NULL;
- if ((patterns = opatterns = strdup(list)) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto fail;
- }
- /* Apply positive (i.e. non-negated) patterns from the list */
- while ((cp = strsep(&patterns, ",")) != NULL) {
- if (*cp == '!') {
- /* negated matches are not supported here */
- r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- goto fail;
- }
- free(matching);
- if ((matching = match_filter_allowlist(all, cp)) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto fail;
- }
- if ((tmp = kex_names_cat(ret, matching)) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto fail;
- }
- free(ret);
- ret = tmp;
- }
- if (ret == NULL || *ret == '\0') {
- /* An empty name-list is an error */
- /* XXX better error code? */
- r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- goto fail;
- }
-
- /* success */
- *listp = ret;
- ret = NULL;
- r = 0;
-
- fail:
- free(matching);
- free(opatterns);
- free(list);
- free(ret);
- return r;
-}
-
/*
* Fill out a proposal array with dynamically allocated values, which may
* be modified as required for compatibility reasons.
(alg = strsep(&algs, ","))) {
if ((sigalg = sshkey_sigalg_by_name(alg)) == NULL)
continue;
- if (!has_any_alg(sigalg, sigalgs))
+ if (!kex_has_any_alg(sigalg, sigalgs))
continue;
/* Don't add an algorithm twice. */
if (ssh->kex->server_sig_algs != NULL &&
- has_any_alg(sigalg, ssh->kex->server_sig_algs))
+ kex_has_any_alg(sigalg, ssh->kex->server_sig_algs))
continue;
xextendf(&ssh->kex->server_sig_algs, ",", "%s", sigalg);
}
static int
choose_kex(struct kex *k, char *client, char *server)
{
- const struct kexalg *kexalg;
-
k->name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
debug("kex: algorithm: %s", k->name ? k->name : "(no match)");
if (k->name == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH;
- if ((kexalg = kex_alg_by_name(k->name)) == NULL) {
+ if (!kex_name_valid(k->name)) {
error_f("unsupported KEX method %s", k->name);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
- k->kex_type = kexalg->type;
- k->hash_alg = kexalg->hash_alg;
- k->ec_nid = kexalg->ec_nid;
+ k->kex_type = kex_type_from_name(k->name);
+ k->hash_alg = kex_hash_from_name(k->name);
+ k->ec_nid = kex_nid_from_name(k->name);
return 0;
}
static int
kexalgs_contains(char **peer, const char *ext)
{
- return has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], ext);
+ return kex_has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], ext);
}
static int
/* Check whether client supports rsa-sha2 algorithms */
if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) {
- if (has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
+ if (kex_has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
"rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com"))
kex->flags |= KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED;
- if (has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
+ if (kex_has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
"rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com"))
kex->flags |= KEX_RSA_SHA2_512_SUPPORTED;
}
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.122 2024/02/02 00:13:34 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.123 2024/05/17 00:30:23 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
};
enum kex_exchange {
- KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1,
+ KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1 = 1,
KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1,
KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256,
KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512,
struct sshbuf *client_pub;
};
+int kex_name_valid(const char *);
+u_int kex_type_from_name(const char *);
+int kex_hash_from_name(const char *);
+int kex_nid_from_name(const char *);
int kex_names_valid(const char *);
char *kex_alg_list(char);
char *kex_names_cat(const char *, const char *);
+int kex_has_any_alg(const char *, const char *);
int kex_assemble_names(char **, const char *, const char *);
void kex_proposal_populate_entries(struct ssh *, char *prop[PROPOSAL_MAX],
const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
-/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.46 2023/03/29 01:07:48 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.47 2024/05/17 00:30:23 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
}
/* Contact privileged parent */
- kex->dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
+ kex->dh = mm_choose_dh(min, nbits, max);
if (kex->dh == NULL) {
(void)sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "no matching DH grp found");
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.193 2024/04/02 10:02:08 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.194 2024/05/17 00:30:23 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2005-2020 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
return 1;
}
+/* returns port number, FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT or -1 on error */
+int
+permitopen_port(const char *p)
+{
+ int port;
+
+ if (strcmp(p, "*") == 0)
+ return FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT;
+ if ((port = a2port(p)) > 0)
+ return port;
+ return -1;
+}
+
/* returns 1 if process is already daemonized, 0 otherwise */
int
daemonized(void)
-/* $OpenBSD: misc.h,v 1.107 2024/03/04 02:16:11 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: misc.h,v 1.108 2024/05/17 00:30:24 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <signal.h>
+/* special-case port number meaning allow any port */
+#define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT 0
+
+/* special-case wildcard meaning allow any host */
+#define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST "*"
+
/* Data structure for representing a forwarding request. */
struct Forward {
char *listen_host; /* Host (address) to listen on. */
};
int forward_equals(const struct Forward *, const struct Forward *);
+int permitopen_port(const char *p);
+
int daemonized(void);
/* Common server and client forwarding options. */
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.237 2023/08/16 16:14:11 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.238 2024/05/17 00:30:24 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #id); \
} while (0)
+void
+mm_encode_server_options(struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+ int r;
+ u_int i;
+
+ /* XXX this leaks raw pointers to the unpriv child processes */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options))) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble options");
+
+#define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
+ if (options.x != NULL && \
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x)) != 0) \
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #x); \
+ } while (0)
+#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
+ for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) { \
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x[i])) != 0) \
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #x); \
+ } \
+ } while (0)
+ /* See comment in servconf.h */
+ COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
+#undef M_CP_STROPT
+#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
+}
+
/* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
int
mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
struct passwd *pwent;
int r, allowed = 0;
- u_int i;
debug3_f("entering");
out:
ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s",
authctxt->valid ? "authenticating" : "invalid ", authctxt->user);
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options))) != 0)
- fatal_fr(r, "assemble options");
-#define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
- if (options.x != NULL && \
- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x)) != 0) \
- fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #x); \
- } while (0)
-#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
- for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) { \
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x[i])) != 0) \
- fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #x); \
- } \
- } while (0)
- /* See comment in servconf.h */
- COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
-#undef M_CP_STROPT
-#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
+ /* Send active options to unpriv */
+ mm_encode_server_options(m);
/* Create valid auth method lists */
if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.h,v 1.23 2019/01/19 21:43:56 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.h,v 1.24 2024/05/17 00:30:24 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
};
struct ssh;
+struct sshbuf;
struct monitor {
int m_recvfd;
void mm_request_receive_expect(int, enum monitor_reqtype, struct sshbuf *);
void mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *, struct monitor *);
+/* XXX: should be returned via a monitor call rather than config_fd */
+void mm_encode_server_options(struct sshbuf *);
+
#endif /* _MONITOR_H_ */
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.129 2023/12/18 14:45:49 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.130 2024/05/17 00:30:24 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "session.h"
#include "servconf.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
debug3_f("entering");
if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
- if (errno == EPIPE)
+ if (errno == EPIPE) {
+ debug3_f("monitor fd closed");
cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
fatal_f("read: %s", strerror(errno));
}
msg_len = PEEK_U32(buf);
return (0);
}
+void
+mm_decode_activate_server_options(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+ const u_char *p;
+ size_t len;
+ u_int i;
+ ServerOptions *newopts;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse opts");
+ if (len != sizeof(*newopts))
+ fatal_f("option block size mismatch");
+ newopts = xcalloc(sizeof(*newopts), 1);
+ memcpy(newopts, p, sizeof(*newopts));
+
+#define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
+ if (newopts->x != NULL && \
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &newopts->x, NULL)) != 0) \
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse %s", #x); \
+ } while (0)
+#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
+ newopts->x = newopts->nx == 0 ? \
+ NULL : xcalloc(newopts->nx, sizeof(*newopts->x)); \
+ for (i = 0; i < newopts->nx; i++) { \
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, \
+ &newopts->x[i], NULL)) != 0) \
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse %s", #x); \
+ } \
+ } while (0)
+ /* See comment in servconf.h */
+ COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
+#undef M_CP_STROPT
+#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
+
+ copy_set_server_options(&options, newopts, 1);
+ log_change_level(options.log_level);
+ log_verbose_reset();
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_log_verbose; i++)
+ log_verbose_add(options.log_verbose[i]);
+ free(newopts);
+}
+
#define GETPW(b, id) \
do { \
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0) \
struct sshbuf *m;
struct passwd *pw;
size_t len;
- u_int i;
- ServerOptions *newopts;
int r;
u_char ok;
const u_char *p;
out:
/* copy options block as a Match directive may have changed some */
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
- fatal_fr(r, "parse opts");
- if (len != sizeof(*newopts))
- fatal_f("option block size mismatch");
- newopts = xcalloc(sizeof(*newopts), 1);
- memcpy(newopts, p, sizeof(*newopts));
-
-#define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
- if (newopts->x != NULL && \
- (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &newopts->x, NULL)) != 0) \
- fatal_fr(r, "parse %s", #x); \
- } while (0)
-#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
- newopts->x = newopts->nx == 0 ? \
- NULL : xcalloc(newopts->nx, sizeof(*newopts->x)); \
- for (i = 0; i < newopts->nx; i++) { \
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, \
- &newopts->x[i], NULL)) != 0) \
- fatal_fr(r, "parse %s", #x); \
- } \
- } while (0)
- /* See comment in servconf.h */
- COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
-#undef M_CP_STROPT
-#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
-
- copy_set_server_options(&options, newopts, 1);
- log_change_level(options.log_level);
- log_verbose_reset();
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_log_verbose; i++)
- log_verbose_add(options.log_verbose[i]);
- process_permitopen(ssh, &options);
- process_channel_timeouts(ssh, &options);
+ mm_decode_activate_server_options(ssh, m);
+ server_process_permitopen(ssh);
+ server_process_channel_timeouts(ssh);
kex_set_server_sig_algs(ssh, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
- free(newopts);
sshbuf_free(m);
return (pw);
return (authenticated);
}
#endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+/*
+ * Inform channels layer of permitopen options for a single forwarding
+ * direction (local/remote).
+ */
+static void
+server_process_permitopen_list(struct ssh *ssh, int listen,
+ char **opens, u_int num_opens)
+{
+ u_int i;
+ int port;
+ char *host, *arg, *oarg;
+ int where = listen ? FORWARD_REMOTE : FORWARD_LOCAL;
+ const char *what = listen ? "permitlisten" : "permitopen";
+
+ channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where);
+ if (num_opens == 0)
+ return; /* permit any */
+
+ /* handle keywords: "any" / "none" */
+ if (num_opens == 1 && strcmp(opens[0], "any") == 0)
+ return;
+ if (num_opens == 1 && strcmp(opens[0], "none") == 0) {
+ channel_disable_admin(ssh, where);
+ return;
+ }
+ /* Otherwise treat it as a list of permitted host:port */
+ for (i = 0; i < num_opens; i++) {
+ oarg = arg = xstrdup(opens[i]);
+ host = hpdelim(&arg);
+ if (host == NULL)
+ fatal_f("missing host in %s", what);
+ host = cleanhostname(host);
+ if (arg == NULL || ((port = permitopen_port(arg)) < 0))
+ fatal_f("bad port number in %s", what);
+ /* Send it to channels layer */
+ channel_add_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM,
+ where, host, port);
+ free(oarg);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Inform channels layer of permitopen options from configuration.
