Check X509_digest() return in x509v3_cache_extensions()

On failure invalidate the cert with EXFLAG_INVALID. It's unlikely that
a cert would make it through to the end of this function without setting
the flag, but it's bad style anyway.

ok jsing

diff --git a/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_purp.c b/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_purp.c
index f2c4f1d..0c92dfb 100644 (file)
--- a/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_purp.c
+++ b/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_purp.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: x509_purp.c,v 1.28 2023/07/02 17:12:17 tb Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: x509_purp.c,v 1.29 2023/08/18 08:42:41 tb Exp $ */
 /* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
  * project 2001.
  */
@@ -550,7 +550,8 @@ x509v3_cache_extensions_internal(X509 *x)
        if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)
                return;
 
-       X509_digest(x, X509_CERT_HASH_EVP, x->hash, NULL);
+       if (!X509_digest(x, X509_CERT_HASH_EVP, x->hash, NULL))
+               x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
 
        version = X509_get_version(x);
        if (version < 0 || version > 2)