Some dude named Tavis Ormandy reported a bug which has gone unfixed.
authortedu <tedu@openbsd.org>
Fri, 18 Apr 2014 15:03:20 +0000 (15:03 +0000)
committertedu <tedu@openbsd.org>
Fri, 18 Apr 2014 15:03:20 +0000 (15:03 +0000)
commita25f52752d2d86a204d2b0f6d4346d6ee88bd76c
tree253a330af54a3d13fa63d80e568229e58d5378c1
parentdaea412d19d3113cd6974b45993d185e15803c9c
Some dude named Tavis Ormandy reported a bug which has gone unfixed.
http://marc.info/?l=openssl-users&m=138014120223264&w=2
Arguably a doc bug, but we argue not. If you parse a new cert into memory
occupied by a previously verified cert, the new cert will inherit that
state, bypassing future verification checks. To avoid this, we will always
start fresh with a new object.

grudging ok from guenther, after i threatened to make him read the code yet
again. "that ok was way more painful and tiring then it should have been"
lib/libcrypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c