+ */
+void
+server_process_permitopen(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ server_process_permitopen_list(ssh, 0,
+ options.permitted_opens, options.num_permitted_opens);
+ server_process_permitopen_list(ssh, 1,
+ options.permitted_listens, options.num_permitted_listens);
+}
+
+void
+server_process_channel_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ u_int i, secs;
+ char *type;
+
+ debug3_f("setting %u timeouts", options.num_channel_timeouts);
+ channel_clear_timeouts(ssh);
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_channel_timeouts; i++) {
+ if (parse_pattern_interval(options.channel_timeouts[i],
+ &type, &secs) != 0) {
+ fatal_f("internal error: bad timeout %s",
+ options.channel_timeouts[i]);
+ }
+ channel_add_timeout(ssh, type, secs);
+ free(type);
+ }
+}
+
+struct connection_info *
+server_get_connection_info(struct ssh *ssh, int populate, int use_dns)
+{
+ static struct connection_info ci;
+
+ if (ssh == NULL || !populate)
+ return &ci;
+ ci.host = use_dns ? ssh_remote_hostname(ssh) : ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+ ci.address = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+ ci.laddress = ssh_local_ipaddr(ssh);
+ ci.lport = ssh_local_port(ssh);
+ ci.rdomain = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh);
+ return &ci;
+}
+
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.49 2022/06/15 16:08:25 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.50 2024/05/17 00:30:24 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
#ifndef _MM_WRAP_H_
#define _MM_WRAP_H_
-extern int use_privsep;
-#define PRIVSEP(x) (use_privsep ? mm_##x : x)
-
enum mm_keytype { MM_NOKEY, MM_HOSTKEY, MM_USERKEY };
struct ssh;
int mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
+void mm_decode_activate_server_options(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m);
+
#ifdef GSSAPI
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
int mm_bsdauth_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
int mm_bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
+/* config / channels glue */
+void server_process_permitopen(struct ssh *);
+void server_process_channel_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh);
+struct connection_info *
+ server_get_connection_info(struct ssh *, int, int);
+
#endif /* _MM_WRAP_H_ */
-/* $OpenBSD: msg.c,v 1.20 2020/10/18 11:32:01 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: msg.c,v 1.21 2024/05/17 00:30:24 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
u_char buf[5];
u_int mlen = sshbuf_len(m);
- debug3_f("type %u", (unsigned int)type & 0xff);
+ debug3_f("type %u len %zu", (unsigned int)type & 0xff, sshbuf_len(m));
put_u32(buf, mlen + 1);
buf[4] = type; /* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */
error_f("write: %s", strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
+ debug3_f("done");
return (0);
}
-/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.313 2023/12/18 14:45:17 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.314 2024/05/17 00:30:24 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
return ssh->remote_ipaddr;
}
+/*
+ * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
+ * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query. Return value is on
+ * heap and no caching is performed.
+ * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
+ * attacks on based on conflation of hostnames and addresses and will
+ * fall back to returning an address on error.
+ */
+
+char *
+ssh_remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_storage from;
+ socklen_t fromlen;
+ struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+ char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
+ const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+
+ /* Get IP address of client. */
+ fromlen = sizeof(from);
+ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+ if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
+ (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
+ debug_f("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ return xstrdup(ntop);
+ }
+
+ debug3_f("trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
+ /* Map the IP address to a host name. */
+ if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
+ NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
+ /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */
+ return xstrdup(ntop);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
+ * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
+ * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5
+ */
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
+ hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
+ logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
+ name, ntop);
+ freeaddrinfo(ai);
+ return xstrdup(ntop);
+ }
+
+ /* Names are stored in lowercase. */
+ lowercase(name);
+
+ /*
+ * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
+ * address actually is an address of this host. This is
+ * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
+ * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
+ * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
+ * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
+ * the domain).
+ */
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
+ logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
+ "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
+ return xstrdup(ntop);
+ }
+ /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
+ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+ if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
+ sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
+ (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
+ break;
+ }
+ freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+ /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
+ if (ai == NULL) {
+ /* Address not found for the host name. */
+ logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
+ "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
+ return xstrdup(ntop);
+ }
+ return xstrdup(name);
+}
+
/* Returns the port number of the remote host. */
int
-/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.96 2023/12/18 14:45:17 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.97 2024/05/17 00:30:24 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
const char *ssh_local_ipaddr(struct ssh *);
int ssh_local_port(struct ssh *);
const char *ssh_packet_rdomain_in(struct ssh *);
+char *ssh_remote_hostname(struct ssh *);
void ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *, u_int64_t, u_int32_t);
time_t ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(struct ssh *);
-/* $OpenBSD: pathnames.h,v 1.31 2019/11/12 19:33:08 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: pathnames.h,v 1.32 2024/05/17 00:30:24 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
#define _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM "/usr/bin/ssh"
+/* Binary paths for the sshd components */
+#define _PATH_SSHD_SESSION "/usr/libexec/sshd-session"
+
/*
* The process id of the daemon listening for connections is saved here to
* make it easier to kill the correct daemon when necessary.
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.405 2024/03/04 02:16:11 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.406 2024/05/17 00:30:24 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
const char *filename, struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes,
struct connection_info *connectinfo, int flags, int *activep, int depth);
-/* Use of privilege separation or not */
-extern int use_privsep;
extern struct sshbuf *cfg;
/* Initializes the server options to their default values. */
options->channel_timeouts = NULL;
options->num_channel_timeouts = 0;
options->unused_connection_timeout = -1;
+ options->sshd_session_path = NULL;
}
/* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */
options->required_rsa_size = SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE;
if (options->unused_connection_timeout == -1)
options->unused_connection_timeout = 0;
+ if (options->sshd_session_path == NULL)
+ options->sshd_session_path = xstrdup(_PATH_SSHD_SESSION);
assemble_algorithms(options);
- /* Turn privilege separation and sandboxing on by default */
- if (use_privsep == -1)
- use_privsep = PRIVSEP_ON;
-
#define CLEAR_ON_NONE(v) \
do { \
if (option_clear_or_none(v)) { \
sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash, sDisableForwarding,
sExposeAuthInfo, sRDomain, sPubkeyAuthOptions, sSecurityKeyProvider,
sRequiredRSASize, sChannelTimeout, sUnusedConnectionTimeout,
+ sSshdMonitorPath,
sDeprecated, sIgnore, sUnsupported
} ServerOpCodes;
{ "requiredrsasize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "channeltimeout", sChannelTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "unusedconnectiontimeout", sUnusedConnectionTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "sshdmonitorpath", sSshdMonitorPath, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
};
options->num_queued_listens = 0;
}
-/*
- * Inform channels layer of permitopen options for a single forwarding
- * direction (local/remote).
- */
-static void
-process_permitopen_list(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOpCodes opcode,
- char **opens, u_int num_opens)
-{
- u_int i;
- int port;
- char *host, *arg, *oarg;
- int where = opcode == sPermitOpen ? FORWARD_LOCAL : FORWARD_REMOTE;
- const char *what = lookup_opcode_name(opcode);
-
- channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where);
- if (num_opens == 0)
- return; /* permit any */
-
- /* handle keywords: "any" / "none" */
- if (num_opens == 1 && strcmp(opens[0], "any") == 0)
- return;
- if (num_opens == 1 && strcmp(opens[0], "none") == 0) {
- channel_disable_admin(ssh, where);
- return;
- }
- /* Otherwise treat it as a list of permitted host:port */
- for (i = 0; i < num_opens; i++) {
- oarg = arg = xstrdup(opens[i]);
- host = hpdelim(&arg);
- if (host == NULL)
- fatal_f("missing host in %s", what);
- host = cleanhostname(host);
- if (arg == NULL || ((port = permitopen_port(arg)) < 0))
- fatal_f("bad port number in %s", what);
- /* Send it to channels layer */
- channel_add_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM,
- where, host, port);
- free(oarg);
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Inform channels layer of permitopen options from configuration.
- */
-void
-process_permitopen(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOptions *options)
-{
- process_permitopen_list(ssh, sPermitOpen,
- options->permitted_opens, options->num_permitted_opens);
- process_permitopen_list(ssh, sPermitListen,
- options->permitted_listens,
- options->num_permitted_listens);
-}
-
-void
-process_channel_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOptions *options)
-{
- int secs;
- u_int i;
- char *type;
-
- debug3_f("setting %u timeouts", options->num_channel_timeouts);
- channel_clear_timeouts(ssh);
- for (i = 0; i < options->num_channel_timeouts; i++) {
- if (parse_pattern_interval(options->channel_timeouts[i],
- &type, &secs) != 0) {
- fatal_f("internal error: bad timeout %s",
- options->channel_timeouts[i]);
- }
- channel_add_timeout(ssh, type, secs);
- free(type);
- }
-}
-
-struct connection_info *
-get_connection_info(struct ssh *ssh, int populate, int use_dns)
-{
- static struct connection_info ci;
-
- if (ssh == NULL || !populate)
- return &ci;
- ci.host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, use_dns);
- ci.address = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
- ci.laddress = ssh_local_ipaddr(ssh);
- ci.lport = ssh_local_port(ssh);
- ci.rdomain = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh);
- return &ci;
-}
-
/*
* The strategy for the Match blocks is that the config file is parsed twice.
*
}
goto parse_time;
+ case sSshdMonitorPath:
+ charptr = &options->sshd_session_path;
+ goto parse_filename;
+
case sDeprecated:
case sIgnore:
case sUnsupported:
dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAlgorithms, o->hostkeyalgorithms);
dump_cfg_string(sPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, o->pubkey_accepted_algos);
dump_cfg_string(sRDomain, o->routing_domain);
+ dump_cfg_string(sSshdMonitorPath, o->sshd_session_path);
/* string arguments requiring a lookup */
dump_cfg_string(sLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level));
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.160 2023/09/06 23:35:35 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.161 2024/05/17 00:30:24 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
#define PERMIT_NO_PASSWD 2
#define PERMIT_YES 3
-/* use_privsep */
-#define PRIVSEP_OFF 0
-#define PRIVSEP_ON 1
-#define PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX 2
-
/* PermitOpen */
#define PERMITOPEN_ANY 0
#define PERMITOPEN_NONE -2
u_int num_channel_timeouts;
int unused_connection_timeout;
+
+ char *sshd_session_path;
} ServerOptions;
/* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(subsystem_args, num_subsystems); \
} while (0)
-struct connection_info *get_connection_info(struct ssh *, int, int);
void initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *);
void fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *);
int process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *, char *, const char *, int,
int *, struct connection_info *, struct include_list *includes);
-void process_permitopen(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOptions *options);
-void process_channel_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOptions *);
void load_server_config(const char *, struct sshbuf *);
void parse_server_config(ServerOptions *, const char *, struct sshbuf *,
struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *, int);
void parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *,
struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *);
+int parse_channel_timeout(const char *, char **, u_int *);
int parse_server_match_testspec(struct connection_info *, char *);
int server_match_spec_complete(struct connection_info *);
void servconf_merge_subsystems(ServerOptions *, ServerOptions *);
-/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.238 2024/04/30 02:14:10 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.239 2024/05/17 00:30:24 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
/* XXX */
extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts;
-extern int use_privsep;
static int no_more_sessions = 0; /* Disallow further sessions. */
static volatile sig_atomic_t child_terminated = 0; /* The child has terminated. */
-/* Cleanup on signals (!use_privsep case only) */
-static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
-
/* prototypes */
static void server_init_dispatch(struct ssh *);
/* requested tunnel forwarding interface(s), shared with session.c */
char *tun_fwd_ifnames = NULL;
-/* returns 1 if bind to specified port by specified user is permitted */
-static int
-bind_permitted(int port, uid_t uid)
-{
- if (use_privsep)
- return 1; /* allow system to decide */
- if (port < IPPORT_RESERVED && uid != 0)
- return 0;
- return 1;
-}
-
static void
sigchld_handler(int sig)
{
child_terminated = 1;
}
-static void
-sigterm_handler(int sig)
-{
- received_sigterm = sig;
-}
-
static void
client_alive_check(struct ssh *ssh)
{
connection_in = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh);
connection_out = ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh);
- if (!use_privsep) {
- ssh_signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
- ssh_signal(SIGINT, sigterm_handler);
- ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
- }
-
server_init_dispatch(ssh);
for (;;) {
if (sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &osigset, NULL) == -1)
error_f("osigset sigprocmask: %s", strerror(errno));
- if (received_sigterm) {
- logit("Exiting on signal %d", (int)received_sigterm);
- /* Clean up sessions, utmp, etc. */
- cleanup_exit(255);
- }
-
channel_after_poll(ssh, pfd, npfd_active);
if (conn_in_ready &&
process_input(ssh, connection_in) < 0)
/* XXX fine grained permissions */
if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 &&
auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag &&
- !options.disable_forwarding && (pw->pw_uid == 0 || use_privsep)) {
+ !options.disable_forwarding) {
c = channel_connect_to_path(ssh, target,
"direct-streamlocal@openssh.com", "direct-streamlocal");
} else {
(options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0 ||
!auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag ||
options.disable_forwarding ||
- (!want_reply && fwd.listen_port == 0) ||
- (fwd.listen_port != 0 &&
- !bind_permitted(fwd.listen_port, pw->pw_uid))) {
+ (!want_reply && fwd.listen_port == 0)) {
success = 0;
ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Server has disabled port forwarding.");
} else {
/* check permissions */
if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0
|| !auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag ||
- options.disable_forwarding ||
- (pw->pw_uid != 0 && !use_privsep)) {
+ options.disable_forwarding) {
success = 0;
ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Server has disabled "
"streamlocal forwarding.");
-/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.337 2024/02/01 02:37:33 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.338 2024/05/17 00:30:24 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
{
socklen_t fromlen;
struct sockaddr_storage from;
- struct passwd * pw = s->pw;
- pid_t pid = getpid();
/*
* Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
}
}
- /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
- if (!use_privsep)
- record_login(pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
- session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len,
- options.use_dns),
- (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
-
if (check_quietlogin(s, command))
return;
/* Allocate a pty and open it. */
debug("Allocating pty.");
- if (!PRIVSEP(pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty,
- sizeof(s->tty)))) {
+ if (!mm_pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty))) {
free(s->term);
s->term = NULL;
s->ptyfd = -1;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
- if (!use_privsep)
- pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty);
-
/* Set window size from the packet. */
pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
signame, s->forced ? "forced-command" : "subsystem");
goto out;
}
- if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) {
+ if (mm_is_monitor()) {
error_f("session signalling requires privilege separation");
goto out;
}
void
session_pty_cleanup(Session *s)
{
- PRIVSEP(session_pty_cleanup2(s));
+ mm_session_pty_cleanup2(s);
}
static char *
* Cleanup ptys/utmp only if privsep is disabled,
* or if running in monitor.
