olen -> out_len

diff --git a/lib/libcrypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c b/lib/libcrypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c
index a0979b4..3bef26e 100644 (file)
--- a/lib/libcrypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c
+++ b/lib/libcrypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*     $OpenBSD: tls1_prf.c,v 1.22 2024/07/09 16:53:33 tb Exp $ */
+/*     $OpenBSD: tls1_prf.c,v 1.23 2024/07/09 16:54:13 tb Exp $ */
 /*
  * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
  * 2016.
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@
 static int tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md,
     const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len,
     const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
-    unsigned char *out, size_t olen);
+    unsigned char *out, size_t out_len);
 
 #define TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF 1024
 
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ static int
 tls1_prf_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md,
     const unsigned char *secret, size_t sec_len,
     const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
-    unsigned char *out, size_t olen)
+    unsigned char *out, size_t out_len)
 {
        int chunk;
        EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_tmp = NULL, *ctx_init = NULL;
@@ -286,24 +286,24 @@ tls1_prf_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md,
                        goto err;
                if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, A1, A1_len))
                        goto err;
-               if (olen > (size_t)chunk && !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx_tmp, ctx))
+               if (out_len > (size_t)chunk && !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx_tmp, ctx))
                        goto err;
                if (seed && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, seed, seed_len))
                        goto err;
 
-               if (olen > (size_t)chunk) {
+               if (out_len > (size_t)chunk) {
                        size_t mac_len;
                        if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, out, &mac_len))
                                goto err;
                        out += mac_len;
-                       olen -= mac_len;
+                       out_len -= mac_len;
            /* calc the next A1 value */
                        if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len))
                                goto err;
                } else {                /* last one */
                        if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, A1, &A1_len))
                                goto err;
-                       memcpy(out, A1, olen);
+                       memcpy(out, A1, out_len);
                        break;
                }
        }
@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ static int
 tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md,
     const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len,
     const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
-    unsigned char *out, size_t olen)
+    unsigned char *out, size_t out_len)
 {
 
        if (EVP_MD_type(md) == NID_md5_sha1) {
@@ -332,24 +332,24 @@ tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md,
                unsigned char *tmp;
                if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_md5(),
                    secret, secret_len/2 + (secret_len & 1),
-                   seed, seed_len, out, olen))
+                   seed, seed_len, out, out_len))
                        return 0;
 
-               if ((tmp = calloc(1, olen)) == NULL) {
+               if ((tmp = calloc(1, out_len)) == NULL) {
                        KDFerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                        return 0;
                }
                if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_sha1(), secret + secret_len/2,
-                   secret_len/2 + (secret_len & 1), seed, seed_len, tmp, olen)) {
-                       freezero(tmp, olen);
+                   secret_len/2 + (secret_len & 1), seed, seed_len, tmp, out_len)) {
+                       freezero(tmp, out_len);
                        return 0;
                }
-               for (i = 0; i < olen; i++)
+               for (i = 0; i < out_len; i++)
                        out[i] ^= tmp[i];
-               freezero(tmp, olen);
+               freezero(tmp, out_len);
                return 1;
        }
-       if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(md, secret, secret_len, seed, seed_len, out, olen))
+       if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(md, secret, secret_len, seed, seed_len, out, out_len))
                return 0;
 
        return 1;