add a RequiredRSASize for checking RSA key length in ssh(1).

User authentication keys that fall beneath this limit will be
ignored. If a host presents a host key beneath this limit then
the connection will be terminated (unfortunately there are no
fallbacks in the protocol for host authentication).

feedback deraadt, Dmitry Belyavskiy; ok markus@

diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/readconf.c b/usr.bin/ssh/readconf.c
index 5b5afa8..ffca590 100644 (file)
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/readconf.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/readconf.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.368 2022/06/03 04:30:47 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.369 2022/09/17 10:33:18 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ typedef enum {
        oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys,
        oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms,
        oPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, oCASignatureAlgorithms, oProxyJump,
-       oSecurityKeyProvider, oKnownHostsCommand,
+       oSecurityKeyProvider, oKnownHostsCommand, oRequiredRSASize,
        oIgnore, oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported
 } OpCodes;
 
@@ -306,6 +306,7 @@ static struct {
        { "proxyjump", oProxyJump },
        { "securitykeyprovider", oSecurityKeyProvider },
        { "knownhostscommand", oKnownHostsCommand },
+       { "requiredrsasize", oRequiredRSASize },
 
        { NULL, oBadOption }
 };
@@ -2162,6 +2163,10 @@ parse_pubkey_algos:
                        *charptr = xstrdup(arg);
                break;
 
+       case oRequiredRSASize:
+               intptr = &options->required_rsa_size;
+               goto parse_int;
+
        case oDeprecated:
                debug("%s line %d: Deprecated option \"%s\"",
                    filename, linenum, keyword);
@@ -2409,6 +2414,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
        options->hostbased_accepted_algos = NULL;
        options->pubkey_accepted_algos = NULL;
        options->known_hosts_command = NULL;
+       options->required_rsa_size = -1;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -2598,6 +2604,8 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
                options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
        if (options->sk_provider == NULL)
                options->sk_provider = xstrdup("internal");
+       if (options->required_rsa_size == -1)
+               options->required_rsa_size = SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE;
 
        /* Expand KEX name lists */
        all_cipher = cipher_alg_list(',', 0);
@@ -3287,6 +3295,7 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host)
        dump_cfg_int(oNumberOfPasswordPrompts, o->number_of_password_prompts);
        dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveCountMax, o->server_alive_count_max);
        dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveInterval, o->server_alive_interval);
+       dump_cfg_int(oRequiredRSASize, o->required_rsa_size);
 
        /* String options */
        dump_cfg_string(oBindAddress, o->bind_address);

diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/readconf.h b/usr.bin/ssh/readconf.h
index f647bd4..ffb5ec4 100644 (file)
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/readconf.h
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/readconf.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.147 2022/06/03 04:30:47 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.148 2022/09/17 10:33:18 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -176,6 +176,8 @@ typedef struct {
 
        char   *known_hosts_command;
 
+       int     required_rsa_size;      /* minimum size of RSA keys */
+
        char    *ignored_unknown; /* Pattern list of unknown tokens to ignore */
 }       Options;
 

diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/ssh.1 b/usr.bin/ssh/ssh.1
index b4956ae..e255b9b 100644 (file)
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/ssh.1
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/ssh.1
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.431 2022/05/28 05:57:56 jmc Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: May 28 2022 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.432 2022/09/17 10:33:18 djm Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: September 17 2022 $
 .Dt SSH 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -571,6 +571,7 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
 .It RemoteCommand
 .It RemoteForward
 .It RequestTTY
+.It RequiredRSASize
 .It SendEnv
 .It ServerAliveInterval
 .It ServerAliveCountMax

diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/ssh.c b/usr.bin/ssh/ssh.c
index a926cc0..9fe9fb9 100644 (file)
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/ssh.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/ssh.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.575 2022/07/01 00:36:30 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.576 2022/09/17 10:33:18 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -500,14 +500,22 @@ resolve_canonicalize(char **hostp, int port)
 }
 