*/
- if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
+ if (mm_is_monitor())
session_destroy_all(ssh, session_pty_cleanup2);
}
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh_api.c,v 1.28 2024/01/09 21:39:14 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh_api.c,v 1.29 2024/05/17 00:30:24 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2012 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
#include "log.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "dh.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "version.h"
u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *);
/*
- * stubs for the server side implementation of kex.
- * disable privsep so our stubs will never be called.
+ * stubs for privsep calls in the server side implementation of kex.
*/
-int use_privsep = 0;
int mm_sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *, u_char **, u_int *,
const u_char *, u_int, const char *, const char *, const char *, u_int);
const u_char *data, u_int datalen, const char *alg,
const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, u_int compat)
{
- return (-1);
+ size_t slen = 0;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = sshkey_sign(key, sigp, &slen, data, datalen, alg,
+ sk_provider, sk_pin, compat);
+ *lenp = slen;
+ return ret;
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
DH *
mm_choose_dh(int min, int nbits, int max)
{
- return (NULL);
+ return choose_dh(min, nbits, max);
}
#endif
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd-session.c,v 1.1 2024/05/17 00:30:24 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * SSH2 implementation:
+ * Privilege Separation:
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/tree.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/queue.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <paths.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "session.h"
+#include "monitor.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "version.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sk-api.h"
+#include "srclimit.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+
+/* Re-exec fds */
+#define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
+#define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2)
+#define REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 3)
+#define REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 4)
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+/* Server configuration options. */
+ServerOptions options;
+
+/* Name of the server configuration file. */
+char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
+
+/*
+ * Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug
+ * mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system
+ * log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing
+ * the first connection.
+ */
+int debug_flag = 0;
+
+/* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
+static int inetd_flag = 0;
+
+/* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */
+static int log_stderr = 0;
+
+/* Saved arguments to main(). */
+static char **saved_argv;
+
+/* Daemon's agent connection */
+int auth_sock = -1;
+static int have_agent = 0;
+
+/*
+ * Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this
+ * structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so
+ * that the pages do not get written into swap. However, there are some
+ * problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle)
+ * have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is
+ * not very useful. Currently, memory locking is not implemented.
+ */
+struct {
+ u_int num_hostkeys;
+ struct sshkey **host_keys; /* all private host keys */
+ struct sshkey **host_pubkeys; /* all public host keys */
+ struct sshkey **host_certificates; /* all public host certificates */
+} sensitive_data;
+
+/* record remote hostname or ip */
+u_int utmp_len = HOST_NAME_MAX+1;
+
+static int startup_pipe = -1; /* in child */
+
+/* variables used for privilege separation */
+struct monitor *pmonitor = NULL;
+int privsep_is_preauth = 1;
+
+/* global connection state and authentication contexts */
+Authctxt *the_authctxt = NULL;
+struct ssh *the_active_state;
+
+/* global key/cert auth options. XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */
+struct sshauthopt *auth_opts = NULL;
+
+/* sshd_config buffer */
+struct sshbuf *cfg;
+
+/* Included files from the configuration file */
+struct include_list includes = TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(includes);
+
+/* message to be displayed after login */
+struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
+
+/* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
+void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
+void demote_sensitive_data(void);
+static void do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *);
+
+/*
+ * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired.
+ */
+static void
+grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
+{
+ /*
+ * Try to kill any processes that we have spawned, E.g. authorized
+ * keys command helpers or privsep children.
+ */
+ if (getpgid(0) == getpid()) {
+ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN);
+ kill(0, SIGTERM);
+ }
+
+ /* Log error and exit. */
+ sigdie("Timeout before authentication for %s port %d",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(the_active_state),
+ ssh_remote_port(the_active_state));
+}
+
+/* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */
+void
+destroy_sensitive_data(void)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
+ sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
+ sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) {
+ sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]);
+ sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/* Demote private to public keys for network child */
+void
+demote_sensitive_data(void)
+{
+ struct sshkey *tmp;
+ u_int i;
+ int r;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
+ if ((r = sshkey_from_private(
+ sensitive_data.host_keys[i], &tmp)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "could not demote host %s key",
+ sshkey_type(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]));
+ sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
+ sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
+ }
+ /* Certs do not need demotion */
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+privsep_preauth_child(void)
+{
+ gid_t gidset[1];
+ struct passwd *pw;
+
+ /* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */
+ privsep_challenge_enable();
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ /* Cache supported mechanism OIDs for later use */
+ ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
+#endif
+
+ /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
+ demote_sensitive_data();
+
+ /* Demote the child */
+ if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) {
+ if ((pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL)
+ fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
+ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER);
+ pw = pwcopy(pw); /* Ensure mutable */
+ endpwent();
+ freezero(pw->pw_passwd, strlen(pw->pw_passwd));
+
+ /* Change our root directory */
+ if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1)
+ fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR,
+ strerror(errno));
+ if (chdir("/") == -1)
+ fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /*
+ * Drop our privileges
+ * NB. Can't use setusercontext() after chroot.
+ */
+ debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
+ (u_int)pw->pw_gid);
+ gidset[0] = pw->pw_gid;
+ if (setgroups(1, gidset) == -1)
+ fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ permanently_set_uid(pw);
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ int status, r;
+ pid_t pid;
+ struct ssh_sandbox *box = NULL;
+
+ /* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */
+ pmonitor = monitor_init();
+ /* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */
+ pmonitor->m_pkex = &ssh->kex;
+
+ box = ssh_sandbox_init();
+ pid = fork();
+ if (pid == -1) {
+ fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
+ } else if (pid != 0) {
+ debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid);
+
+ pmonitor->m_pid = pid;
+ if (have_agent) {
+ r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock);
+ if (r != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "Could not get agent socket");
+ have_agent = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if (box != NULL)
+ ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(box, pid);
+ monitor_child_preauth(ssh, pmonitor);
+
+ /* Wait for the child's exit status */
+ while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
+ if (errno == EINTR)
+ continue;
+ pmonitor->m_pid = -1;
+ fatal_f("waitpid: %s", strerror(errno));
+ }
+ privsep_is_preauth = 0;
+ pmonitor->m_pid = -1;
+ if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
+ if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0)
+ fatal_f("preauth child exited with status %d",
+ WEXITSTATUS(status));
+ } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status))
+ fatal_f("preauth child terminated by signal %d",
+ WTERMSIG(status));
+ if (box != NULL)
+ ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(box);
+ return 1;
+ } else {
+ /* child */
+ close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
+ close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
+
+ /* Arrange for logging to be sent to the monitor */
+ set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
+
+ privsep_preauth_child();
+ setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
+ if (box != NULL)
+ ssh_sandbox_child(box);
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ /* New socket pair */
+ monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
+
+ pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
+ if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
+ fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
+ else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {
+ verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
+ sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
+ monitor_clear_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
+ monitor_child_postauth(ssh, pmonitor);
+
+ /* NEVERREACHED */
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ /* child */
+
+ close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
+ pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
+
+ /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
+ demote_sensitive_data();
+
+ /* Drop privileges */
+ do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
+
+ /* It is safe now to apply the key state */
+ monitor_apply_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
+
+ /*
+ * Tell the packet layer that authentication was successful, since
+ * this information is not part of the key state.
+ */
+ ssh_packet_set_authenticated(ssh);
+}
+
+static void
+append_hostkey_type(struct sshbuf *b, const char *s)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if (match_pattern_list(s, options.hostkeyalgorithms, 0) != 1) {
+ debug3_f("%s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms", s);
+ return;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s", sshbuf_len(b) > 0 ? "," : "", s)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
+}
+
+static char *
+list_hostkey_types(void)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *b;
+ struct sshkey *key;
+ char *ret;
+ u_int i;
+
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
+ if (key == NULL)
+ key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i];
+ if (key == NULL)
+ continue;
+ switch (key->type) {
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ /* for RSA we also support SHA2 signatures */
+ append_hostkey_type(b, "rsa-sha2-512");
+ append_hostkey_type(b, "rsa-sha2-256");
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ case KEY_XMSS:
+ append_hostkey_type(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
+ break;
+ }
+ /* If the private key has a cert peer, then list that too */
+ key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i];
+ if (key == NULL)
+ continue;
+ switch (key->type) {
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ /* for RSA we also support SHA2 signatures */
+ append_hostkey_type(b,
+ "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com");
+ append_hostkey_type(b,
+ "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com");
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
+ case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
+ append_hostkey_type(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed");
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ debug_f("%s", ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static struct sshkey *
+get_hostkey_by_type(int type, int nid, int need_private, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ u_int i;
+ struct sshkey *key;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ switch (type) {
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
+ case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
+ key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i];
+ break;
+ default:
+ key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
+ if (key == NULL && !need_private)
+ key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i];
+ break;
+ }
+ if (key == NULL || key->type != type)
+ continue;
+ switch (type) {
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ if (key->ecdsa_nid != nid)
+ continue;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default:
+ return need_private ?
+ sensitive_data.host_keys[i] : key;
+ }
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+struct sshkey *
+get_hostkey_public_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 0, ssh);
+}
+
+struct sshkey *
+get_hostkey_private_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 1, ssh);
+}
+
+struct sshkey *
+get_hostkey_by_index(int ind)
+{
+ if (ind < 0 || (u_int)ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
+ return (NULL);
+ return (sensitive_data.host_keys[ind]);
+}
+
+struct sshkey *
+get_hostkey_public_by_index(int ind, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ if (ind < 0 || (u_int)ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
+ return (NULL);
+ return (sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[ind]);
+}
+
+int
+get_hostkey_index(struct sshkey *key, int compare, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+ if (key == sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] ||
+ (compare && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] &&
+ sshkey_equal(key,
+ sensitive_data.host_certificates[i])))
+ return (i);
+ } else {
+ if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i] ||
+ (compare && sensitive_data.host_keys[i] &&
+ sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_keys[i])))
+ return (i);
+ if (key == sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] ||
+ (compare && sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] &&
+ sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i])))
+ return (i);
+ }
+ }
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+/* Inform the client of all hostkeys */
+static void
+notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *buf;
+ struct sshkey *key;
+ u_int i, nkeys;
+ int r;
+ char *fp;
+
+ /* Some clients cannot cope with the hostkeys message, skip those. */
+ if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS)
+ return;
+
+ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
+ for (i = nkeys = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(i, ssh);
+ if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC ||
+ sshkey_is_cert(key))
+ continue;
+ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ debug3_f("key %d: %s %s", i, sshkey_ssh_name(key), fp);
+ free(fp);
+ if (nkeys == 0) {
+ /*
+ * Start building the request when we find the
+ * first usable key.
