More fixing. Previous revert was incomplete.

diff --git a/usr.sbin/rpki-client/parser.c b/usr.sbin/rpki-client/parser.c
index 1ac396a..9f5d6a3 100644 (file)
--- a/usr.sbin/rpki-client/parser.c
+++ b/usr.sbin/rpki-client/parser.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*     $OpenBSD: parser.c,v 1.41 2022/01/18 16:24:55 claudio Exp $ */
+/*     $OpenBSD: parser.c,v 1.42 2022/01/18 16:29:06 claudio Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2019 Claudio Jeker <claudio@openbsd.org>
  * Copyright (c) 2019 Kristaps Dzonsons <kristaps@bsd.lv>
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ static struct crl_tree         crlt = RB_INITIALIZER(&crlt);
 struct parse_repo {
        RB_ENTRY(parse_repo)     entry;
        char                    *path;
+       char                    *validpath;
        unsigned int             id;
 };
 
@@ -72,20 +73,75 @@ repo_get(unsigned int id)
 }
 
 static void
-repo_add(unsigned int id, char *path)
+repo_add(unsigned int id, char *path, char *validpath)
 {
        struct parse_repo *rp;
 
-       if ((rp = malloc(sizeof(*rp))) == NULL)
+       if ((rp = calloc(1, sizeof(*rp))) == NULL)
                err(1, NULL);
        rp->id = id;
-       if ((rp->path = strdup(path)) == NULL)
-               err(1, NULL);
+       if (path != NULL)
+               if ((rp->path = strdup(path)) == NULL)
+                       err(1, NULL);
+       if (validpath != NULL)
+               if ((rp->validpath = strdup(validpath)) == NULL)
+                       err(1, NULL);
 
        if (RB_INSERT(repo_tree, &repos, rp) != NULL)
                errx(1, "repository already added: id %d, %s", id, path);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Build access path to file based on repoid, path and file values.
+ * If wantalt == 1 the function can return NULL, if wantalt == 0 it
+ * can not fail.
+ */
+static char *
+parse_filepath(unsigned int repoid, const char *path, const char *file,
+    int wantalt)
+{
+       struct parse_repo       *rp;
+       char                    *fn, *repopath;
+
+       /* build file path based on repoid, entity path and filename */
+       rp = repo_get(repoid);
+       if (rp == NULL) {
+               /* no repo so no alternative path. */
+               if (wantalt)
+                       return NULL;
+
+               if (path == NULL) {
+                       if ((fn = strdup(file)) == NULL)
+                               err(1, NULL);
+               } else {
+                       if (asprintf(&fn, "%s/%s", path, file) == -1)
+                               err(1, NULL);
+               }
+       } else {
+               if (wantalt || rp->path == NULL)
+                       repopath = rp->validpath;
+               else
+                       repopath = rp->path;
+
+               if (repopath == NULL)
+                       return NULL;
+
+               if (path == NULL) {
+                       if (asprintf(&fn, "%s/%s", repopath, file) == -1)
+                               err(1, NULL);
+               } else {
+                       if (asprintf(&fn, "%s/%s/%s", repopath, path,
+                           file) == -1)
+                               err(1, NULL);
+               }
+       }
+       return fn;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Callback for X509_verify_cert() to handle critical extensions in old
+ * LibreSSL libraries or OpenSSL libs without RFC3779 support.
+ */
 static int
 verify_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx)
 {
@@ -144,52 +200,74 @@ verify_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx)
 }
 
 /*
- * Parse and validate a ROA.
- * This is standard stuff.
- * Returns the roa on success, NULL on failure.
+ * Validate the X509 certificate.  If crl is NULL don't check CRL.
+ * Returns 1 for valid certificates, returns 0 if there is a verify error
  */
-static struct roa *
-proc_parser_roa(char *file, const unsigned char *der, size_t len)
+static int
+valid_x509(char *file, X509 *x509, struct auth *a, struct crl *crl)
 {
-       struct roa              *roa;
-       X509                    *x509;
-       int                      c;
-       struct auth             *a;
        STACK_OF(X509)          *chain;
-       STACK_OF(X509_CRL)      *crls;
-       struct crl              *crl;
-
-       if ((roa = roa_parse(&x509, file, der, len)) == NULL)
-               return NULL;
+       STACK_OF(X509_CRL)      *crls = NULL;
+       int                      c;
 
