(void) cast a snprintf() call that can't possibly truncate unless we

	suddenly supported a cipher with a name that's > 200 bytes long ...
	... in which case harmless truncation would occur and we'd have to
	readjust our buffer

diff --git a/usr.sbin/smtpd/ssl.c b/usr.sbin/smtpd/ssl.c
index 9c188cc..ad24e54 100644 (file)
--- a/usr.sbin/smtpd/ssl.c
+++ b/usr.sbin/smtpd/ssl.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*     $OpenBSD: ssl.c,v 1.60 2014/02/17 19:50:09 eric Exp $   */
+/*     $OpenBSD: ssl.c,v 1.61 2014/04/19 14:09:19 gilles Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2008 Pierre-Yves Ritschard <pyr@openbsd.org>
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ ssl_to_text(const SSL *ssl)
 {
        static char buf[256];
 
-       snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "version=%s, cipher=%s, bits=%d",
+       (void)snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "version=%s, cipher=%s, bits=%d",
            SSL_get_cipher_version(ssl),
            SSL_get_cipher_name(ssl),
            SSL_get_cipher_bits(ssl, NULL));