+ */
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "hostkeys-00@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0) /* want reply */
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: start request", __func__);
+ }
+ /* Append the key to the request */
+ sshbuf_reset(buf);
+ if ((r = sshkey_putb(key, buf)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "couldn't put hostkey %d", i);
+ if ((r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, buf)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: append key", __func__);
+ nkeys++;
+ }
+ debug3_f("sent %u hostkeys", nkeys);
+ if (nkeys == 0)
+ fatal_f("no hostkeys");
+ if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send", __func__);
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+}
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n", SSH_VERSION, SSH_OPENSSL_VERSION);
+ fprintf(stderr,
+"usage: sshd [-46DdeGiqTtV] [-C connection_spec] [-c host_cert_file]\n"
+" [-E log_file] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]\n"
+" [-h host_key_file] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]\n"
+ );
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+static void
+parse_hostkeys(struct sshbuf *hostkeys)
+{
+ int r;
+ u_int num_keys = 0;
+ struct sshkey *k;
+ struct sshbuf *kbuf;
+ const u_char *cp;
+ size_t len;
+
+ while (sshbuf_len(hostkeys) != 0) {
+ if (num_keys > 2048)
+ fatal_f("too many hostkeys");
+ sensitive_data.host_keys = xrecallocarray(
+ sensitive_data.host_keys, num_keys, num_keys + 1,
+ sizeof(*sensitive_data.host_pubkeys));
+ sensitive_data.host_pubkeys = xrecallocarray(
+ sensitive_data.host_pubkeys, num_keys, num_keys + 1,
+ sizeof(*sensitive_data.host_pubkeys));
+ sensitive_data.host_certificates = xrecallocarray(
+ sensitive_data.host_certificates, num_keys, num_keys + 1,
+ sizeof(*sensitive_data.host_certificates));
+ /* private key */
+ k = NULL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_froms(hostkeys, &kbuf)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "extract privkey");
+ if (sshbuf_len(kbuf) != 0 &&
+ (r = sshkey_private_deserialize(kbuf, &k)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse pubkey");
+ sensitive_data.host_keys[num_keys] = k;
+ sshbuf_free(kbuf);
+ if (k)
+ debug2_f("privkey %u: %s", num_keys, sshkey_ssh_name(k));
+ /* public key */
+ k = NULL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(hostkeys, &cp, &len)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "extract pubkey");
+ if (len != 0 && (r = sshkey_from_blob(cp, len, &k)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse pubkey");
+ sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[num_keys] = k;
+ if (k)
+ debug2_f("pubkey %u: %s", num_keys, sshkey_ssh_name(k));
+ /* certificate */
+ k = NULL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(hostkeys, &cp, &len)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "extract pubkey");
+ if (len != 0 && (r = sshkey_from_blob(cp, len, &k)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse pubkey");
+ sensitive_data.host_certificates[num_keys] = k;
+ if (k)
+ debug2_f("cert %u: %s", num_keys, sshkey_ssh_name(k));
+ num_keys++;
+ }
+ sensitive_data.num_hostkeys = num_keys;
+}
+
+static void
+recv_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf, uint64_t *timing_secretp)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *m, *inc, *hostkeys;
+ u_char *cp, ver;
+ size_t len;
+ int r;
+ struct include_item *item;
+
+ debug3_f("entering fd = %d", fd);
+
+ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (inc = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+ if (ssh_msg_recv(fd, m) == -1)
+ fatal_f("ssh_msg_recv failed");
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &ver)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse version");
+ if (ver != 0)
+ fatal_f("rexec version mismatch");
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &cp, &len)) != 0 || /* XXX _direct */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, timing_secretp)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_froms(m, &hostkeys)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, inc)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse config");
+
+ if (conf != NULL && (r = sshbuf_put(conf, cp, len)))
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put");
+
+ while (sshbuf_len(inc) != 0) {
+ item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item));
+ if ((item->contents = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(inc, &item->selector, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(inc, &item->filename, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(inc, item->contents)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse includes");
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&includes, item, entry);
+ }
+
+ parse_hostkeys(hostkeys);
+
+ free(cp);
+ sshbuf_free(m);
+ sshbuf_free(hostkeys);
+ sshbuf_free(inc);
+
+ debug3_f("done");
+}
+
+/*
+ * If IP options are supported, make sure there are none (log and
+ * return an error if any are found). Basically we are worried about
+ * source routing; it can be used to pretend you are somebody
+ * (ip-address) you are not. That itself may be "almost acceptable"
+ * under certain circumstances, but rhosts authentication is useless
+ * if source routing is accepted. Notice also that if we just dropped
+ * source routing here, the other side could use IP spoofing to do
+ * rest of the interaction and could still bypass security. So we
+ * exit here if we detect any IP options.
+ */
+static void
+check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ int sock_in = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh);
+ struct sockaddr_storage from;
+ u_char opts[200];
+ socklen_t i, option_size = sizeof(opts), fromlen = sizeof(from);
+ char text[sizeof(opts) * 3 + 1];
+
+ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+ if (getpeername(sock_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from,
+ &fromlen) == -1)
+ return;
+ if (from.ss_family != AF_INET)
+ return;
+ /* XXX IPv6 options? */
+
+ if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts,
+ &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
+ text[0] = '\0';
+ for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
+ snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
+ " %2.2x", opts[i]);
+ fatal("Connection from %.100s port %d with IP opts: %.800s",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), text);
+ }
+ return;
+}
+
+/* Set the routing domain for this process */
+static void
+set_process_rdomain(struct ssh *ssh, const char *name)
+{
+ int rtable, ortable = getrtable();
+ const char *errstr;
+
+ if (name == NULL)
+ return; /* default */
+
+ if (strcmp(name, "%D") == 0) {
+ /* "expands" to routing domain of connection */
+ if ((name = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh)) == NULL)
+ return;
+ }
+
+ rtable = (int)strtonum(name, 0, 255, &errstr);
+ if (errstr != NULL) /* Shouldn't happen */
+ fatal("Invalid routing domain \"%s\": %s", name, errstr);
+ if (rtable != ortable && setrtable(rtable) != 0)
+ fatal("Unable to set routing domain %d: %s",
+ rtable, strerror(errno));
+ debug_f("set routing domain %d (was %d)", rtable, ortable);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Main program for the daemon.
+ */
+int
+main(int ac, char **av)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
+ extern char *optarg;
+ extern int optind;
+ int r, opt, on = 1, remote_port;
+ int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, rexeced_flag = 0, have_key = 0;
+ const char *remote_ip, *rdomain;
+ char *line, *laddr, *logfile = NULL;
+ u_int i;
+ u_int64_t ibytes, obytes;
+ mode_t new_umask;
+ Authctxt *authctxt;
+ struct connection_info *connection_info = NULL;
+ sigset_t sigmask;
+ uint64_t timing_secret = 0;
+
+ sigemptyset(&sigmask);
+ sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &sigmask, NULL);
+
+ /* Save argv. */
+ saved_argv = av;
+
+ /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+ sanitise_stdfd();
+
+ /* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */
+ initialize_server_options(&options);
+
+ /* Parse command-line arguments. */
+ while ((opt = getopt(ac, av,
+ "C:E:b:c:f:g:h:k:o:p:u:46DGQRTdeiqrtV")) != -1) {
+ switch (opt) {
+ case '4':
+ options.address_family = AF_INET;
+ break;
+ case '6':
+ options.address_family = AF_INET6;
+ break;
+ case 'f':
+ config_file_name = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'c':
+ servconf_add_hostcert("[command-line]", 0,
+ &options, optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'd':
+ if (debug_flag == 0) {
+ debug_flag = 1;
+ options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+ } else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
+ options.log_level++;
+ break;
+ case 'D':
+ /* ignore */
+ break;
+ case 'E':
+ logfile = optarg;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case 'e':
+ log_stderr = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'i':
+ inetd_flag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'r':
+ /* ignore */
+ break;
+ case 'R':
+ rexeced_flag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'Q':
+ /* ignored */
+ break;
+ case 'q':
+ options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
+ break;
+ case 'b':
+ /* protocol 1, ignored */
+ break;
+ case 'p':
+ options.ports_from_cmdline = 1;
+ if (options.num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "too many ports.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg);
+ if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] <= 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Bad port number.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ break;
+ case 'g':
+ if ((options.login_grace_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Invalid login grace time.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ break;
+ case 'k':
+ /* protocol 1, ignored */
+ break;
+ case 'h':
+ servconf_add_hostkey("[command-line]", 0,
+ &options, optarg, 1);
+ break;
+ case 't':
+ case 'T':
+ case 'G':
+ fatal("test/dump modes not supported");
+ break;
+ case 'C':
+ connection_info = server_get_connection_info(ssh, 0, 0);
+ if (parse_server_match_testspec(connection_info,
+ optarg) == -1)
+ exit(1);
+ break;
+ case 'u':
+ utmp_len = (u_int)strtonum(optarg, 0, HOST_NAME_MAX+1+1, NULL);
+ if (utmp_len > HOST_NAME_MAX+1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Invalid utmp length.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ break;
+ case 'o':
+ line = xstrdup(optarg);
+ if (process_server_config_line(&options, line,
+ "command-line", 0, NULL, NULL, &includes) != 0)
+ exit(1);
+ free(line);
+ break;
+ case 'V':
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n",
+ SSH_VERSION, SSH_OPENSSL_VERSION);
+ exit(0);
+ default:
+ usage();
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */
+ if (optind < ac) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ debug("sshd version %s, %s", SSH_VERSION, SSH_OPENSSL_VERSION);
+
+ if (!rexeced_flag)
+ fatal("sshd-session should not be executed directly");
+
+ closefrom(REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD);
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+#endif
+
+ /* If requested, redirect the logs to the specified logfile. */
+ if (logfile != NULL) {
+ char *cp, pid_s[32];
+
+ snprintf(pid_s, sizeof(pid_s), "%ld", (unsigned long)getpid());
+ cp = percent_expand(logfile,
+ "p", pid_s,
+ "P", "sshd-session",
+ (char *)NULL);
+ log_redirect_stderr_to(cp);
+ free(cp);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host
+ * key (unless started from inetd)
+ */
+ log_init(__progname,
+ options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ?
+ SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
+ options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ?
+ SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility,
+ log_stderr || !inetd_flag || debug_flag);
+
+ debug("sshd version %s, %s", SSH_VERSION, SSH_OPENSSL_VERSION);
+
+ /* Fetch our configuration */
+ if ((cfg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("sshbuf_new config buf failed");
+ setproctitle("%s", "[rexeced]");
+ recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, cfg, &timing_secret);
+ close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
+ parse_server_config(&options, "rexec", cfg, &includes, NULL, 1);
+ /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
+ fill_default_server_options(&options);
+ options.timing_secret = timing_secret;
+
+ if (!debug_flag) {
+ startup_pipe = dup(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
+ close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
+ /*
+ * Signal parent that this child is at a point where
+ * they can go away if they have a SIGHUP pending.
+ */
+ (void)atomicio(vwrite, startup_pipe, "\0", 1);
+ }
+
+ /* Check that options are sensible */
+ if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL &&
+ (options.authorized_keys_command != NULL &&
+ strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_command, "none") != 0))
+ fatal("AuthorizedKeysCommand set without "
+ "AuthorizedKeysCommandUser");
+ if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL &&
+ (options.authorized_principals_command != NULL &&
+ strcasecmp(options.authorized_principals_command, "none") != 0))
+ fatal("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand set without "
+ "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser");
+
+ /*
+ * Check whether there is any path through configured auth methods.
+ * Unfortunately it is not possible to verify this generally before
+ * daemonisation in the presence of Match block, but this catches
+ * and warns for trivial misconfigurations that could break login.