-       a = valid_ski_aki(file, &auths, roa->ski, roa->aki);
        build_chain(a, &chain);
-       crl = get_crl(a);
-       build_crls(crl, &crls);
+       if (crl != NULL)
+               build_crls(crl, &crls);
 
        assert(x509 != NULL);
        if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, NULL, x509, NULL))
                cryptoerrx("X509_STORE_CTX_init");
+
        X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, verify_cb);
        if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, file))
                cryptoerrx("X509_STORE_CTX_set_app_data");
-       X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
+       if (crl != NULL)
+               X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
        X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(ctx, MAX_CERT_DEPTH);
        X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(ctx, chain);
-       X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(ctx, crls);
+       if (crl != NULL)
+               X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(ctx, crls);
 
        if (X509_verify_cert(ctx) <= 0) {
                c = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+               warnx("%s: %s", file, X509_verify_cert_error_string(c));
                X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
-               if (verbose > 0 || c != X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL)
-                       warnx("%s: %s", file, X509_verify_cert_error_string(c));
-               X509_free(x509);
-               roa_free(roa);
                sk_X509_free(chain);
                sk_X509_CRL_free(crls);
-               return NULL;
+               return 0;
        }
+
        X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+       sk_X509_free(chain);
+       sk_X509_CRL_free(crls);
+       return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse and validate a ROA.
+ * This is standard stuff.
+ * Returns the roa on success, NULL on failure.
+ */
+static struct roa *
+proc_parser_roa(char *file, const unsigned char *der, size_t len)
+{
+       struct roa              *roa;
+       struct crl              *crl;
+       struct auth             *a;
+       X509                    *x509;
+
+       if ((roa = roa_parse(&x509, file, der, len)) == NULL)
+               return NULL;
+
+       a = valid_ski_aki(file, &auths, roa->ski, roa->aki);
+       crl = get_crl(a);
+
+       if (!valid_x509(file, x509, a, crl)) {
+               X509_free(x509);
+               roa_free(roa);
+               return NULL;
+       }
+       X509_free(x509);
 
        /*
         * Check CRL to figure out the soonest transitive expiry moment
@@ -214,10 +292,6 @@ proc_parser_roa(char *file, const unsigned char *der, size_t len)
        if (valid_roa(file, &auths, roa))
                roa->valid = 1;
 
-       sk_X509_free(chain);
-       sk_X509_CRL_free(crls);
-       X509_free(x509);
-
        return roa;
 }
 
@@ -229,13 +303,8 @@ int
 mft_check(const char *fn, struct mft *p)
 {
        size_t  i;
-       int     fd, rc = 1;
-       char    *cp, *h, *path = NULL;
-
-       /* Check hash of file now, but first build path for it */
-       cp = strrchr(fn, '/');
-       assert(cp != NULL);
-       assert(cp - fn < INT_MAX);
+       int     fd, try, rc = 1;
+       char    *h, *path;
 
        for (i = 0; i < p->filesz; i++) {
                const struct mftfile *m = &p->files[i];
@@ -246,15 +315,24 @@ mft_check(const char *fn, struct mft *p)
                        free(h);
                        continue;
                }
-               if (asprintf(&path, "%.*s/%s", (int)(cp - fn), fn,
-                   m->file) == -1)
-                       err(1, NULL);
-               fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
+
+               fd = -1;
+               try = 0;
+               path = NULL;
+               do {
+                       free(path);
+                       if ((path = parse_filepath(p->repoid, p->path, m->file,
+                           try++)) == NULL)
+                               break;
+                       fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
+               } while (fd == -1 && try < 2);
+
+               free(path);
+
                if (!valid_filehash(fd, m->hash, sizeof(m->hash))) {
                        warnx("%s: bad message digest for %s", fn, m->file);
                        rc = 0;
                }
-               free(path);
        }
 
        return rc;
@@ -276,49 +354,31 @@ proc_parser_mft(char *file, const unsigned char *der, size_t len,
 {
        struct mft              *mft;
        X509                    *x509;
-       int                      c;
        struct auth             *a;
-       STACK_OF(X509)          *chain;
 
        if ((mft = mft_parse(&x509, file, der, len)) == NULL)
                return NULL;
 
        a = valid_ski_aki(file, &auths, mft->ski, mft->aki);
-       build_chain(a, &chain);
-
-       if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, NULL, x509, NULL))
-               cryptoerrx("X509_STORE_CTX_init");
-
-       /* CRL checks disabled here because CRL is referenced from mft */
-       X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, verify_cb);
-       if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, file))
-               cryptoerrx("X509_STORE_CTX_set_app_data");
-       X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(ctx, MAX_CERT_DEPTH);
-       X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(ctx, chain);
 