 /*
- * Check the result of hostkey loading, ignoring some errors and
- * fatal()ing for others.
+ * Check the result of hostkey loading, ignoring some errors and either
+ * discarding the key or fatal()ing for others.
  */
 static void
-check_load(int r, const char *path, const char *message)
+check_load(int r, struct sshkey **k, const char *path, const char *message)
 {
        switch (r) {
        case 0:
+               /* Check RSA keys size and discard if undersized */
+               if (k != NULL && *k != NULL &&
+                   (r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(*k,
+                   options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
+                       error_r(r, "load %s \"%s\"", message, path);
+                       free(*k);
+                       *k = NULL;
+               }
                break;
        case SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR:
        case SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL:
@@ -1557,7 +1565,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
        if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \
                fatal_f("pubkey out of array bounds"); \
        check_load(sshkey_load_public(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), NULL), \
-           p, "pubkey"); \
+           &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), p, "pubkey"); \
        if (sensitive_data.keys[o] != NULL) \
                debug2("hostbased key %d: %s key from \"%s\"", o, \
                    sshkey_ssh_name(sensitive_data.keys[o]), p); \
@@ -1565,7 +1573,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 #define L_CERT(p,o) do { \
        if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \
                fatal_f("cert out of array bounds"); \
-       check_load(sshkey_load_cert(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o])), p, "cert"); \
+       check_load(sshkey_load_cert(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o])), \
+           &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), p, "cert"); \
        if (sensitive_data.keys[o] != NULL) \
                debug2("hostbased key %d: %s cert from \"%s\"", o, \
                    sshkey_ssh_name(sensitive_data.keys[o]), p); \
@@ -2244,7 +2253,7 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
                filename = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp, cinfo);
                free(cp);
                check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL),
-                   filename, "pubkey");
+                   &public, filename, "pubkey");
                debug("identity file %s type %d", filename,
                    public ? public->type : -1);
                free(options.identity_files[i]);
@@ -2263,7 +2272,7 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
                        continue;
                xasprintf(&cp, "%s-cert", filename);
                check_load(sshkey_load_public(cp, &public, NULL),
-                   filename, "pubkey");
+                   &public, filename, "pubkey");
                debug("identity file %s type %d", cp,
                    public ? public->type : -1);
                if (public == NULL) {
@@ -2294,7 +2303,7 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
                free(cp);
 
                check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL),
-                   filename, "certificate");
+                   &public, filename, "certificate");
                debug("certificate file %s type %d", filename,
                    public ? public->type : -1);
                free(options.certificate_files[i]);

diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/ssh_config.5 b/usr.bin/ssh/ssh_config.5
index 10c8d61..2a0f1e1 100644 (file)
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/ssh_config.5
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/ssh_config.5
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.373 2022/06/24 04:27:14 djm Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: June 24 2022 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.374 2022/09/17 10:33:18 djm Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: September 17 2022 $
 .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -1635,6 +1635,17 @@ and
 .Fl T
 flags for
 .Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Cm RequiredRSASize
+Specifies the minimum RSA key size (in bits) that
+.Xr ssh 1
+will accept.
+User authentication keys smaller than this limit will be ignored.
+Servers that present host keys smaller than this limit will cause the
+connection to be terminated.
+The default is
+.Cm 1024
+bits.
+Note that this limit may only be raised from the default.
 .It Cm RevokedHostKeys
 Specifies revoked host public keys.
 Keys listed in this file will be refused for host authentication.

diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/sshconnect2.c b/usr.bin/ssh/sshconnect2.c
index 56f3fe4..058ec7c 100644 (file)
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/sshconnect2.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.360 2022/08/19 06:07:47 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.361 2022/09/17 10:33:18 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -91,6 +91,11 @@ static const struct ssh_conn_info *xxx_conn_info;
 static int
 verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh)
 {
+       int r;
+
+       if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(hostkey,
+           options.required_rsa_size)) != 0)
+               fatal_r(r, "Bad server host key");
        if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey,
            xxx_conn_info) == -1)
                fatal("Host key verification failed.");
@@ -1599,6 +1604,13 @@ load_identity_file(Identity *id)
                        private = NULL;
                        quit = 1;
                }
+               if (!quit && (r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(private,
+                   options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
+                       debug_fr(r, "Skipping key %s", id->filename);
+                       sshkey_free(private);
+                       private = NULL;
+                       quit = 1;
+               }
                if (!quit && private != NULL && id->agent_fd == -1 &&
                    !(id->key && id->isprivate))
                        maybe_add_key_to_agent(id->filename, private, comment,
@@ -1745,6 +1757,12 @@ pubkey_prepare(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
        /* list of keys supported by the agent */
        if ((r = get_agent_identities(ssh, &agent_fd, &idlist)) == 0) {
                for (j = 0; j < idlist->nkeys; j++) {
+                       if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(idlist->keys[j],
+                           options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
+                               debug_fr(r, "ignoring %s agent key",
+                                   sshkey_ssh_name(idlist->keys[j]));
+                               continue;
+                       }
                        found = 0;
                        TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &files, next) {
                                /*