+ */
+ if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_auth_methods; i++) {
+ if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[i],
+ 1) == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (i >= options.num_auth_methods)
+ fatal("AuthenticationMethods cannot be satisfied by "
+ "enabled authentication methods");
+ }
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ if (options.moduli_file != NULL)
+ dh_set_moduli_file(options.moduli_file);
+#endif
+
+ if (options.host_key_agent) {
+ if (strcmp(options.host_key_agent, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME))
+ setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME,
+ options.host_key_agent, 1);
+ if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(NULL)) == 0)
+ have_agent = 1;
+ else
+ error_r(r, "Could not connect to agent \"%s\"",
+ options.host_key_agent);
+ }
+
+ if (options.num_host_key_files != sensitive_data.num_hostkeys) {
+ fatal("internal error: hostkeys confused (config %u recvd %u)",
+ options.num_host_key_files, sensitive_data.num_hostkeys);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i] != NULL ||
+ (have_agent && sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] != NULL)) {
+ have_key = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!have_key)
+ fatal("internal error: monitor recieved no hostkeys");
+
+ /* Ensure that umask disallows at least group and world write */
+ new_umask = umask(0077) | 0022;
+ (void) umask(new_umask);
+
+ /* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */
+ if (debug_flag)
+ log_stderr = 1;
+ log_init(__progname, options.log_level,
+ options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_log_verbose; i++)
+ log_verbose_add(options.log_verbose[i]);
+
+ /* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
+ log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+
+ /*
+ * Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
+ * unmounted if desired.
+ */
+ if (chdir("/") == -1)
+ error("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /* ignore SIGPIPE */
+ ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+
+ /* Get a connection, either from inetd or rexec */
+ if (inetd_flag) {
+ /*
+ * NB. must be different fd numbers for the !socket case,
+ * as packet_connection_is_on_socket() depends on this.
+ */
+ sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
+ sock_out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
+ } else {
+ /* rexec case; accept()ed socket in ancestor listener */
+ sock_in = sock_out = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2
+ * as our code for setting the descriptors won't work if
+ * ttyfd happens to be one of those.
+ */
+ if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, !log_stderr) == -1)
+ error("stdfd_devnull failed");
+ debug("network sockets: %d, %d", sock_in, sock_out);
+
+ /* This is the child processing a new connection. */
+ setproctitle("%s", "[accepted]");
+
+ /* Executed child processes don't need these. */
+ fcntl(sock_out, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+ fcntl(sock_in, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+
+ /* We will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense. */
+ ssh_signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+
+ /*
+ * Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do
+ * not have a key.
+ */
+ if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, sock_in, sock_out)) == NULL)
+ fatal("Unable to create connection");
+ the_active_state = ssh;
+ ssh_packet_set_server(ssh);
+
+ check_ip_options(ssh);
+
+ /* Prepare the channels layer */
+ channel_init_channels(ssh);
+ channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family);
+ server_process_channel_timeouts(ssh);
+ server_process_permitopen(ssh);
+
+ /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
+ if (options.tcp_keep_alive && ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) &&
+ setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
+ error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+ if ((remote_port = ssh_remote_port(ssh)) < 0) {
+ debug("ssh_remote_port failed");
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The rest of the code depends on the fact that
+ * ssh_remote_ipaddr() caches the remote ip, even if
+ * the socket goes away.
+ */
+ remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+
+ rdomain = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh);
+
+ /* Log the connection. */
+ laddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock_in);
+ verbose("Connection from %s port %d on %s port %d%s%s%s",
+ remote_ip, remote_port, laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh),
+ rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain \"",
+ rdomain == NULL ? "" : rdomain,
+ rdomain == NULL ? "" : "\"");
+ free(laddr);
+
+ /*
+ * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
+ * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
+ * cleared after successful authentication. A limit of zero
+ * indicates no limit. Note that we don't set the alarm in debugging
+ * mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you
+ * are about to discover the bug.
+ */
+ ssh_signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler);
+ if (!debug_flag)
+ alarm(options.login_grace_time);
+
+ if ((r = kex_exchange_identification(ssh, -1,
+ options.version_addendum)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "banner exchange");
+
+ ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(ssh);
+
+ /* allocate authentication context */
+ authctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*authctxt));
+ ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
+
+ /* XXX global for cleanup, access from other modules */
+ the_authctxt = authctxt;
+
+ /* Set default key authentication options */
+ if ((auth_opts = sshauthopt_new_with_keys_defaults()) == NULL)
+ fatal("allocation failed");
+
+ /* prepare buffer to collect messages to display to user after login */
+ if ((loginmsg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("sshbuf_new loginmsg failed");
+ auth_debug_reset();
+
+ if (privsep_preauth(ssh) == 1)
+ goto authenticated;
+
+ /* perform the key exchange */
+ /* authenticate user and start session */
+ do_ssh2_kex(ssh);
+ do_authentication2(ssh);
+
+ /*
+ * The unprivileged child now transfers the current keystate and exits.
+ */
+ mm_send_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
+ ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
+ exit(0);
+
+ authenticated:
+ /*
+ * Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for
+ * authentication.
+ */
+ alarm(0);
+ ssh_signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
+ authctxt->authenticated = 1;
+ if (startup_pipe != -1) {
+ close(startup_pipe);
+ startup_pipe = -1;
+ }
+
+ if (options.routing_domain != NULL)
+ set_process_rdomain(ssh, options.routing_domain);
+
+ /*
+ * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare
+ * file descriptor passing.
+ */
+ privsep_postauth(ssh, authctxt);
+ /* the monitor process [priv] will not return */
+
+ ssh_packet_set_timeout(ssh, options.client_alive_interval,
+ options.client_alive_count_max);
+
+ /* Try to send all our hostkeys to the client */
+ notify_hostkeys(ssh);
+
+ /* Start session. */
+ do_authenticated(ssh, authctxt);
+
+ /* The connection has been terminated. */
+ ssh_packet_get_bytes(ssh, &ibytes, &obytes);
+ verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes",
+ (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes);
+
+ verbose("Closing connection to %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
+ ssh_packet_close(ssh);
+
+ mm_terminate();
+
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+int
+sshd_hostkey_sign(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *privkey,
+ struct sshkey *pubkey, u_char **signature, size_t *slenp,
+ const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg)
+{
+ if (privkey) {
+ if (mm_sshkey_sign(ssh, privkey, signature, slenp,
+ data, dlen, alg, options.sk_provider, NULL,
+ ssh->compat) < 0)
+ fatal_f("privkey sign failed");
+ } else {
+ if (mm_sshkey_sign(ssh, pubkey, signature, slenp,
+ data, dlen, alg, options.sk_provider, NULL,
+ ssh->compat) < 0)
+ fatal_f("pubkey sign failed");
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* SSH2 key exchange */
+static void
+do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ char *hkalgs = NULL, *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX];
+ const char *compression = NULL;
+ struct kex *kex;
+ int r;
+
+ if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
+ ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit,
+ options.rekey_interval);
+
+ if (options.compression == COMP_NONE)
+ compression = "none";
+ hkalgs = list_hostkey_types();
+
+ kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal, options.kex_algorithms,
+ options.ciphers, options.macs, compression, hkalgs);
+
+ free(hkalgs);
+
+ /* start key exchange */
+ if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "kex_setup");
+ kex_set_server_sig_algs(ssh, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
+ kex = ssh->kex;
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
+#endif
+ kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
+ kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
+ kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
+ kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
+
+ ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done);
+ kex_proposal_free_entries(myproposal);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "markus")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
+ (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "send test");
+#endif
+ debug("KEX done");
+}
+
+/* server specific fatal cleanup */
+void
+cleanup_exit(int i)
+{
+ if (the_active_state != NULL && the_authctxt != NULL) {
+ do_cleanup(the_active_state, the_authctxt);
+ if (privsep_is_preauth &&
+ pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) {
+ debug("Killing privsep child %d", pmonitor->m_pid);
+ if (kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGKILL) != 0 &&
+ errno != ESRCH) {
+ error_f("kill(%d): %s", pmonitor->m_pid,
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ _exit(i);
+}
--- /dev/null
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.1 2024/05/17 00:30:24 djm Exp $
+
+.PATH: ${.CURDIR}/..
+
+SRCS= sshd-session.c auth2-methods.c \
+ auth-rhosts.c auth-passwd.c sshpty.c sshlogin.c servconf.c \
+ serverloop.c auth.c auth2.c auth-options.c session.c auth2-chall.c \
+ groupaccess.c auth-bsdauth.c auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c \
+ auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c auth2-pubkey.c auth2-pubkeyfile.c \
+ monitor.c monitor_wrap.c \
+ sftp-server.c sftp-common.c sftp-realpath.c sandbox-pledge.c srclimit.c
+SRCS+= authfd.c compat.c dns.c fatal.c hostfile.c readpass.c utf8.c uidswap.c
+SRCS+= ${SRCS_BASE} ${SRCS_KEX} ${SRCS_KEXS} ${SRCS_KEY} ${SRCS_KEYP} \
+ ${SRCS_KRL} ${SRCS_PROT} ${SRCS_PKT} ${SRCS_UTL} ${SRCS_PKCS11} \
+ ${SRCS_SK_CLIENT}
+
+PROG= sshd-session
+BINDIR= /usr/libexec
+BINMODE=511
+NOMAN= 1
+
+.include <bsd.own.mk> # for KERBEROS and AFS
+
+KERBEROS5=no
+
+.if (${KERBEROS5:L} == "yes")
+CFLAGS+=-DKRB5 -I${DESTDIR}/usr/include/kerberosV -DGSSAPI
+SRCS+= auth-krb5.c auth2-gss.c gss-serv.c gss-serv-krb5.c
+.endif
+
+.include <bsd.prog.mk>
+
+.if (${KERBEROS5:L} == "yes")
+LDADD+= -lgssapi -lkrb5 -lasn1
+LDADD+= -lwind -lroken -lcom_err -lpthread -lheimbase -lkafs
+DPADD+= ${LIBGSSAPI} ${LIBKRB5}
+.endif
+
+.if (${OPENSSL:L} == "yes")
+LDADD+= -lcrypto
+DPADD+= ${LIBCRYPTO}
+.endif
+
+LDADD+= -lutil
+DPADD+= ${LIBUTIL}
+
+.if (${ZLIB:L} == "yes")
+LDADD+= -lz
+DPADD+= ${LIBZ}
+.endif
+
+# The random relink kit, used on OpenBSD by /etc/rc
+
+CLEANFILES+= ${PROG}.tar install.sh
+
+install.sh: Makefile
+ echo "set -o errexit" > $@
+ echo "${CC} ${LDFLAGS} ${LDSTATIC} -o ${PROG}" \
+ "\`echo " ${OBJS} "| tr ' ' '\\\n' | sort -R\`" ${LDADD} >> $@
+ echo "./${PROG} -V # test it works" >> $@
+ echo "install -c -s -o root -g bin -m ${BINMODE} ${PROG} " \
+ "${BINDIR}/${PROG}" >> $@
+
+${PROG}.tar: ${OBJS} install.sh
+ tar cf $@ ${OBJS} install.sh
+
+afterinstall: ${PROG}.tar
+ install -d -o root -g wheel -m 755 \
+ ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/relink/${BINDIR}/${PROG}
+ install -o ${BINOWN} -g ${BINGRP} -m 640 \
+ ${PROG}.tar ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/relink/${BINDIR}/${PROG}/${PROG}.tar
-/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.602 2024/01/08 00:34:34 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.603 2024/05/17 00:30:24 djm Exp $ */
/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * This program is the ssh daemon. It listens for connections from clients,
- * and performs authentication, executes use commands or shell, and forwards
- * information to/from the application to the user client over an encrypted
- * connection. This can also handle forwarding of X11, TCP/IP, and
- * authentication agent connections.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- *
- * SSH2 implementation:
- * Privilege Separation:
- *
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
*
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
#include "sshpty.h"
-#include "packet.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "misc.h"
-#include "match.h"
#include "servconf.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
#include "compat.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
-#include "kex.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "atomicio.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "msg.h"
-#include "dispatch.h"
-#include "channels.h"
-#include "session.h"
-#include "monitor.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
-#include "auth-options.h"
#include "version.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sk-api.h"
#include "srclimit.h"
-#include "dh.h"
/* Re-exec fds */
#define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
/* Server configuration options. */
ServerOptions options;
-/* Name of the server configuration file. */
-char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
-
/*
* Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug
* mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system
*/
int debug_flag = 0;
-/*
- * Indicating that the daemon should only test the configuration and keys.