-       if (X509_verify_cert(ctx) <= 0) {
-               c = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
-               X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
-               warnx("%s: %s", file, X509_verify_cert_error_string(c));
+       if (!valid_x509(file, x509, a, NULL)) {
                mft_free(mft);
                X509_free(x509);
-               sk_X509_free(chain);
                return NULL;
        }
-
-       X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
-       sk_X509_free(chain);
        X509_free(x509);
 
-       if (!mft_check(file, mft)) {
-               mft_free(mft);
-               return NULL;
-       }
-
+       mft->repoid = repoid;
        if (path != NULL)
                if ((mft->path = strdup(path)) == NULL)
                        err(1, NULL);
-       mft->repoid = repoid;
+
+       if (!mft->stale)
+               if (!mft_check(file, mft)) {
+                       mft_free(mft);
+                       return NULL;
+               }
+
        return mft;
 }
 
@@ -334,10 +394,8 @@ proc_parser_cert(char *file, const unsigned char *der, size_t len)
 {
        struct cert             *cert;
        X509                    *x509;
-       int                      c;
-       struct auth             *a = NULL;
-       STACK_OF(X509)          *chain;
-       STACK_OF(X509_CRL)      *crls;
+       struct auth             *a;
+       struct crl              *crl;
 
        /* Extract certificate data and X509. */
 
@@ -346,35 +404,13 @@ proc_parser_cert(char *file, const unsigned char *der, size_t len)
                return NULL;
 
        a = valid_ski_aki(file, &auths, cert->ski, cert->aki);
-       build_chain(a, &chain);
-       build_crls(get_crl(a), &crls);
-
-       assert(x509 != NULL);
-       if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, NULL, x509, NULL))
-               cryptoerrx("X509_STORE_CTX_init");
-
-       X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, verify_cb);
-       if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, file))
-               cryptoerrx("X509_STORE_CTX_set_app_data");
-       X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
-       X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(ctx, MAX_CERT_DEPTH);
-       X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(ctx, chain);
-       X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(ctx, crls);
+       crl = get_crl(a);
 
-       if (X509_verify_cert(ctx) <= 0) {
-               c = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
-               warnx("%s: %s", file, X509_verify_cert_error_string(c));
-               X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+       if (!valid_x509(file, x509, a, crl)) {
                cert_free(cert);
-               sk_X509_free(chain);
-               sk_X509_CRL_free(crls);
                X509_free(x509);
                return NULL;
        }
-
-       X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
-       sk_X509_free(chain);
-       sk_X509_CRL_free(crls);
        X509_free(x509);
 
        cert->talid = a->cert->talid;
@@ -535,39 +571,18 @@ proc_parser_gbr(char *file, const unsigned char *der, size_t len)
 {
        struct gbr              *gbr;
        X509                    *x509;
-       int                      c;
        struct auth             *a;
-       STACK_OF(X509)          *chain;
-       STACK_OF(X509_CRL)      *crls;
+       struct crl              *crl;
 
        if ((gbr = gbr_parse(&x509, file, der, len)) == NULL)
                return;
 
        a = valid_ski_aki(file, &auths, gbr->ski, gbr->aki);
+       crl = get_crl(a);
 
-       build_chain(a, &chain);
-       build_crls(get_crl(a), &crls);
-
-       assert(x509 != NULL);
-       if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, NULL, x509, NULL))
-               cryptoerrx("X509_STORE_CTX_init");
-       X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, verify_cb);
-       if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, file))
-               cryptoerrx("X509_STORE_CTX_set_app_data");
-       X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
-       X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(ctx, MAX_CERT_DEPTH);
-       X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(ctx, chain);
-       X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(ctx, crls);
-
-       if (X509_verify_cert(ctx) <= 0) {
-               c = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
-               if (verbose > 0 || c != X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL)
-                       warnx("%s: %s", file, X509_verify_cert_error_string(c));
-       }
+       /* return value can be ignored since nothing happens here */
+       valid_x509(file, x509, a, crl);
 
