Only allow zero length key shares when we know we're doing HRR.

ok inoguchi@ tb@

diff --git a/lib/libssl/ssl_tlsext.c b/lib/libssl/ssl_tlsext.c
index 3da8ebc..c97ade8 100644 (file)
--- a/lib/libssl/ssl_tlsext.c
+++ b/lib/libssl/ssl_tlsext.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssl_tlsext.c,v 1.101 2021/11/01 16:37:17 jsing Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssl_tlsext.c,v 1.102 2022/01/04 10:34:16 jsing Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2016, 2017, 2019 Joel Sing <jsing@openbsd.org>
  * Copyright (c) 2017 Doug Hogan <doug@openbsd.org>
@@ -1558,8 +1558,10 @@ tlsext_keyshare_client_parse(SSL *s, uint16_t msg_type, CBS *cbs, int *alert)
                goto err;
 
        if (CBS_len(cbs) == 0) {
-               /* HRR does not include an actual key share. */
-               /* XXX - we should know that we are in a HRR... */
+               /* HRR does not include an actual key share, only the group. */
+               if (msg_type != SSL_TLSEXT_MSG_HRR)
+                       return 0;
+
                S3I(s)->hs.tls13.server_group = group;
                return 1;
        }