- * If test_flag > 1 ("-T" flag), then sshd will also dump the effective
- * configuration, optionally using connection information provided by the
- * "-C" flag.
- */
-static int test_flag = 0;
-
-/* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
-static int inetd_flag = 0;
-
-/* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
-static int no_daemon_flag = 0;
-
-/* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */
-static int log_stderr = 0;
-
/* Saved arguments to main(). */
static char **saved_argv;
-/* re-exec */
-static int rexeced_flag = 0;
-static int rexec_flag = 1;
-static int rexec_argc = 0;
-static char **rexec_argv;
-
/*
* The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP
* signal handler.
static int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS];
static int num_listen_socks = 0;
-/* Daemon's agent connection */
-int auth_sock = -1;
-static int have_agent = 0;
-
/*
* Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this
* structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so
static int *startup_flags = NULL; /* Indicates child closed listener */
static int startup_pipe = -1; /* in child */
-/* variables used for privilege separation */
-int use_privsep = -1;
-struct monitor *pmonitor = NULL;
-int privsep_is_preauth = 1;
-
-/* global connection state and authentication contexts */
-Authctxt *the_authctxt = NULL;
-struct ssh *the_active_state;
-
-/* global key/cert auth options. XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */
-struct sshauthopt *auth_opts = NULL;
-
/* sshd_config buffer */
struct sshbuf *cfg;
/* message to be displayed after login */
struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
-/* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
-void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
-void demote_sensitive_data(void);
-static void do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *);
-
static char *listener_proctitle;
/*
errno = save_errno;
}
-/*
- * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired.
- */
-static void
-grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
-{
- /*
- * Try to kill any processes that we have spawned, E.g. authorized
- * keys command helpers or privsep children.
- */
- if (getpgid(0) == getpid()) {
- ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN);
- kill(0, SIGTERM);
- }
-
- /* Log error and exit. */
- sigdie("Timeout before authentication for %s port %d",
- ssh_remote_ipaddr(the_active_state),
- ssh_remote_port(the_active_state));
-}
-
-/* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */
-void
-destroy_sensitive_data(void)
-{
- u_int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
- if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
- sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
- sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
- }
- if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) {
- sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]);
- sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
- }
- }
-}
-
-/* Demote private to public keys for network child */
-void
-demote_sensitive_data(void)
-{
- struct sshkey *tmp;
- u_int i;
- int r;
-
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
- if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
- if ((r = sshkey_from_private(
- sensitive_data.host_keys[i], &tmp)) != 0)
- fatal_r(r, "could not demote host %s key",
- sshkey_type(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]));
- sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
- sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
- }
- /* Certs do not need demotion */
- }
-}
-
-static void
-privsep_preauth_child(void)
-{
- gid_t gidset[1];
- struct passwd *pw;
-
- /* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */
- privsep_challenge_enable();
-
-#ifdef GSSAPI
- /* Cache supported mechanism OIDs for later use */
- ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
-#endif
-
- /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
- demote_sensitive_data();
-
- /* Demote the child */
- if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) {
- if ((pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL)
- fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
- SSH_PRIVSEP_USER);
- pw = pwcopy(pw); /* Ensure mutable */
- endpwent();
- freezero(pw->pw_passwd, strlen(pw->pw_passwd));
-
- /* Change our root directory */
- if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1)
- fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR,
- strerror(errno));
- if (chdir("/") == -1)
- fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));
-
- /*
- * Drop our privileges
- * NB. Can't use setusercontext() after chroot.
- */
- debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
- (u_int)pw->pw_gid);
- gidset[0] = pw->pw_gid;
- if (setgroups(1, gidset) == -1)
- fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- permanently_set_uid(pw);
- }
-}
-
-static int
-privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh)
-{
- int status, r;
- pid_t pid;
- struct ssh_sandbox *box = NULL;
-
- /* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */
- pmonitor = monitor_init();
- /* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */
- pmonitor->m_pkex = &ssh->kex;
-
- if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON)
- box = ssh_sandbox_init();
- pid = fork();
- if (pid == -1) {
- fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
- } else if (pid != 0) {
- debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid);
-
- pmonitor->m_pid = pid;
- if (have_agent) {
- r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock);
- if (r != 0) {
- error_r(r, "Could not get agent socket");
- have_agent = 0;
- }
- }
- if (box != NULL)
- ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(box, pid);
- monitor_child_preauth(ssh, pmonitor);
-
- /* Wait for the child's exit status */
- while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
- if (errno == EINTR)
- continue;
- pmonitor->m_pid = -1;
- fatal_f("waitpid: %s", strerror(errno));
- }
- privsep_is_preauth = 0;
- pmonitor->m_pid = -1;
- if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
- if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0)
- fatal_f("preauth child exited with status %d",
- WEXITSTATUS(status));
- } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status))
- fatal_f("preauth child terminated by signal %d",
- WTERMSIG(status));
- if (box != NULL)
- ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(box);
- return 1;
- } else {
- /* child */
- close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
- close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
-
- /* Arrange for logging to be sent to the monitor */
- set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
-
- privsep_preauth_child();
- setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
- if (box != NULL)
- ssh_sandbox_child(box);
-
- return 0;
- }
-}
-
-static void
-privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) {
- /* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */
- use_privsep = 0;
- goto skip;
- }
-
- /* New socket pair */
- monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
-
- pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
- if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
- fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
- else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {
- verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
- sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
- monitor_clear_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
- monitor_child_postauth(ssh, pmonitor);
-
- /* NEVERREACHED */
- exit(0);
- }
-
- /* child */
-
- close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
- pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
-
- /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
- demote_sensitive_data();
-
- /* Drop privileges */
- do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
-
- skip:
- /* It is safe now to apply the key state */
- monitor_apply_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
-
- /*
- * Tell the packet layer that authentication was successful, since
- * this information is not part of the key state.
- */
- ssh_packet_set_authenticated(ssh);
-}
-
-static void
-append_hostkey_type(struct sshbuf *b, const char *s)
-{
- int r;
-
- if (match_pattern_list(s, options.hostkeyalgorithms, 0) != 1) {
- debug3_f("%s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms", s);
- return;
- }
- if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s", sshbuf_len(b) > 0 ? "," : "", s)) != 0)
- fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
-}
-
-static char *
-list_hostkey_types(void)
-{
- struct sshbuf *b;
- struct sshkey *key;
- char *ret;
- u_int i;
-
- if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
- key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
- if (key == NULL)
- key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i];
- if (key == NULL)
- continue;
- switch (key->type) {
- case KEY_RSA:
- /* for RSA we also support SHA2 signatures */
- append_hostkey_type(b, "rsa-sha2-512");
- append_hostkey_type(b, "rsa-sha2-256");
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- case KEY_DSA:
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- case KEY_ED25519:
- case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
- case KEY_ED25519_SK:
- case KEY_XMSS:
- append_hostkey_type(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
- break;
- }
- /* If the private key has a cert peer, then list that too */
- key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i];
- if (key == NULL)
- continue;
- switch (key->type) {
- case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- /* for RSA we also support SHA2 signatures */
- append_hostkey_type(b,
- "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com");
- append_hostkey_type(b,
- "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com");
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
- case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
- case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
- case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
- case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
- append_hostkey_type(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
- break;
- }
- }
- if ((ret = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL)
- fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed");
- sshbuf_free(b);
- debug_f("%s", ret);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static struct sshkey *
-get_hostkey_by_type(int type, int nid, int need_private, struct ssh *ssh)
-{
- u_int i;
- struct sshkey *key;
-
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
- switch (type) {
- case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
- case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
- case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
- case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
- case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
- key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i];
- break;
- default:
- key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
- if (key == NULL && !need_private)
- key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i];
- break;
- }
- if (key == NULL || key->type != type)
- continue;
- switch (type) {
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
- case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
- case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
- if (key->ecdsa_nid != nid)
- continue;
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- default:
- return need_private ?
- sensitive_data.host_keys[i] : key;
- }
- }
- return NULL;
-}
-
-struct sshkey *
-get_hostkey_public_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
-{
- return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 0, ssh);
-}
-
-struct sshkey *
-get_hostkey_private_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
-{
- return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 1, ssh);
-}
-
-struct sshkey *
-get_hostkey_by_index(int ind)
-{
- if (ind < 0 || (u_int)ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
- return (NULL);
- return (sensitive_data.host_keys[ind]);
-}
-
-struct sshkey *
-get_hostkey_public_by_index(int ind, struct ssh *ssh)
-{
- if (ind < 0 || (u_int)ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
- return (NULL);
- return (sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[ind]);
-}
-
-int
-get_hostkey_index(struct sshkey *key, int compare, struct ssh *ssh)
-{
- u_int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
- if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
- if (key == sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] ||
- (compare && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] &&
- sshkey_equal(key,
- sensitive_data.host_certificates[i])))
- return (i);
- } else {
- if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i] ||
- (compare && sensitive_data.host_keys[i] &&
- sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_keys[i])))
- return (i);
- if (key == sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] ||
- (compare && sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] &&
- sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i])))
- return (i);
- }
- }
- return (-1);
-}
-
-/* Inform the client of all hostkeys */
-static void
-notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
-{
- struct sshbuf *buf;
- struct sshkey *key;
- u_int i, nkeys;
- int r;
- char *fp;
-
- /* Some clients cannot cope with the hostkeys message, skip those. */
- if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS)
- return;
-
- if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
- for (i = nkeys = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
- key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(i, ssh);
- if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC ||
- sshkey_is_cert(key))
- continue;
- fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
- SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
- debug3_f("key %d: %s %s", i, sshkey_ssh_name(key), fp);
- free(fp);
- if (nkeys == 0) {
- /*
- * Start building the request when we find the
- * first usable key.
- */
- if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "hostkeys-00@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0) /* want reply */
- sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: start request", __func__);
- }
- /* Append the key to the request */
- sshbuf_reset(buf);
- if ((r = sshkey_putb(key, buf)) != 0)
- fatal_fr(r, "couldn't put hostkey %d", i);
- if ((r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, buf)) != 0)
- sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: append key", __func__);
- nkeys++;
- }
- debug3_f("sent %u hostkeys", nkeys);
- if (nkeys == 0)
- fatal_f("no hostkeys");
- if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send", __func__);
- sshbuf_free(buf);
-}
-
/*
* returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise.
* dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability
exit(1);
}
+static struct sshbuf *
+pack_hostkeys(void)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *keybuf = NULL, *hostkeys = NULL;
+ int r;
+ u_int i;
+
+ if ((keybuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (hostkeys = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+
+ /* pack hostkeys into a string. Empty key slots get empty strings */
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ /* private key */
+ sshbuf_reset(keybuf);
+ if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i] != NULL &&
+ (r = sshkey_private_serialize(sensitive_data.host_keys[i],
+ keybuf)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "serialize hostkey private");
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(hostkeys, keybuf)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose hostkey private");
+ /* public key */
+ if (sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] != NULL) {
+ if ((r = sshkey_puts(sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i],
+ hostkeys)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose hostkey public");
+ } else {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(hostkeys, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose hostkey empty public");
+ }
+ /* cert */
+ if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] != NULL) {
+ if ((r = sshkey_puts(
+ sensitive_data.host_certificates[i],
+ hostkeys)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose host cert");
+ } else {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(hostkeys, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose host cert empty");
+ }
+ }
+
+ sshbuf_free(keybuf);
+ return hostkeys;
+}
+
static void
send_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf)
{
- struct sshbuf *m = NULL, *inc = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *m = NULL, *inc = NULL, *hostkeys = NULL;
struct include_item *item = NULL;
- int r;
+ int r, sz;
debug3_f("entering fd = %d config len %zu", fd,
sshbuf_len(conf));
- if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (inc = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (inc = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
/* pack includes into a string */
fatal_fr(r, "compose includes");
}
+ hostkeys = pack_hostkeys();
+
/*
* Protocol from reexec master to child:
* string configuration
+ * uint64 timing_secret
+ * string host_keys[] {
+ * string private_key
+ * string public_key
+ * string certificate
+ * }
* string included_files[] {
* string selector
* string filename
* }
*/
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, conf)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, options.timing_secret)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, hostkeys)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, inc)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "compose config");
+
+ /* We need to fit the entire message inside the socket send buffer */
+ sz = ROUNDUP(sshbuf_len(m) + 5, 16*1024);
+ if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDBUF, &sz, sizeof sz) == -1)
+ fatal_f("setsockopt SO_SNDBUF: %s", strerror(errno));
+
if (ssh_msg_send(fd, 0, m) == -1)
error_f("ssh_msg_send failed");
sshbuf_free(m);
sshbuf_free(inc);
+ sshbuf_free(hostkeys);
debug3_f("done");
}
-static void
-recv_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf)
-{
- struct sshbuf *m, *inc;
- u_char *cp, ver;
- size_t len;
- int r;
- struct include_item *item;
-
- debug3_f("entering fd = %d", fd);
-
- if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (inc = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
- if (ssh_msg_recv(fd, m) == -1)
- fatal_f("ssh_msg_recv failed");
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &ver)) != 0)
- fatal_fr(r, "parse version");
- if (ver != 0)
- fatal_f("rexec version mismatch");
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &cp, &len)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, inc)) != 0)
- fatal_fr(r, "parse config");
-
- if (conf != NULL && (r = sshbuf_put(conf, cp, len)))
- fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put");
-
- while (sshbuf_len(inc) != 0) {
- item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item));
- if ((item->contents = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(inc, &item->selector, NULL)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(inc, &item->filename, NULL)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(inc, item->contents)) != 0)
- fatal_fr(r, "parse includes");
- TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&includes, item, entry);
- }
-
- free(cp);
- sshbuf_free(m);
-
- debug3_f("done");
-}
-
-/* Accept a connection from inetd */
-static void
-server_accept_inetd(int *sock_in, int *sock_out)
-{
- if (rexeced_flag) {
- close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
- *sock_in = *sock_out = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
- } else {
- *sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
- *sock_out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
- }
- /*
- * We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2
- * as our code for setting the descriptors won't work if
- * ttyfd happens to be one of those.
- */
- if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, !log_stderr) == -1)
- error_f("stdfd_devnull failed");
- debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", *sock_in, *sock_out);
-}
-
/*
* Listen for TCP connections
*/
* from this function are in a forked subprocess.
*/
static void
-server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
+server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s,
+ int log_stderr)
{
struct pollfd *pfd = NULL;
int i, j, ret, npfd;
continue;
}
- if (rexec_flag && socketpair(AF_UNIX,
+ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX,
SOCK_STREAM, 0, config_s) == -1) {
error("reexec socketpair: %s",
strerror(errno));
close(startup_p[1]);
startup_pipe = -1;
pid = getpid();
- if (rexec_flag) {
- send_rexec_state(config_s[0], cfg);
- close(config_s[0]);
- }
+ send_rexec_state(config_s[0], cfg);
+ close(config_s[0]);
free(pfd);
return;
}
options.log_level,
options.log_facility,
log_stderr);
- if (rexec_flag)
- close(config_s[0]);
- else {
- /*
- * Signal parent that the preliminaries
- * for this child are complete. For the
- * re-exec case, this happens after the
- * child has received the rexec state
- * from the server.
- */
- (void)atomicio(vwrite, startup_pipe,
- "\0", 1);
- }
+ close(config_s[0]);
free(pfd);
return;
}
close(startup_p[1]);
- if (rexec_flag) {
- close(config_s[1]);
- send_rexec_state(config_s[0], cfg);
- close(config_s[0]);
- }
+ close(config_s[1]);
+ send_rexec_state(config_s[0], cfg);
+ close(config_s[0]);
close(*newsock);
}
}
}
-/*
- * If IP options are supported, make sure there are none (log and
- * return an error if any are found). Basically we are worried about
- * source routing; it can be used to pretend you are somebody
- * (ip-address) you are not. That itself may be "almost acceptable"
- * under certain circumstances, but rhosts authentication is useless
- * if source routing is accepted. Notice also that if we just dropped
- * source routing here, the other side could use IP spoofing to do
- * rest of the interaction and could still bypass security. So we
- * exit here if we detect any IP options.
- */
-static void
-check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
-{
- int sock_in = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh);
- struct sockaddr_storage from;
- u_char opts[200];
- socklen_t i, option_size = sizeof(opts), fromlen = sizeof(from);
- char text[sizeof(opts) * 3 + 1];
-
- memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
- if (getpeername(sock_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from,
- &fromlen) == -1)
- return;
- if (from.ss_family != AF_INET)
- return;
- /* XXX IPv6 options? */
-
- if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts,
- &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
- text[0] = '\0';
- for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
- snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
- " %2.2x", opts[i]);
- fatal("Connection from %.100s port %d with IP opts: %.800s",
- ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), text);
- }
- return;
-}
-
-/* Set the routing domain for this process */
-static void
-set_process_rdomain(struct ssh *ssh, const char *name)
-{
- int rtable, ortable = getrtable();
- const char *errstr;
-
- if (name == NULL)
- return; /* default */
-
- if (strcmp(name, "%D") == 0) {
- /* "expands" to routing domain of connection */
- if ((name = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh)) == NULL)
- return;
- }
-
- rtable = (int)strtonum(name, 0, 255, &errstr);
- if (errstr != NULL) /* Shouldn't happen */
- fatal("Invalid routing domain \"%s\": %s", name, errstr);
- if (rtable != ortable && setrtable(rtable) != 0)
- fatal("Unable to set routing domain %d: %s",
- rtable, strerror(errno));
- debug_f("set routing domain %d (was %d)", rtable, ortable);
-}
-
static void
accumulate_host_timing_secret(struct sshbuf *server_cfg,
struct sshkey *key)
}
static void
-print_config(struct ssh *ssh, struct connection_info *connection_info)
+print_config(struct connection_info *connection_info)
{
- /*
- * If no connection info was provided by -C then use
- * use a blank one that will cause no predicate to match.
- */
- if (connection_info == NULL)
- connection_info = get_connection_info(ssh, 0, 0);
connection_info->test = 1;
parse_server_match_config(&options, &includes, connection_info);
dump_config(&options);
int
main(int ac, char **av)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
extern char *optarg;
extern int optind;
- int r, opt, on = 1, do_dump_cfg = 0, already_daemon, remote_port;
- int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, newsock = -1;
- const char *remote_ip, *rdomain;
- char *fp, *line, *laddr, *logfile = NULL;
- int config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 };
+ int log_stderr = 0, inetd_flag = 0, test_flag = 0, no_daemon_flag = 0;
+ char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
+ int r, opt, do_dump_cfg = 0, keytype, already_daemon, have_agent = 0;
+ int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, newsock = -1, rexec_argc = 0;
+ int config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 }, have_connection_info = 0;
+ char *fp, *line, *logfile = NULL, **rexec_argv = NULL;
+ struct stat sb;
u_int i, j;
- u_int64_t ibytes, obytes;
mode_t new_umask;
struct sshkey *key;
struct sshkey *pubkey;
- int keytype;
- Authctxt *authctxt;
- struct connection_info *connection_info = NULL;
+ struct connection_info connection_info;
sigset_t sigmask;
+ memset(&connection_info, 0, sizeof(connection_info));
+
sigemptyset(&sigmask);
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &sigmask, NULL);
inetd_flag = 1;
break;
case 'r':
- rexec_flag = 0;
+ /* ignored */
break;
case 'R':
- rexeced_flag = 1;
- inetd_flag = 1;
+ fatal("-R not supported here");
break;
case 'Q':
/* ignored */
test_flag = 2;
break;
case 'C':
- connection_info = get_connection_info(ssh, 0, 0);
- if (parse_server_match_testspec(connection_info,
+ if (parse_server_match_testspec(&connection_info,
optarg) == -1)
exit(1);
+ have_connection_info = 1;
break;
case 'u':
utmp_len = (u_int)strtonum(optarg, 0, HOST_NAME_MAX+1+1, NULL);
break;
}
}
- if (rexeced_flag || inetd_flag)
- rexec_flag = 0;
- if (!test_flag && !do_dump_cfg && rexec_flag && !path_absolute(av[0]))
- fatal("sshd re-exec requires execution with an absolute path");
- if (rexeced_flag)
- closefrom(REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD);
- else
- closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD);
+ if (!test_flag && !do_dump_cfg && !path_absolute(av[0]))
+ fatal("sshd requires execution with an absolute path");
+ closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD);
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
#endif
/* If requested, redirect the logs to the specified logfile. */
- if (logfile != NULL)
- log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile);
+ if (logfile != NULL) {
+ char *cp, pid_s[32];
+
+ snprintf(pid_s, sizeof(pid_s), "%ld", (unsigned long)getpid());
+ cp = percent_expand(logfile,
+ "p", pid_s,
+ "P", "sshd",
+ (char *)NULL);
+ log_redirect_stderr_to(cp);
+ free(cp);
+ }
+
/*
* Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host
* key (unless started from inetd)
* If we're not doing an extended test do not silently ignore connection
* test params.
*/
- if (test_flag < 2 && connection_info != NULL)
+ if (test_flag < 2 && have_connection_info)
fatal("Config test connection parameter (-C) provided without "
"test mode (-T)");
/* Fetch our configuration */
if ((cfg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
- if (rexeced_flag) {
- setproctitle("%s", "[rexeced]");
- recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, cfg);
- if (!debug_flag) {
- startup_pipe = dup(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
- close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
- /*
- * Signal parent that this child is at a point where
- * they can go away if they have a SIGHUP pending.
- */
- (void)atomicio(vwrite, startup_pipe, "\0", 1);
- }
- } else if (strcasecmp(config_file_name, "none") != 0)
+ fatal("sshbuf_new config failed");
+ if (strcasecmp(config_file_name, "none") != 0)
load_server_config(config_file_name, cfg);
- parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
- cfg, &includes, NULL, rexeced_flag);
-
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- if (options.moduli_file != NULL)
- dh_set_moduli_file(options.moduli_file);
-#endif
+ parse_server_config(&options, config_file_name, cfg,
+ &includes, NULL, 0);
/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
fill_default_server_options(&options);
/*
* Check whether there is any path through configured auth methods.
* Unfortunately it is not possible to verify this generally before
- * daemonisation in the presence of Match block, but this catches
+ * daemonisation in the presence of Match blocks, but this catches
* and warns for trivial misconfigurations that could break login.