-       X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
-       sk_X509_free(chain);
-       sk_X509_CRL_free(crls);
        X509_free(x509);
        gbr_free(gbr);
 }
@@ -629,33 +644,40 @@ build_crls(const struct crl *crl, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) **crls)
 }
 
 static char *
-parse_filepath(struct entity *entp)
+parse_load_file(struct entity *entp, unsigned char **f, size_t *flen)
 {
-       struct parse_repo       *rp;
-       char                    *file;
+       char *file, *nfile;
 
-       /* build file path based on repoid, entity path and filename */
-       rp = repo_get(entp->repoid);
-       if (rp == NULL) {
-               if (entp->path == NULL) {
-                       if ((file = strdup(entp->file)) == NULL)
-                                       err(1, NULL);
-               } else {
-                       if (asprintf(&file, "%s/%s", entp->path,
-                           entp->file) == -1)
-                               err(1, NULL);
-               }
-       } else {
-               if (entp->path == NULL) {
-                       if (asprintf(&file, "%s/%s", rp->path,
-                           entp->file) == -1)
-                               err(1, NULL);
-               } else {
-                       if (asprintf(&file, "%s/%s/%s", rp->path,
-                           entp->path, entp->file) == -1)
-                               err(1, NULL);
-               }
+       file = parse_filepath(entp->repoid, entp->path, entp->file, 0);
+
+       /* TAL files include the data already */
+       if (entp->type == RTYPE_TAL) {
+               *f = NULL;
+               *flen = 0;
+               return file;
        }
+
+       *f = load_file(file, flen);
+       if (*f != NULL)
+               return file;
+
+       if (errno != ENOENT)
+               goto fail;
+
+       /* try alternate file location */
+       nfile = parse_filepath(entp->repoid, entp->path, entp->file, 1);
+       if (nfile == NULL)
+               goto fail;
+
+       free(file);
+       file = nfile;
+
+       *f = load_file(file, flen);
+       if (*f != NULL)
+               return file;
+
+fail:
+       warn("parse file %s", file);
        return file;
 }
 
@@ -678,20 +700,14 @@ parse_entity(struct entityq *q, struct msgbuf *msgq)
 
                /* handle RTYPE_REPO first */
                if (entp->type == RTYPE_REPO) {
-                       repo_add(entp->repoid, entp->path);
+                       repo_add(entp->repoid, entp->path, entp->file);
                        entity_free(entp);
                        continue;
                }
 
-               f = NULL;
-               file = parse_filepath(entp);
-               if (entp->type != RTYPE_TAL) {
-                       f = load_file(file, &flen);
-                       if (f == NULL)
-                               warn("%s", file);
-               }
+               file = parse_load_file(entp, &f, &flen);
 
-               /* pass back at least type and filename */
+               /* pass back at least type, repoid and filename */
                b = io_new_buffer();
                io_simple_buffer(b, &entp->type, sizeof(entp->type));
                io_str_buffer(b, file);
@@ -776,6 +792,7 @@ proc_parser(int fd)
        ERR_load_crypto_strings();
        OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers();
        OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
+       x509_init_oid();
 
        if ((ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new()) == NULL)
                cryptoerrx("X509_STORE_CTX_new");

diff --git a/usr.sbin/rpki-client/roa.c b/usr.sbin/rpki-client/roa.c
index 21cebd0..a67e6ff 100644 (file)
--- a/usr.sbin/rpki-client/roa.c
+++ b/usr.sbin/rpki-client/roa.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*     $OpenBSD: roa.c,v 1.36 2022/01/18 16:18:22 claudio Exp $ */
+/*     $OpenBSD: roa.c,v 1.37 2022/01/18 16:29:06 claudio Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2019 Kristaps Dzonsons <kristaps@bsd.lv>
  *
@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ roa_parse(X509 **x509, const char *fn, const unsigned char *der, size_t len)
        memset(&p, 0, sizeof(struct parse));
        p.fn = fn;
 
-       cms = cms_parse_validate(x509, fn, der, len, roa_oid, &cmsz, 0);
+       cms = cms_parse_validate(x509, fn, der, len, roa_oid, &cmsz);
        if (cms == NULL)
                return NULL;