*/
if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
debug("sshd version %s, %s", SSH_VERSION, SSH_OPENSSL_VERSION);
if (do_dump_cfg)
- print_config(ssh, connection_info);
+ print_config(&connection_info);
/* load host keys */
sensitive_data.host_keys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files,
sshkey_type(key));
}
- if (use_privsep) {
- struct stat st;
-
- if (getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER) == NULL)
- fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
- SSH_PRIVSEP_USER);
- endpwent();
- if ((stat(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, &st) == -1) ||
- (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) == 0))
- fatal("Missing privilege separation directory: %s",
- _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
- if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0)
- fatal("%s must be owned by root and not group or "
- "world-writable.", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
- }
+ /* Ensure privsep directory is correctly configured. */
+ if (getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER) == NULL)
+ fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
+ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER);
+ endpwent();
+ if ((stat(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, &sb) == -1) ||
+ (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode) == 0))
+ fatal("Missing privilege separation directory: %s",
+ _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
+ if (sb.st_uid != 0 || (sb.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s must be owned by root and not group or "
+ "world-writable.", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
if (test_flag > 1)
- print_config(ssh, connection_info);
+ print_config(&connection_info);
/* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */
if (test_flag)
exit(0);
- if (rexec_flag) {
- if (rexec_argc < 0)
- fatal("rexec_argc %d < 0", rexec_argc);
- rexec_argv = xcalloc(rexec_argc + 2, sizeof(char *));
- for (i = 0; i < (u_int)rexec_argc; i++) {
- debug("rexec_argv[%d]='%s'", i, saved_argv[i]);
- rexec_argv[i] = saved_argv[i];
- }
- rexec_argv[rexec_argc] = "-R";
- rexec_argv[rexec_argc + 1] = NULL;
+ /* Prepare arguments for sshd-session */
+ if (rexec_argc < 0)
+ fatal("rexec_argc %d < 0", rexec_argc);
+ rexec_argv = xcalloc(rexec_argc + 3, sizeof(char *));
+ /* Point to the sshd-session binary instead of sshd */
+ rexec_argv[0] = options.sshd_session_path;
+ for (i = 1; i < (u_int)rexec_argc; i++) {
+ debug("rexec_argv[%d]='%s'", i, saved_argv[i]);
+ rexec_argv[i] = saved_argv[i];
}
+ rexec_argv[rexec_argc++] = "-R";
+ rexec_argv[rexec_argc] = NULL;
+ if (stat(rexec_argv[0], &sb) != 0 || !(sb.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR)))
+ fatal("%s does not exist or is not executable", rexec_argv[0]);
+ debug3("using %s for re-exec", rexec_argv[0]);
+
listener_proctitle = prepare_proctitle(ac, av);
/* Ensure that umask disallows at least group and world write */
(void) umask(new_umask);
/* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */
- if (debug_flag && (!inetd_flag || rexeced_flag))
+ if (debug_flag && !inetd_flag)
log_stderr = 1;
log_init(__progname, options.log_level,
options.log_facility, log_stderr);
/* Get a connection, either from inetd or a listening TCP socket */
if (inetd_flag) {
- server_accept_inetd(&sock_in, &sock_out);
+ /* Send configuration to ancestor sshd-session process */
+ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, config_s) == -1)
+ fatal("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno));
+ send_rexec_state(config_s[0], cfg);
+ close(config_s[0]);
} else {
server_listen();
/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
- &newsock, config_s);
+ &newsock, config_s, log_stderr);
}
/* This is the child processing a new connection. */
if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag && setsid() == -1)
error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- if (rexec_flag) {
- debug("rexec start in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d",
- sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]);
+ debug("rexec start in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d/%d",
+ sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0], config_s[1]);
+ if (!inetd_flag) {
if (dup2(newsock, STDIN_FILENO) == -1)
- debug3_f("dup2 stdin: %s", strerror(errno));
+ debug3("dup2 stdin: %s", strerror(errno));
if (dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)
- debug3_f("dup2 stdout: %s", strerror(errno));
- if (startup_pipe == -1)
- close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
- else if (startup_pipe != REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD) {
- if (dup2(startup_pipe, REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD) == -1)
- debug3_f("dup2 startup_p: %s", strerror(errno));
- close(startup_pipe);
- startup_pipe = REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD;
- }
-
+ debug3("dup2 stdout: %s", strerror(errno));
+ }
+ if (config_s[1] != REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD) {
if (dup2(config_s[1], REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD) == -1)
- debug3_f("dup2 config_s: %s", strerror(errno));
+ debug3("dup2 config_s: %s", strerror(errno));
close(config_s[1]);
-
- ssh_signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* avoid reset to SIG_DFL */
- execv(rexec_argv[0], rexec_argv);
-
- /* Reexec has failed, fall back and continue */
- error("rexec of %s failed: %s", rexec_argv[0], strerror(errno));
- recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, NULL);
- log_init(__progname, options.log_level,
- options.log_facility, log_stderr);
-
- /* Clean up fds */
- close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
- newsock = sock_out = sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
- if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, 0) == -1)
- error_f("stdfd_devnull failed");
- debug("rexec cleanup in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d",
- sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]);
- }
-
- /* Executed child processes don't need these. */
- fcntl(sock_out, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
- fcntl(sock_in, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
-
- /* We will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense. */
- ssh_signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
- ssh_signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
- ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
- ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
- ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
-
- /*
- * Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do
- * not have a key.
- */
- if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, sock_in, sock_out)) == NULL)
- fatal("Unable to create connection");
- the_active_state = ssh;
- ssh_packet_set_server(ssh);
-
- check_ip_options(ssh);
-
- /* Prepare the channels layer */
- channel_init_channels(ssh);
- channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family);
- process_channel_timeouts(ssh, &options);
- process_permitopen(ssh, &options);
-
- /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
- if (options.tcp_keep_alive && ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) &&
- setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
- error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-
- if ((remote_port = ssh_remote_port(ssh)) < 0) {
- debug("ssh_remote_port failed");
- cleanup_exit(255);
- }
-
- /*
- * The rest of the code depends on the fact that
- * ssh_remote_ipaddr() caches the remote ip, even if
- * the socket goes away.
- */
- remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
-
- rdomain = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh);
-
- /* Log the connection. */
- laddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock_in);
- verbose("Connection from %s port %d on %s port %d%s%s%s",
- remote_ip, remote_port, laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh),
- rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain \"",
- rdomain == NULL ? "" : rdomain,
- rdomain == NULL ? "" : "\"");
- free(laddr);
-
- /*
- * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
- * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
- * cleared after successful authentication. A limit of zero
- * indicates no limit. Note that we don't set the alarm in debugging
- * mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you
- * are about to discover the bug.
- */
- ssh_signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler);
- if (!debug_flag)
- alarm(options.login_grace_time);
-
- if ((r = kex_exchange_identification(ssh, -1,
- options.version_addendum)) != 0)
- sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "banner exchange");
-
- ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(ssh);
-
- /* allocate authentication context */
- authctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*authctxt));
- ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
-
- /* XXX global for cleanup, access from other modules */
- the_authctxt = authctxt;
-
- /* Set default key authentication options */
- if ((auth_opts = sshauthopt_new_with_keys_defaults()) == NULL)
- fatal("allocation failed");
-
- /* prepare buffer to collect messages to display to user after login */
- if ((loginmsg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
- auth_debug_reset();
-
- if (use_privsep) {
- if (privsep_preauth(ssh) == 1)
- goto authenticated;
- } else if (have_agent) {
- if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock)) != 0) {
- error_r(r, "Unable to get agent socket");
- have_agent = 0;
- }
}
-
- /* perform the key exchange */
- /* authenticate user and start session */
- do_ssh2_kex(ssh);
- do_authentication2(ssh);
-
- /*
- * If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers
- * the current keystate and exits
- */
- if (use_privsep) {
- mm_send_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
- ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
- exit(0);
- }
-
- authenticated:
- /*
- * Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for
- * authentication.
- */
- alarm(0);
- ssh_signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
- authctxt->authenticated = 1;
- if (startup_pipe != -1) {
+ if (startup_pipe == -1)
+ close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
+ else if (startup_pipe != REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD) {
+ if (dup2(startup_pipe, REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD) == -1)
+ debug3("dup2 startup_p: %s", strerror(errno));
close(startup_pipe);
- startup_pipe = -1;
- }
-
- if (options.routing_domain != NULL)
- set_process_rdomain(ssh, options.routing_domain);
-
- /*
- * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare
- * file descriptor passing.
- */
- if (use_privsep) {
- privsep_postauth(ssh, authctxt);
- /* the monitor process [priv] will not return */
- }
-
- ssh_packet_set_timeout(ssh, options.client_alive_interval,
- options.client_alive_count_max);
-
- /* Try to send all our hostkeys to the client */
- notify_hostkeys(ssh);
-
- /* Start session. */
- do_authenticated(ssh, authctxt);
-
- /* The connection has been terminated. */
- ssh_packet_get_bytes(ssh, &ibytes, &obytes);
- verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes",
- (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes);
-
- verbose("Closing connection to %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
- ssh_packet_close(ssh);
-
- if (use_privsep)
- mm_terminate();
-
- exit(0);
-}
-
-int
-sshd_hostkey_sign(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *privkey,
- struct sshkey *pubkey, u_char **signature, size_t *slenp,
- const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg)
-{
- int r;
-
- if (use_privsep) {
- if (privkey) {
- if (mm_sshkey_sign(ssh, privkey, signature, slenp,
- data, dlen, alg, options.sk_provider, NULL,
- ssh->compat) < 0)
- fatal_f("privkey sign failed");
- } else {
- if (mm_sshkey_sign(ssh, pubkey, signature, slenp,
- data, dlen, alg, options.sk_provider, NULL,
- ssh->compat) < 0)
- fatal_f("pubkey sign failed");
- }
- } else {
- if (privkey) {
- if (sshkey_sign(privkey, signature, slenp, data, dlen,
- alg, options.sk_provider, NULL, ssh->compat) < 0)
- fatal_f("privkey sign failed");
- } else {
- if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, pubkey,
- signature, slenp, data, dlen, alg,
- ssh->compat)) != 0) {
- fatal_fr(r, "agent sign failed");
- }
- }
}
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* SSH2 key exchange */
-static void
-do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
-{
- char *hkalgs = NULL, *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX];
- const char *compression = NULL;
- struct kex *kex;
- int r;
- if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
- ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit,
- options.rekey_interval);
+ ssh_signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* avoid reset to SIG_DFL */
+ execv(rexec_argv[0], rexec_argv);
- if (options.compression == COMP_NONE)
- compression = "none";
- hkalgs = list_hostkey_types();
-
- kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal, options.kex_algorithms,
- options.ciphers, options.macs, compression, hkalgs);
-
- free(hkalgs);
-
- /* start key exchange */
- if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)
- fatal_r(r, "kex_setup");
- kex_set_server_sig_algs(ssh, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
- kex = ssh->kex;
-
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
-#endif
- kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
- kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
- kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
- kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
- kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
-
- ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done);
- kex_proposal_free_entries(myproposal);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
- if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "markus")) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
- (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal_fr(r, "send test");
-#endif
- debug("KEX done");
+ fatal("rexec of %s failed: %s", rexec_argv[0], strerror(errno));
}
/* server specific fatal cleanup */
void
cleanup_exit(int i)
{
- if (the_active_state != NULL && the_authctxt != NULL) {
- do_cleanup(the_active_state, the_authctxt);
- if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth &&
- pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) {
- debug("Killing privsep child %d", pmonitor->m_pid);
- if (kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGKILL) != 0 &&
- errno != ESRCH) {
- error_f("kill(%d): %s", pmonitor->m_pid,
- strerror(errno));
- }
- }
- }
_exit(i);
}
-# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.110 2024/04/01 15:48:16 deraadt Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.111 2024/05/17 00:30:24 djm Exp $
.PATH: ${.CURDIR}/..
-SRCS= sshd.c auth-rhosts.c auth-passwd.c sshpty.c sshlogin.c servconf.c \
- serverloop.c auth.c auth2.c auth-options.c session.c auth2-chall.c \
- groupaccess.c auth-bsdauth.c auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c \
- auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c auth2-pubkey.c auth2-pubkeyfile.c \
- monitor.c monitor_wrap.c \
- sftp-server.c sftp-common.c sftp-realpath.c sandbox-pledge.c srclimit.c
-SRCS+= authfd.c compat.c dns.c fatal.c hostfile.c readpass.c utf8.c uidswap.c
-SRCS+= ${SRCS_BASE} ${SRCS_KEX} ${SRCS_KEXS} ${SRCS_KEY} ${SRCS_KEYP} \
- ${SRCS_KRL} ${SRCS_PROT} ${SRCS_PKT} ${SRCS_UTL} ${SRCS_PKCS11} \
- ${SRCS_SK_CLIENT}
+SRCS= sshd.c servconf.c sshpty.c srclimit.c groupaccess.c auth2-methods.c
+SRCS+= dns.c fatal.c compat.c utf8.c authfd.c canohost.c kex-names.c
+SRCS+= ${SRCS_BASE} ${SRCS_KEY} ${SRCS_KEYP} ${SRCS_KRL} \
+ ${SRCS_MAC} ${SRCS_UTL} ${SRCS_SK_CLIENT}
PROG= sshd
BINMODE=511
# The random relink kit, used on OpenBSD by /etc/rc
-CLEANFILES+= sshd.tar install.sh
+CLEANFILES+= ${PROG}.tar install.sh
install.sh: Makefile
echo "set -o errexit" > $@
projects / openbsd / commitdiff